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


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
Palestine Liberation Organization  
Research Center  
Beirut

Gift



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August 1971

## To The Martyrs of Black September




"The Tomb of The Unknown Martyr"  
Jabal Ashrafiya - Amman

Erected by the Palestine Liberation Organization on 21 October 1970. Demolished by the Jordanian army, which claimed that the monument was erected solely to undermine the national unity of Jordan, on 31 May 1971.



The Hijack of Black September



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## PREFACE

"While it raged, the battle for Amman was one of the best-staffed but least-reported in journalistic history."\* More than one hundred foreign correspondents representing about forty news services around the world were pinned down in Amman's Jordan Intercontinental Hotel as royalist snipers kept them virtually imprisoned while the battle raged outside. Communications were completely shut down, telephone service was cut, and only after one week were some of the correspondents able to leave Jordan to report their harrowing experiences.

The whole truth about the September battle in Jordan may never be known. Before, during and after the fighting stopped, avalanches of truths, lies, exaggerations and posturings were broadcast and published to cause confusion, to camouflage real intentions and actions and to bolster morale. A consistent pattern of falsehoods in the pronouncements of many parties emerges here for all to read and to judge their credibility.

Most people have very short memories. This book is intended to provide for them a record of events, truth and lies. It is not the study of who won or who lost the battle, nor is it a historical analysis. It is simply an attempt to record some of the words spoken and written so that they will not be lost and forgotten and to show how the spoken word matches the events.

Admittedly this selection is a reflection of the Palestinian position. Most of the documentation, broadcasts and press releases, however, were taken from non-Arab sources. Our comments are intended to shed more light on the events and to give a clearer understanding to what has been quoted. The boxes scattered throughout the book will help to give background information on the events.

We believe that most of the final truths about "Black September" are now evident and hope that our presentation will bring a better and deeper understanding of those tragic events now and in the future.

**Note:** Due to the large number of quotations in this book and the various ways of transliterating Arabic names, we have deviated from the usual rule of reproducing quotations with their original spelling, and have unified names for the sake of readability.

\**Time*, 5 October 1970.



# I

## PRELUDE TO WAR

The War of 1967 ended on June 11 with a total Arab defeat and a wave of optimism sweeping over Israel. This time peace on Israel's terms would certainly be attained by the unconditional surrender of the Arabs. A new era of prosperity would open and the Israelis and Arabs would live happily ever after, as happily as victors and vanquished could.

While sitting along the Suez Canal, on the Golan Heights overlooking Damascus and along the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Israelis hoped that Amman would sign a separate peace treaty with Tel Aviv. "We're waiting for a phone call from King Hussein," said Defence Minister Moshe Dayan at the time. The call did not come through; therefore the search for a peace formula and a final political solution began.

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 which was immediately considered to be "the peaceful solution" to the Palestine problem. From then until the spring of 1970, great efforts were exercised to put the resolution into effect and Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., was appointed as special representative to U Thant, the UN Secretary General, to help the parties agree on a way of executing this resolution. But agreement was never reached and Jarring returned to Moscow. In October 1969, the United States submitted a Middle East peace proposal to the Russians. In an apparent bid to the Arab world, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers called for Israel's withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war in return for Arab assurance of a binding peace commitment. This, he said, was the essence of the American formula handed to the Soviet Union. The plan was rejected and the Soviet-American dialogue reached a dead end in December.

By mid-1968, the feda'i organizations began to escalate their activities in Israel; when Israel began to feel the pressure emanating from across the Jordan, a plan was made to attack the Palestine Liberation Movement within Jordan. Starting in November 1968, the feda'iyeen were pressed into several crises—on an escalating basis—in preparation for the "peaceful solution" between Jordan and Israel. On the fourth of the month, the first serious confrontation occurred between the feda'iyeen and the Jordanian Army.



The second serious confrontation took place in February 1970, and civil war was averted only after Hussein rescinded security measures that he himself had ordered for controlling feda'i action and freedom of movement. On February 19, President Nixon said that the United States had "gone as far as we believe useful in making new proposals until there is a response" from unnamed "other parties."

In May, the uneasy truce between the feda'iyen and the regime again became strained when eight feda'is were wounded and two captured in a clash with Jordanian forces near the ceasefire line; it was the first conflict since the agreement reached between the feda'iyen and the government of Jordan after the February clashes. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) asserted that Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil, the commander in chief of the Armed Forces and the king's uncle, had directed a plot against the liberation movement with the full support of the American Central Intelligence Agency.

During June, Amman witnessed its bloodiest days yet, when the Jordanian regime's reactionary forces, again suspected of being backed by the United States, moved to strike at the Palestine Liberation Movement. The attacks coincided with an escalation of feda'i actions inside occupied Palestine and the unification of all forces of the liberation movement under one command. Israeli casualties during this period had risen higher than at any time since the 1967 war.

Also significant was the international political climate surrounding the conspiracy. Important diplomatic and political initiatives which were being leaked out emerged with the aim of implementing the "peaceful solution."

On Sunday, June 7, 1970, the Sa'iqa (the special anti-feda'i unit of the Jordan Army) began by attacking a PFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) vehicle at Zarqa and a clash resulted in which nine feda'is were killed and ten wounded. Ten Jordanian soldiers were killed and seventeen wounded in the clashes that ensued. The "Voice of Assifa," the Cairo-based radio of Fat'h, charged the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Embassy in Amman with instigating the weekend clashes in Jordan.

Morris Draper, head of the U.S. Embassy's political section, was kidnapped and later released upon the intervention of the Unified Feda'i Command. "Outraged, the army struck back as soon as Draper's release had been negotiated the next day [Monday, June 8]. To show who was boss, Hussein's uncle, Army Commander Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil, ordered the Third Armoured Division, commanded by Zeid Ben Shaker, the king's cousin, to surround Amman and to pound known guerilla positions in outlying refugee camps as well as in the capital itself. From that point on the fighting rapidly escalated, despite ceasefire appeals from both Hussein and Yasser Arafat, leader of Fat'h, the principal commando organization."

*Newsweek*, 22 June 1970

On Tuesday, June 9, the Interior Minister of Jordan announced, "Today's regrettable incidents reached a climax when His Majesty's procession came under heavy fire near the town of Sweileh, in the outskirts of Amman, but God was merciful for this country and His Majesty escaped the treacherous fire."

UPI, 9 June 1970

This was the customary story of yet another assassination attempt on the life of King Hussein. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denied reports of an assassination attempt and said that these reports had been fabricated as usual.\*

Meanwhile Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerillas ignored the call for a ceasefire and continued to fight in the streets of Amman. Guerilla sources said it was started by the Jordanian Army's Sa'iqa, who attacked the headquarters and offices of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC). Later the fighting spread to all parts of the Jordanian capital. An agreement reached by the authorities and the feda'iyen around noon failed to go into effect. Fighting continued and the army resumed indiscriminate shelling of the refugee camps and feda'i headquarters. On Tuesday night, Amman was a city living in terror.

After the fighting started, the Northern Jordanian Army Command refused to move its troops—some 20,000—from the front lines facing Israel, when ordered to march on Zarqa and Amman. The Fat'h Cub Training Center at Baqa'a was a special target for the Armoured Brigade and Fat'h retaliated by rocket attacks against the royal palace and the Jordanian radio station. The unified forces of the Palestine Liberation Movement gained complete control of Amman and successfully repulsed all attacks by the Army. PFLP occupied the Jordan Intercontinental and Philadelphia Hotels and held sixty of their occupants, most of whom were foreigners, as hostages.

In the course of the clashes, in addition to the kidnapping of Morris Draper, Major Robert P. Perry, an American assistant Military Attaché, was killed. Mr. Yves Aubin, the Cultural Attaché of the French Embassy, was shot and wounded by a Jordanian Army patrol. "Some 200 Americans were evacuated from Jordan today after King Hussein secured calm in his battered capital by giving in to Palestinian demands."

*New York Times*, \*\* 12 June 1970

**Tuesday, June 9:** "Fat'h, the top Arab guerilla organization, charged tonight that Crown Prince Hassan, with American backing, was trying to overthrow his elder brother, King Hussein of Jordan, in bloody fighting that 'is plunging this country into civil war.'"

\*See Box 2.

\*\*Hereafter NYT.



"The latest guerilla demands included the arrest and punishment of Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil, armed forces commander and King Hussein's uncle; Zeid Ben Shaker, commander of the armoured forces; Mohammed Rassoul Kilani, intelligence chief, and Information Minister Salah Abu Zeid [and other senior army and security officers]. The guerillas charged that all of these were involved in Crown Prince Hassan's alleged plot, backed by the American Embassy, to overthrow Hussein."

*New York Herald Tribune*,\* 10 June 1970

Late that night, the Palestinian feda'iyen offered an immediate cease-fire to Jordanian officials to "spare the shedding of our blood and avoid nationwide massacres." All Arab governments were asked to intervene and the PLO put forward a five-point plan for immediate cessation of hostilities. The offer was rejected.

**Wednesday, June 10:** "The Palestinians in Jordan have a case and they have the ability to create many differences, both for their hosts, their neighbors and the enemies. It would serve the common good to make at least a serious effort to meet their real needs and to remove from the Middle East this perennial source of peril."

*NYHT*, 10 June 1970

**Thursday, June 11:** After five days of the bloodiest fighting ever between the feda'iyen and the Jordan Army, Hussein finally threw in the towel. In an emotional radio address, he yielded to the two principal feda'iyen demands and announced the dismissal of his uncle and cousin, but he warned: "This is the last chance at a settlement between us and the commandos, and there will be no other."

He did not, however, give in to the ultimatum that the two men must leave the country and at his press conference, the king professed his loyalty to both. As long as they remained in Amman, the threat of a fourth round of fighting would be present. The feda'iyen should have read the writing on the wall. The Associated Press reported that the commandos refused to be satisfied with this concession and were calling on the king to go one step further and formally renounce his commitment to a political settlement with Israel.

"The latest bloody clash between Palestinian guerillas and the Jordanian Army adds urgency to the fresh diplomatic initiatives that Secretary of State Rogers has promised in connection with any new arms aid to Israel."

\*Hereafter *NYHT*.

"The guerillas who are adamantly opposed to the United Nations resolution that is the basis of American peace hopes, have given an ominous demonstration of strength in seizing control over wide areas of central Amman. The pact King Hussein has signed with guerilla leader Yasser Arafat comes close to granting the Palestinian militants full partnership in Jordanian affairs. It could lead to a further intensification of fighting in the Jordan Valley. It may seriously impair Hussein's ability to negotiate a settlement based on the United Nations resolution."

*NYT*, 11 June 1970

**Friday, June 12:** "Amman, capital of Jordan, was reported 'quiet, but very, very tense,' with commandos and government troops watching each other warily from their respective strong points in and around the city. Fragmentary information from the city still virtually isolated from the outside world, indicated that a cease-fire declared early Wednesday and finally implemented last night was more of an uneasy truce than a final end to fighting, which has left hundreds killed and wounded."

*Christian Science Monitor*,\* 12 June 1970

The Palestinian Red Crescent (equivalent to the Red Cross) announced that at least seven hundred persons were killed and wounded.

"State Department officials noted that the position of King Hussein might have been eroded by the guerillas' rebellion and his subsequent concessions to them in dismissing two top military commanders. Information reaching here indicated the guerillas still controlled most of Amman."

Tad Szulc, *NYT*, 12 June 1970

"The general opinion here was that the king's failure to quell the guerillas by force of arms underscored the limitations of his powers and thereby contributed to its decline, since appearances count for much in Arab power politics. Many independent observers felt the . . . guerillas had, by the same token, enhanced their power and influence still further by their tough showing in the skirmishes, which were particularly bloody in the last three days."

*NYHT*, 12 June 1970

**Saturday, June 13:** "Each new crisis in Jordan leads to speculation about the possibility of a guerilla takeover in Amman. But Fat'h itself probably prefers to have King Hussein remain on the throne. It does not at this stage want the responsibility of government. Moreover, a Palestinian takeover would polarize the situation on Israel's eastern frontier, and remove the pro-Western government

\*Hereafter *CSM*.



which can still play a moderating influence in the difficult search for a peace settlement.

"Meanwhile, King Hussein is caught in a delicate balancing act. Once again he has patched up an agreement with Fat'h allowing the guerillas a broad measure of freedom. How long the agreement will last is anyone's guess. Since the guerillas are now a powerful force in his kingdom, he has no alternative but to learn to live with them somehow. But he is ruling, as it were, on shifting sands. Each new crisis points up the underlying instability of his regime."

CSM, 13 June 1970

"Not everyone was counting Hussein out so quickly, but it was clear that the week's events had badly eroded his position—and, in a sense, the position of most parties to the Mideast crisis. The Israelis may have grown somewhat more indifferent to the kind of extremists who were slipping into power behind him, some of whom made Arafat and Fat'h look like models of bourgeois respectability. For Washington, the blow was even stiffer, for Hussein represents America's last tenuous link to the Arab combatants. Until the dust cleared, in fact, Washington was inclined to move cautiously on Israel's request for additional Phantom and Skyhawk jets. Apparently the Nixon administration did mean to sell Israel some planes, but it seemed last week that the announcement might be delayed or underplayed, for fear of provoking new outbreaks of Palestinian violence.

"For Arab leaders, too, a painful sorting out process seemed in order. ... With 300,000 Palestinians of their own to worry about, and with local tensions between army troops and Palestinian guerillas mounting, Lebanese leaders could only be alarmed by the fate that had befallen Hussein. Least comforted by all, perhaps was Egypt's Nasser. His sharp differences with Hussein had long been a matter of record. But there is no doubt that the Egyptian leader valued the Jordanian monarch's moderating role as an Arab link to the U.S. and as a foil for more extremist Arab demands. Already Nasser's freedom of action is severely limited by the Russians who defend his country. And without Hussein, who has served him as a sort of lightning rod, Nasser's own position might be menaced by militant Palestinian demands."

Time, 25 June 1970

"Although most of the other Arab governments are in a stronger position than is Jordan's, each of them now has to confront the same guerilla problems. ... Something new is emerging in the Arab Middle East. What it will finally be, no one knows. But the Arab guerillas will play a major role in its final evolution."

CSM, 13 June 1970

## II

### THE DIE IS CAST

From that moment onward, Hussein, together with the members of the royal family, his personal advisers, and the Army and security officers identified with the traditionally reactionary relatives of the Hashemites, started planning for the final showdown against the Palestinians.

"'We're going to do everything we can to get negotiations started,' [said U.S. Secretary of State Rogers]. The result of this situation has been a frantic effort on the part of pro-Zionist forces in the Senate to make the President stiffen his position in support of Israel, as the balance of guerilla and air power begin slowly to swing against it.

"To forestall this imminent peril, it is essential that the diplomatic stalemate be promptly broken. To prevail, any agreement must offer to the mass of displaced Palestinians—from whom the guerillas draw their strength—a reasonably attractive alternative to the all-or-nothing struggle prescribed by the guerilla fanatics. Otherwise, events in the Middle East may soon pass beyond the control of any of the powers that have been engaged in the effort to negotiate a peaceful settlement."

Saville R. Davis, CSM, 11 June 1970

**Wednesday, June 17:** "The United Arab Republic indicated today that it was in a receptive mood to study United States initiatives aimed at a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The government's official spokesman also hinted that Cairo would welcome a visit by Secretary of State William P. Rogers for consultations if he wished to come."

Raymond H. Anderson, NYT, 18 June 1970

**Thursday, June 18:** "President Nasser has stated Egypt's willingness to negotiate through the United Nations a package peace agreement with Israel and recognize it as a state, provided it withdraws from all Arab territory it captured in 1967 and recognizes 'the rights of the people of Palestine,' in an interview for the United States National Educational Television network and Boston's station WGBH ... originally recorded in Cairo last month and broadcast in the United States June 14.



"Diplomatic observers in the Middle East considered the interview important because it reaffirmed Egypt's support for a compromise solution under the UN Security Council resolution of 1967."

John K. Cooley, CSM, 18 June 1970

**Monday, June 22:** "King Hussein of Jordan has sent his four children to safety in London but diplomatic sources yesterday discounted any political significance in the move."

AP, 22 June 1970

**Tuesday, June 23:** "Mrs. Meir said Israel would not interfere in the internal affairs of Jordan even if the Arab guerilla leader, Yasser Arafat, was proclaimed President and the country was named Palestine. ...[She] said that the repatriation of the Palestine refugees would mean the annihilation of Israel as a Jewish state."

Guardian, 23 June 1970

**Wednesday, June 24:** "President Nasser and his Arab allies, who have been meeting this past week on the problem, would have to accept negotiations on the Palestinian refugees for which there could be no perfect assurance in advance, and would have to accept jointly arranged moves with Israel instead of forcing Israel conspicuously to move first. The American initiatives seem to be headed toward arrangements that would be largely private, with only part of the iceberg appearing above the surface."

Saville R. Davis, CSM, 24 June 1970

"It is admitted here [Washington] that the Palestinians have become a power and any settlement would have to take them into account; to bring them in at this stage, the administration felt, would torpedo any chance there might be of getting a negotiation started."

Economist, 6 July 1970

"Nasser ... and ... Hussein have been saying for publication ever since 1967 that Israel must withdraw from every inch of occupied territory, but highly placed Arab sources have indicated privately that some compromises were possible. The United States proposal was made after the most recent consultations in Washington between Secretary of State William Rogers and Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union. Its main contents were said to have been in the hands of President Nasser and King Hussein when they met over the weekend in Tripoli, Libya, together with the leaders of other Arab governments. This fact is likely to reinforce the suspicion among Arab guerilla leaders that a secret purpose of the conference in Tripoli of Arab government leaders was to discuss the possibility of a new approach to a peaceful settlement."

Dana Schmidt, NYT, 24 June 1970

**Thursday, June 25:** "Fresh Middle East peace proposals put forward by the United States with at least some concurrence of the Soviet Union and other big powers may break the deadlocked Mideast crisis, diplomats here believe. U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers was expected to announce the proposals in Washington by June 25. They found a hostile advance reception from both Israel and the Palestine guerillas, but signs of serious interest from Egypt and Jordan. The mission of UN envoy Gunnar Jarring, suspended last year, would be revived to negotiate implementation of the proposals."

"Both the Palestinians and Arab diplomats here believe President Nasser of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan discussed the peace proposals, which were communicated to them and to the Israeli government at the Arab summit meetings in Tripoli, Libya, June 19-22. Most of the Arab leaders' public oratory at the Tripoli meeting concerned mobilization and eventual war against Israel. This, the Palestinians are saying, was a 'smokescreen to hide the betrayal of the Palestinian cause from their own people.'"

"Both U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism had worked long and carefully over this plan. While U.S. imperialism openly armed Israel and developed it as its clientele state, Soviet social-imperialism did likewise with Egypt."

Fateh, 15 Aug. 1970

"They (the Russians) expected Mister Nasser to persuade the guerillas to comply. ... Russians call for this procedure: the Palestinians to be given the West Bank of the Jordan and aid in resettlement as well as readmission to Israel of some Palestinians."

International Herald Tribune,\* 24 July 1970

"Leaders of the Palestinian Arabs here are showing dismay towards what one of their leaders privately called 'a sellout of the Palestinian people.' The Palestine guerillas have consistently rejected all compromise solutions through the United Nations or the big powers and have said they would fight, if necessary, against any Arab regimes trying to impose them.\*\* Leaders of Fat'h and several other guerilla groups were summoned to Amman, Jordan, late June 23 for an emergency meeting there. Any violent Palestinian reaction against the peace proposals would depend in part upon King Hussein's response. Only in Jordan, where radical guerilla movements fought King Hussein's forces last June 10 to 12 and wrested concessions from him, is the 'revolutionary situation favorable,' the Palestinians say. Though their resentment against President Nasser is equally bitter, they have little or no strength in Egypt to battle against the military and security apparatus there."

John K. Cooley, CSM, 25 June 1970

\*Hereafter IHT.

\*\*See Box 1.



## BOX 1

### WHY THE PALESTINIANS REJECT THE PEACE PROPOSAL

At no stage in the peace dialogues have the great powers, Israel, or the Arab nations consulted the Palestinians. But they made their position very clear: Palestine Liberation Organization leaders refuse the UN Resolution 242 and the subsequent "peace solutions" and proposals based upon it. Though the resolution may solve the problem of the occupying forces of Israel with Egypt and Jordan, and also with Syria if it accepts it, it is not a solution to the Palestine problem because:

- "1. The resolution deals only with the occupation of 1967, leaving standing the occupation of 1948. Such a slicing of history is arbitrary and indefensible. It means that the Zionist occupation of a part of Palestine has become respectable because it is now 22 years old, but that the 3-year old occupation is not yet respectable. The passage of time makes an occupation respectable and therefore acceptable in the eyes of the world, only if nobody fights to achieve liberation. We are fighting and will continue to struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine. We refuse the position that occupation improves through ageing, like wine;
2. The resolution deals with only half the Palestinian community, namely those who lived in 1967 in the Gaza Strip and the 'West Bank.' The other half will not be enabled to exercise the right of self-determination in any true sense—in the sense of being able to exercise sovereignty;
3. The resolution not only fails to recognize the nationhood and right of sovereignty of the Palestinian people, but it legitimizes Israel's existence and seeks to obtain our signature and seal to a confirmation of Israel's legitimacy; and
4. The resolution does not provide a realistic solution to the Palestine problem because it does not provide a formula acceptable to the Palestinians—the party first and foremost involved. It leaves our needs unfulfilled. It takes a short-term view of the whole issue, and thus can only breed long-term trouble."\*

\*Taken from an address delivered on April 15, 1970 at Central Hall, Westminster, London, by Yusif A. Sayigh, reprinted by Fifth of June Society.

"All Palestinian guerilla groups have expressed private concerns that this latest peace move has won at least the tacit approval of the Egyptian and the Jordanian governments. What has further alarmed the guerillas, whose strength in Jordan could prove a decisive factor in any attempt to push through a political settlement, is that the Arab governments have now attempted to form a cushion between them and the Jordan regime through the formation of a four-man committee to study the Jordan crisis."

Moshe Brilliant, *London Times*,\* 25 June 1970

"[An] account of the proposals [Rogers' peace initiative] is being leaked, apparently deliberately, by sources close to the Lebanese government. The government, which is among those informed in advance of the new plan, appears to have been asked by Egypt to prepare the Arab public for this new and crucial stage in Middle East peace-seeking diplomacy."

David Hirst, *Guardian*, 25 June 1970

**Friday, June 26:** "However, the slight hopes that Mr. Rogers said he now believes exist for peace talks between Israel and the Arabs under UN auspices plus the concern caused here by the battling between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian guerillas earlier this month have led him to conclude that any public mention of military aid to the Israelis could undermine the U.S. diplomatic effort. The U.S. is known to regard the Jordanian situation as highly explosive, and the latest crisis has raised fears that the announcement of new military assistance to Israel might further weaken King Hussein in his difficulties with Palestinian guerillas."

NYT, 26 June 1970

**Saturday, June 27:** "Washington officials admit that there is little new in the plan. Most of the points were rejected by the Arabs last December. There is a hope, however, that because of the heavy fighting since then, the Russian military build up in Egypt and the growing strength of the Palestine commando movement, the Arabs and the Israelis are more ready for a compromise than they were six months ago."

*Daily Telegraph*,\*\* 27 June 1970

"The biggest single factor standing between the regimes and peace in the Middle East is the Palestinian guerilla movement which, in the past eighteen months, has taken a stranglehold on the political life of Jordan and Lebanon and has a potential power of veto over pan-Arab decisions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The movement has reiterated its familiar stand against all political solutions and has made it clear that *it will fight regimes to insure its survival*."\*\*\*

\*Hereafter *London T.*  
 \*\*Hereafter *D. Telegraph*.  
 \*\*\*Italics ours.



"However, with the rise of Palestinian militancy and in view of the hopes which the feda'iyeen have instilled in Palestinian hearts farther afield than the lines of confrontation, a real solution to the Palestine problem has become imperative. Unless a solution is found, and put into effect, by both Israel and the Arabs, the Palestinian guerilla movements will not disappear overnight and neither will the Palestinian dream of creating a state which stretches from the Jordan to the Mediterranean."

Paul Martin, *London T*, 27 June 1970

"King Hussein of Jordan may find it difficult to accept the Rogers plan publicly. (This is because of the big Palestinian guerilla presence in Jordan. The Palestinians have consistently said that they will reject any compromise solution and will fight to the finish to obtain recovery of their homeland.) So, too, may President Nasser. It remains to be seen how much the latter's strident reaction in Benghazi Thursday, was merely bargaining rhetoric. Fortunately the Egyptian leader has no guerilla presence within his borders to contend with."

*CSM*, 27 June 1970

"According to Fat'h sources in Beirut, however, the differences between the commandos, who reject a peaceful settlement, and President Nasser do not prevent their sympathizing with the Egypt leader's diplomatic manoeuvring under apparent Soviet pressure for moderation. In another article, the [Fateh] newspaper said the gravest aspect of the new American initiative was that it appeared in the guise of friendship which sought to lure some Arab states into a trap. 'They would end up by finding themselves involved in committing the crime of a liquidation of the Palestine case and elimination of the Palestinian revolution' it said."

*Daily Star*, 25 July 1970

**Monday, June 29:** "The violence which broke out in Jordan during early June and which nearly toppled King Hussein from his throne, was a distressing and a worrying event to all who are working for a settlement in the Middle East. It gave Washington a reason to step up its search for a viable peace formula."

Joseph C. Harsch, *CSM*, 29 June 1970

"'Some morning,' says William R. Polk, director of the Adlai Stevenson Institute for International Affairs in Chicago, 'the United States administration may wake up and find the Middle East has gone the way of China.'"

"Mr. Polk, who drew up policy papers for President Kennedy and was active in several efforts toward Egyptian-Israeli peace talks and a search for a solution of the Palestine refugee problem, said, 'Things were much simpler in 1965. The Egyptian and Israeli positions were closer than most people realized. Even in 1968, before the big fighting began on the Suez Canal, a solution between Egypt

and Israel would have been easier than now. Now a new element has been introduced: The Palestinians. The refugees of the past are a different people. The Palestinian leadership has changed the mentality of their people as Moses transformed the Children of Israel in the wilderness. They have become a political force no one, least of all the Arab governments, can ignore.'

"He urged Israeli and United States recognition of 'the basic injustice done to the Palestinians in 1948' a move which he said would not endanger Israeli security and would help 'defuse' the conflict. Mr. Polk, like many senior American diplomats on active service here, finds that Washington is 'ignoring Arab psychology and the fact that there is a social revolution underway in the Middle East. Two revolutionary Palestinian groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic Front have announced their intention to become 'mass political parties.'

"Mr. Polk shares the opinion of numerous American scholars, diplomats, and businessmen working in this area that President Nixon's emphasis on 'military balance' in the Middle East, and neglect of the social and political problems of the Arab world will have disastrous results for American interests."

John K. Cooley, *CSM*, 17 July 1970

"In Rabat the daily *L'Opinion* said the U.S. plan can have catastrophic consequences. Under the heading 'pseudo peace plan' the paper said in an editorial: 'By continuing to ignore the aims of the Palestine resistance and the illegality of the Israeli aggression the American government can be sure that no partial nor durable peace can come about.'

"In Hong Kong the New China News Agency said ... the United States would never give up its plan to 'liquidate' the Palestinian people's armed forces. 'On the one hand, it continues to engineer fresh plots of armed suppression of the Palestinian commandos while on the other, it is intensifying its intrigue for a 'peaceful solution fraud,' the agency said.

"In Paris the leading French newspaper *Le Monde* suggested that the American peace plan could be just a tactical device to placate pro-Arab factions within the Nixon administration prior to supplying war planes to Israel."

*Daily Star*, 27 June 1970

"Meanwhile the government reshuffle in Jordan has emphasized how narrow King Hussein's room for manoeuvre will be because of Palestinian opposition to a settlement. Our Beirut correspondent reported yesterday: the Jordanian cabinet formed last night should be seen as yet another step by King Hussein to please



Palestinian commandos and maintain national unity. The sixteen-man cabinet under Premier Abdul Moneim Rifa'i includes Palestinians in important portfolios and East Bankers known for sympathy with guerillas."

*Financial Times*,\* 29 June 1970

**Tuesday, June 30:** "Egypt still prefers a peaceful solution but will not be able to withstand Arab opposition. First hints of readiness to oppose any approval came from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine whose organ in Beirut openly criticized Egypt's attitude toward peace for the first time."

*Daily Star*, 30 June 1970

Recent events convinced Hussein that any proposal aimed at solving what is called the Middle East crisis could not be realized unless the Palestinian Resistance Movement were liquidated. He, therefore, began executing a plot.

Immediate steps were taken to dismiss all nationalist army and security officers. An extensive campaign, begun earlier to arouse and brainwash the Bedouin and Jordanian army against the Palestinians, was intensified. This campaign was conducted personally by Hussein and his brothers, Mohammad and Hassan, assisted by Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil, Zeid Ben Shaker and the government and army public information establishments. He formed the Jordanian Popular Resistance; enlarged, strengthened, and rearmed the Jordanian Army Special Forces (Sai'qa) and formed his own so-called commando organizations.

"A new unit, the Third (Internal Security) Division was formed under an officer the king felt he could trust—his cousin Brig. General Zeid Ben Shaker. (This, with some additions, is the unit which has been in action against the guerillas all last week). It was to be essentially a counter-revolutionary force. The British-built Saladin, Saracen, and Whippet armoured cars were withdrawn from the front opposite Israel and, together with paratroops and special forces, retrained secretly for street fighting.

"The men, almost entirely Bedouin, were given indoctrination for their new role, built around the battle-cry *Allah, Malik, Watan* (God, king and country) with special emphasis on loyalty to Hussein and contempt for the 'athiest rebels.'"

M. Sayle and B. Moynahan, *Sunday Times*,\*\* 29 Sep. 1970

The Army's Department of Moral Guidance began the systematic praise of the Army and the Bedouin to satisfy their weakness for praise and greatness. It also began to encourage and provoke regional differences and prejudice. It brought out

\*Hereafter *Financial T.*

\*\*Hereafter *S. Times*.

a series of fictitious stories about the humiliation of the Army at the hands of the feda'iyeen and atrocities said to be committed by the feda'iyeen against the people, the Army, and the womenfolk of front-line soldiers. It even went so far as to identify the resistance movement with the Israeli enemy by claiming that feda'i action was disrupting the Arab United Front against Israel.

The king's international actions included exploitation of religion in his contacts with sponsors of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, e.g. Saudi Arabia, by claiming this was an organization infiltrated by heretics. He also began to play up to Nasser and the United Arab Republic by repeatedly referring to "his dear brother Nasser" and "big sister Egypt" while trying to justify his position on the peace talks and the peace settlement. Finally, he began undermining the Eastern Command by insisting that Iraqi troops be placed under his command.

**Saturday, July 4:** "Emotions skyrocketed last month throughout the Arab world as Palestinian freedom fighters and Jordanian regulars clashed in a series of skirmishes and mortar battles in the capital city of Amman leaving over 1,000 dead, for the most part civilians.

"In actual fact, the move came not from the feda'iyeen, but from the Jordanian special forces, one of several 'popular resistance groups' set up by Hussein's uncle, armed forces head Nasser Ben Jamil and Rassoul Kilani, former intelligence chief and Minister of the Interior. The 'special forces' are a para-military organization whose orders are for continual harrassment of the feda'iyeen and whose goal is their suppression. It is through these para-military organizations that the CIA operates in Jordan."

Elaine Klein, *Guardian*, 4 July 1970


**Wednesday, August 12:** "King Hussein of Jordan said ... (in his first public utterance since June 17—two days before the delivery of the United States proposals for a cease-fire and negotiations) that despite the opposition of the Palestinian commandos, a majority of his subjects would support 'a just and durable peace' as defined by the United Nations Security Council resolution on the Middle East of November 22, 1967."

John L. Hess, *NYT*, 12 Aug. 1970

On this point there is considerable argument. The king knew full well that the Palestinians would not support him or the UN resolution. Their support was with the commandos who—alone—were authorized to speak for the Palestinians.\*

\*"Commandos" here does not refer to the armed fighters only. It refers also to the commando organizations: the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine National Council, as well as to all the Palestinian fighters, i.e. the Palestine Liberation Movement as a whole.





"Behind you, therefore, Your Majesty, stands a whole people..."

*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 Sep. 1970

### III

## THE SHOWDOWN

By late August, the stage was set for the final showdown. "Today, Jordanian officials made known what seemed to have been an anti-commando gesture by the king: the appointment of Major General Zeid Ben Shaker as Deputy Chief of Staff."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 9 Aug. 1970

Minor clashes broke out practically every day and the atmosphere was very tense. Many felt that Jordan was on the brink of civil war. The commandos tried their best to avert a confrontation, but it was inevitable. Both national and international parties were either enticing, encouraging or threatening Hussein to eliminate the commandos and the Palestine Liberation Movement. Hussein and his allies had already taken the decision to strike.

**Thursday, August 27:** "Fighting flared briefly between Jordanian Army patrols and Palestine guerillas in the center of Amman yesterday as Mr. Yasser Arafat, the Fat'h leader, returned from talks in Cairo with President Nasser."

John Bulloch, *D. Telegraph*, 27 Aug. 1970

**Friday, August 28:** "Leaders of ten guerilla groups attended today's session of the Central Committee of the Palestinian Commando Organizations, held to complete plans for the meeting of the 112-member Palestine National Council which opens here August 27. The council acts in effect as a Palestinian legislature in exile."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 24 Aug. 1970

"The 112 delegates\* represent all the guerilla groups, plus communities on the occupied West Bank and Palestinian cultural and business organizations. A delegation from the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only political party, will attend as observers. There will also be representatives from Communist China, Albanian, North Korea, and the Black Panthers."

John Bulloch, *D. Telegraph*, 27 Aug. 1970

\*Of whom 58 are university graduates.



"The commandos have also been receiving unofficial groups of young leftist visitors, largely from France and other Western European countries, but including some from the United States."

NYT, 27 Aug. 1970

The Palestine National Council categorically rejected the U.S. sponsored initiative for a peace fraud in the Middle East known as the Rogers plan. "The Palestine National Council representing the commando organizations and other Palestinian elements, resolved to continue to escalate the Palestinian armed struggle for the complete liberation of the whole of Palestine.... The Egyptians and the Russians were yesterday heavily engaged in trying to overcome Arab opposition to their plans for finding a negotiated settlement in the Middle East."

Observer, 29 Aug. 1970

Later that week, during an interview with King Hussein, a French journalist asked the Jordanian monarch: "What do you think of the recent resolution adopted by the Palestinian National Council denouncing as a traitor anyone outside their ranks who claims to speak in the name of the Palestinian people? The king's face darkened. 'I say that at the present time, my government alone is empowered to speak in the name of the Palestinians, who are part of the big family over which I rule.'"

Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde Weekly*,\*\* 9 Sep. 1970

**Saturday, August 29:** "Palestinian commandos and Jordanian troops exchanged fire in Amman last night, after the Palestine National Congress officially rejected the American peace proposal."

D. Telegraph, 29 Aug. 1970

"The army had taken up key positions in and around Amman last week, patrolling the main streets in armoured cars with weapons at the ready ... One night early last week the Army felt itself challenged when a few militant feda'iyeen distributed pamphlets calling on soldiers to ally themselves with the guerillas. On Saturday (August 29) two Palestinians were slain in cold blood by guards as they passed by the palace."

*Le Monde W*, 2 Sep. 1970

"King Hussein defended the acceptance by Jordan and Egypt of the American initiative and said it was the invitation to start negotiations with Dr. Gunnar

\*The events to come apparently changed the king's mind. When asked why he had approved the clause in the Cairo peace agreement ending the civil war in late September that provided that the government would recognize only the Palestine Liberation Organization as representing the Jordanian Palestinian Resistance Movement, he explained: "That is enough because the Central Committee represents all the Palestinian organizations."

\*\*Hereafter *Le Monde W*.

Jarring, the UN Middle East envoy, for the realization of the Security Council resolution 'for the implementation of which we, the United Arab Republic and several other Arab states have so often called.'

"Acceptance of the U.S. peace move was a result of the American and Soviet emphasis of the danger in the area threatening the world with a terrible conflagration, he said. The king also backed the attitude of Egypt and President Nasser and said they had made the greatest sacrifices for the Arabs and Palestinians. ...The monarch threatened force against what he called the provocations from the commandos, and said the Iraqis must remain under Jordanian command. He described as a delusion the commando organizations' warning of a clash with the Jordanian authorities."

Daily Star, 30 Aug. 1970

"King Hussein of Jordan, in a television speech tonight, warned Arab commandos that 'we shall deal with any attempt to undermine our national unity with whatever means are necessary.'... He affirmed that preserving 'our entity' was 'our duty which we took upon ourselves when we assumed responsibility.' The king also confirmed reports that the inter-Arab Eastern Command had been dissolved ... The main significance of the command change is that it alters the status of the estimated 12,000 Iraqi troops now deployed in Jordan and puts them under Jordan's command. That his remarks tonight were made as a warning to the commandos was indicated by the fact that there was no particular occasion for speechmaking; *the king seemed simply to have decided that the time was ripe*. The speech was given on only a few hours' notice to the public."

NYT, 29 Aug. 1970

**Sunday, August 30:** "Heavy fighting broke out in Amman tonight between Jordanian government forces and Palestinian commandos."

UPI, 31 Aug. 1970

"In another interview, King Hussein also ruled out the prospect of immediate violence. That was on Sunday [August 30] just an hour before the shooting started. The king took an extremely harsh line against the feda'iyeen, but gave no sign he wanted to take the offensive."

"Both Hussein and the Syrian rulers fear that the Iraqi troops might ultimately be used against them instead of Israel. Indeed Baghdad is repeatedly claiming that its force in Jordan is 'at the disposal' of the guerillas, implying that the Palestinians could call in the Iraqis in the event of a showdown with Hussein."

"Meanwhile, it is widely believed that a few hard-line Jordan Army officers would like to use this moment, when the guerillas are exceptionally divided and

\*See Appendix IV.



uncertain of their way ahead, to launch an armed sweep to break the guerillas' power in the country."

Geoffrey Summer, *Times*, 30 Aug. 1970

**Monday, August 31:** "Authorities and commando groups agree on easing tension."

*Fateh*, 31 Aug. 1970

"The feda'iyeen leaders apparently fear the realization of a project for an autonomous Palestinian state in West Bank Jordan within the Hashemite kingdom. It is felt by many here that the project enjoys the backing of King Hussein, the United States and even the United Arab Republic.

"Friends of Mr. Arafat said he was deeply disappointed by his talks in Cairo with President Nasser, who reportedly 'spoke like a quitter' suggesting it would be futile to attempt to continue the struggle against the desire for peace by the majority of Palestinians and Arabs as well as the great powers. 'It is clear that time is on King Hussein's side now' a Palestinian leader remarked bitterly. 'We should have taken power last June when the entire population was with us.'"

Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde W*, 2 Sep. 1970

**Tuesday, September 1:** "Commando leaders and Jordan government ministers met in Amman last night in an effort to avert further fighting, but the guerillas and the security forces seemed to be preparing for a final battle. A newspaper put out by Fat'h claimed that the king was preparing to install a military government and to rule by martial law. There was no evidence of this.\* General Mash-hour Haditha, the Army commander, is known to favour a moderate line with the commandos, and he was at the meeting."

John Bulloch, *D. Telegraph*, 1 Sep. 1970

"King Hussein of Jordan appears determined to battle Palestinian guerillas if necessary to pursue his hope of a peaceful political solution. In a televised Saturday night [August 29] speech, King Hussein wore his uniform as Jordanian Air Force Commander. He said in firm tones that he would push forward with his policy of seeking a peaceful solution regardless of guerilla opposition."

John K. Cooley, *CSM*, 1 Sep. 1970

"All the signs are that Hussein and Nasser have decided to initiate a campaign of limitation using political, police, and occasionally military methods rather than to go all out to annihilate the guerillas. After all, there is no hurry about disarming the feda'iyeen, for the peace talks in New York are only just beginning and for the time being they look more like failing than being a quick success.

\*The military government was, in fact, formed on September 15.

"Not until there are definite signs of results will there be any urgency about curbing the guerillas' activities. Until then, the two heads of state will probably aim more at damping down polemics against peaceful solution as far as possible and seeking allies among moderate Palestinians by promising them representation at the talks."

*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zurich, 1 Sep. 1970

That evening, the Premier's office in Amman issued the following statement on Amman radio: "At 17.40 while King Hussein was proceeding in a motorcade to Amman civilian airport to welcome his daughter, Princess Aliyah, armed men opened fire at His Majesty's motorcade near the railway crossing along the Ain Ghazal road. Thanks to God's care for this steadfast country and for His Majesty, the Arab commander who is devoted to his people and homeland, the wicked hand was disappointed. Hussein will remain the symbol of the steadfastness and struggle of this homeland and will remain surrounded by the loyalty and love of his people."

Amman Home Service,\* 1 Sep. 1970

"Sources here speculated Hussein would form a military government and declare martial law as a result of the attempt on his life."

*Daily Star*, 2 Sep. 1970

Baghdad Home Service broadcast the following two reports: 18.25 GMT "The Jordanian Army began an all-out attack on Amman at 18.00 in a new attempt to strike at the Palestine Resistance. ...The refugee camps and gathering places were now being shelled by heavy and medium artillery."

19.05 GMT "The Foreign Minister summoned the Jordanian Ambassador in Baghdad at 21.00 today and requested that he ask his government to stop the measures against the feda'iyeen and feda'i action. Failing that, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army stationed on the Eastern Front would take all necessary measures to protect feda'i action."

At 21.03 GMT, the Jordanian Premier's office denied Baghdad radio reports: "The Jordanian government assures the noble people and the entire Arab nation that the situation in Jordan and the Jordanian capital is under complete control and life in the capital has begun to return to normal and calm. Any allegations or rumours about the Jordanian Army entering the capital, about the Jordanian authorities striking the feda'i action, or about the authorities' determination to liquidate this action are completely unfounded and false. Such claims and allegations are only aimed to create anxiety and disturbances and harm the public's security."

Amman HS

\*Hereafter Amman HS.



Speaking from Damascus on the Palestine Resistance Central Committee Program at 21.33 GMT, the announcer said: "The Jordanian Premier this evening issued a statement ... saying that the king was fired on. The Central Committee stresses to our Arab people everywhere that this report is not true and that it is wholly fabricated. It is meant to cover the crime committed by the authorities this evening in indiscriminately shelling Amman with artillery for the purpose

## BOX 2

### MASTER OF SURVIVAL

King Hussein has emerged unscathed from attempted assassinations, political coups, car accidents and wars. It is no wonder he has acquired the reputation of the "master of survival."

The war in Jordan came shortly after the Premier's office's statement on September 1, saying that armed men opened fire on the king's motorcade as he was driving to the airport. This story, like most previous attempts on Hussein's life, was wholly fabricated, this time to justify an all-out attack on Amman that evening as well as the civil war which was to follow. The four would-be assassins were shot in the back by the king's own guards with their Klashnikovs slung on their shoulders — muzzles down!

Three months earlier, on June 9, the Jordanian Interior Minister had announced that Hussein's procession had come under heavy fire near Sweileh. Days later, the "salted and peppered" story claimed that three of Hussein's bodyguards were killed. Though wounded, the king and his uncle, Sharif Nasser who was with him, leaped from the car and opened fire on the ambushers, six of whom were killed and one was captured. No one was permitted to see the dead or captured commandos.

"So cunning and varied and constant have been the plots against my person that sometimes I feel like the central character in a detective novel," confessed Hussein in his autobiography, *Uneasy Lies the Head*. Below is a sample of the more publicized attempts on King Hussein's life:

July 20, 1951 While accompanying his grandfather, King Abdullah, to prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Hussein had a bullet ricocheted off a tin metal on his chest. The bullet came from the gun of the young man who killed his grandfather that same day.

August, 1955	Ambushed while driving from Jerash to Amman with his uncle. Nine bullets hit his uncle's car, identical to his own, which was ahead of him. The would-be assassins were never found.
October, 1955	Poisoning attempt by U.A.R.'s Deuxième Bureau in Damascus through an assistant cook. Dead cats in the palace grounds exposed this attempt. The expert Deuxième Bureau apparently forgot to tell the cook what dose to use, so he experimented on the palace cats.
April 13, 1957	A military coup d'état attempt at Zarqa lead by Ali Abu Nawwar, his cousin Ma'an, and Ali al-Hayari—all three are now working with the king.*
April 13, 1957	Another plot the same day—a rebel officer planted dynamite under a bridge that Hussein was to drive over.
April, 1958	Assassination attempt by Major Fuad Hilal, the Egyptian Military Attache to Amman, who bribed a Jordanian trooper to do the job.
July 14, 1958	Another coup d'état attempt on the same day King Faisal of Iraq was killed.
July 15, 1958	Murder attempt by Cadet Yusuf al-Hazari.
July 16, 1958	Conspirators hoping to stage a coup d'état, including Suleiman Nabulsi, a former premier, were rounded up.**
July 17, 1958	British parachute troops were flown in from Cyprus over Israel to save the king and his throne.
September, 1958	A letter found in the safe of Yusri Kunsowa, Egyptian representative of the Joint Command of Arab Armies proving complicity in an assassination plot and Jordan takeover.



- Nov. 10, 1958 Air attack by two U.A.R. Mig jets while flying to Europe. Described by Hussein as "the narrowest escape from death I have ever had."
- 1959 Another conspiracy by Chief of Staff of Jordan's Armed Forces, General Sadek al-Shara'a, to overthrow the regime.\*\*\*
- August 29, 1960 Bomb in office of P.M. Haza'a Majali—after the first one killed the Prime Minister, a second one went off—after Hussein was stopped from going into the office.
- August 30, 1960 Deadly poison found in nose-drop bottle which Hussein used regularly for his sinus condition.
- September, 1967 During the "Rumman Hill Climb" motor race which Hussein invariably won, his car hit the iron rail. He later claimed that someone had engineered the accident.
- June 9, 1970 Ambush near Sweileh.
- Sep. 1, 1970 Ambush by commandos on Ain Ghazal road.
- Sep. 22, 1970 Shelling by commandos of his palace at Hummar.

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Where are the plotters now?

\*Ali Abu Nawwar is now Ambassador of Jordan in France.

Ma'an Abu Nawwar is now Director of Moral Guidance, Army Headquarters, Jordan.

Ali al-Hayari is now Ambassador of Jordan in U.A.R.

\*\*Suleiman Nabulsi is now an appointed member of the king's own Advisory Council as well as the Chairman of the Jordanian National Bloc.

\*\*\*Sadek al-Shara'a is now Director of the Department of Passports, Jordan.

## AMMAN BROADCAST: AUGUST 28, 1970



"It is expected that there will be an attempt on His Majesty's life tomorrow afternoon at 17.40 when His Majesty proceeds to welcome his daughter who will be returning from abroad, and His Majesty will narrowly escape this attempt... as usual... thanks to God's care. This attempt will be followed by fierce fighting between the feda'iyeen and our forces..."

*Al-Ahram*, 11 Sep. 1970

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of confusing and preoccupying our masses and those of the Arab nation. The case is wholly fabricated. The truth is that the Central Committee headquarters was the target of direct shelling when it was in session. A large number of people were wounded as a result and some were killed."

At 23.00 GMT, the announcer reported: "The [Red Crescent] Society's main headquarters at Jabal al-Hussein received a direct hit during artillery shelling of Hussein camp and the Red Crescent center."

Forty minutes later, the PLO Central Committee decided to call on the Arab League Council to convene in an emergency session to discuss the Jordanian Army attack.

**Wednesday, September 2:** "Fat'h claimed that the assassination attempt was a fiction designed to justify the onslaught on the Palestinians. As in June, it accused the Army, including units stationed in the royal palace grounds, of using



tanks, mortars, and artillery against refugee camps. For its part, the regime denied, for the umpteenth time, any intention of crushing the guerilla movement."

David Hirst, *Guardian*, 2 Sep. 1970

"The mass circulation evening paper [in Israel] *Maariv* said ... the threat to King Hussein's regime in Jordan casts doubts on the validity of any commitment he might make in the current Middle East peace talks in New York. 'Since the king does not control either the commandos or the foreign troops in his country, what will be the value of the guarantees and promises Jordan might make in the coming talks.'"

Reuters, 2 Sep. 1970

At 5.00 GMT Israel radio broadcast a similar theme: "*Hamodia Agudat Yisrael* sees the important question for Israel as being whether King Hussein and his cabinet can represent Jordan in the Jarring talks. Israel should not be obliged to come to an agreement with a tottering kingdom under the sway of the terrorists who threaten war against her ..."

The first serious threat of intervention was broadcast at 11.00 GMT: "Baghdad radio said that Vice President Hardan Abdul-Ghaffar (Tikriti) of Iraq had declared that the Iraqi Army would remain at the front 'to support the feda'iyen' and that it would 'teach those who tried to harm feda'i action an unforgettable lesson.'"

Amman's reply came at 11.28 GMT: "The Jordanian government has repeatedly emphasized that it always supports and defends feda'i action. Hence, it totally refutes all the relevant charges contained in the Iraqi note."

Then Israel radio, capitalizing on the situation, broadcast at 12.00 GMT: "*Yedi'ot Aharonot* says: So long as the struggle in Jordan was between Hussein and the terrorists, we were content with being an outside observer. Iraq's direct intervention radically changes the situation, however."

18.39 GMT "Extreme tension prevails in and around Amman. Large units of the Jordanian army are still besieging the capital. ... Zeid Ben Shaker was moving a number of Jordanian Army units to besiege one of our camps near Amman and shell it heavily. Bringing Zeid Ben Shaker back to the post of Deputy Chief of Staff and to the Operations Department has more than one meaning. It means, first and foremost, that the authorities are still determined to strike and liquidate the Resistance preparatory to imposing the surrender solutions on our Arab masses."

Baghdad "Voice of the Palestine Revolution"\*

\*Hereafter "VPR".

**Friday, September 4:** "Amman returns to normal as fighting flares in garrison town of Zarqa. Thirty commandos are killed by Jordanian Army artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire."

*Fateh*, 17 Sep. 1970

"Several enigmas could determine the outcome of the current conflict between King Hussein of Jordan and the Palestinian guerillas. They concern the role of Iraqi troops in Jordan, the possibility of other outside interference in the conflict, and the part played by extremist elements on both the royal and the guerilla sides.

"King Hussein is believed to have sent an envoy to Baghdad September 1. His message was a request that Iraq either assure its neutrality in the Jordanian conflict or withdraw Iraqi forces.\*

About 2000 Pakistani military personnel are in Jordan training Jordanian Air Force officers and bolstering anti-aircraft defenses. Pakistan's pro-Chinese leftist opposition, the Pakistan People's Party, wants the military government of General Yahya Khan to withdraw Pakistanis from a position where they might become involved in the conflict against the guerillas."

"The PLO Central Committee asked Arab League Secretary-General Abdul Khalek Hassouna to convoke an urgent meeting of the Arab League Council. The PLO asked the league to 'discuss measures to halt massacre and civil war in Jordan.'"

John K. Cooley, *CSM*, 4 Sep. 1970

**Saturday, September 5:** "Amman radio said that the Jordanian government had informed the Arab League Secretary-General of its decision to attend the emergency meeting in Cairo of September 5. At 04.00 GMT on September 4, Baghdad radio reported that Iraq sent delegates to the meeting. ... Mustafa al-Sayyid, the Foreign Minister ... had stated that Syria would attend the [emergency] meeting [of September 5 in Cairo] 'because we realise that conspiracies and attempts to strike the Palestine Resistance are increasing along with the escalation of attempts to impose the plans aimed at imposing capitulation on the Arab nation.' The Minister was said to have stated that Syria would stand by the Palestine Resistance until victory, express its views at Arab League Council meetings, expose plotters against the Palestine Resistance and 'ask them to stop plotting.'"

Arab League Council Meeting

\*It is now a known fact.



At 17.55 GMT the Libyan News Agency broadcast: "The Libyan Arab Republic has decided to suspend its subsidy to Jordan until the critical situation between the Jordanian Army and the feda'iyeen has been cleared up. This was announced at midday today by the official spokesman of the Revolution Command Council. Libya gives Jordan financial assistance of about £9,000,000 a year as part of its commitment to Arab coordination agreed at the Khartoum Conference of 1967."

"King Hussein's government, whose proclaimed objective is now to restore the agreement with the feda'iyeen which ended the June clash, finds itself in an extremely delicate situation. The agreement requires the government, in exchange for feda'iyeen observance of Jordanian law and order, to support the commando movement—which is dedicated to thwarting the peace talks in which Jordan is engaged in New York."

*Daily Star*, 5 Sep. 1970

**Sunday, September 6:** Cairo radio reported at 20.00 GMT: "The Arab League Council opened an emergency session at 19.30 today to discuss the crisis between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestine Resistance Organizations."

In order to disclaim the Palestinians' charges, King Hussein broadcast this statement from Amman at 21.00 GMT: "I would like to assert that I have always thought, felt, and acted through my faith in my responsibility and my realization of my duty without aspiring to position or to riches. All my cares stem from my belonging to my country and my nation. I want my country to be the best, the most impregnable, and the strongest. I want my nation to be the best, most civilized and most glorious ... I had only just assumed responsibility when I placed my throne and my life in the hands of fate and sought to achieve a long-cherished wish. I Arabised the Army so that it would be my country's means of support for the Arab cause—foremost of which is the Palestine cause."

"The Resistance is in the arena with our full approval and is the object of our appreciation, support, and patronage. We helped it from the beginning and protected it so it could grow and get stronger. And because it is part of us, we cared for it as we care for our sons, daughters, and sisters. Because the Resistance is of the people and belongs to them, there is no room for thinking of liquidating the Resistance, and we shall never think of that."

Amman HS

The Iraqi Industry Minister, Taha al-Jazrawi was not convinced. At 23.00 GMT, he broadcast Iraq's refusal to place Iraqi forces under the command of King Hussein because "he had accepted the Rogers plan."

Baghdad HS

"Despite Saturday's [September 5] agreement between the government and the Palestinian guerillas to hold back their forces in Amman after several clashes last week, fighting began in various provincial towns at the weekend and spread to the capital today. The weekend clashes added seventy more casualties to the two hundred suffered in Amman last week."

"Observers said it was believed that the weekend clashes have prompted King Hussein to make an unscheduled broadcast last night—*his third in eight days*—in which he denied that he was seeking to liquidate the commando movement. 'I will not remain silent in the face of doubts and accusations that are aimed at the people and the army.' The king was referring to guerilla claims that his regime was out to deal the Resistance movement a death blow."

*IHT*, 6 Sep. 1970

"After the king's tough speech last night, the Central Committee of the guerilla movement declared that there would be no formal meeting with the government, and no statement calculated to lower the temperature, until the army units were withdrawn from positions round the capital and until all 'vicious elements' were purged from the armed forces."

David Hirst, *Guardian*, 6 Sep. 1970

"The harried Jordanian government, bowing to Arab guerilla demands announced today that it ordered the 'pulling back of military units around the capital ... to their training centers in order to put an end to the appearance of military personnel near the capital and the appearance of armed men from various organizations in the city.'"

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 6 Sep. 1970

**Monday, September 7:** "All fourteen countries in the Arab League put their weight behind an endeavor to find a formula to end the strife in Jordan between the Palestinian commandos and the Jordanian armed forces. The Arab League Council ... reactivated a four-nation committee ... made up of representatives of the United Arab Republic, Libya, the Sudan, and Algeria."

Raymond H. Anderson, *NYT*, 9 Sep. 1970

At 12.02 GMT a joint statement by the Jordanian government and the PLO Central Committee was broadcast, in which they agreed upon: "a final and imme-



diate cease-fire," "immediate removal of armed men and all members of the feda'i organizations from Amman streets, city entrances and main roads," and a "ban on the molesting of any member of the armed forces or of the feda'i organizations by any party."

At 19.00 GMT the following announcement was heard over Amman radio: "The Premier's office wishes to inform the citizens that reports received by the government today from all over the kingdom emphasise that the situation has been completely calm."

**Tuesday, September 8:** "At noon on September 8 Amman radio broadcast the text of the cease-fire agreement concluded by the Jordanian government and the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee. It said later that the agreement had been signed by Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, the Jordanian Premier and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Central Committee. At 19.00 GMT the radio reported comment by Lt. Gen. Mashhour Haditha, the Jordanian Chief of Staff, who announced that he had ordered the armed forces to adhere to the agreement in both letter and spirit.

"King Hussein has broadcast to the nation three times in the last ten days, each time reassuring the commandos that he did not aim to liquidate their revolution as the price of a peace settlement with Jordan [sic]."

*Daily Star, 9 Sep. 1970*

The calm did not last. The following reports were broadcast at 20.15 GMT from Damascus: "The Fat'h information office here issued a statement tonight announcing fresh clashes between the Palestine Resistance forces and Jordanian troops in Irbid and other places in Jordan. The statement says that armoured units of the Jordanian Army 40th Brigade attacked Resistance bases in Kafar Asad, Tayyibah, Samad, Wadi al-Arab and Deir Abu Sa'id at noon today. The attackers shelled the feda'i bases after surrounding the area with tanks. The first count of feda'i losses tonight stood at 25 killed and 17 wounded."

And at 22.15 GMT: "A Palestine Resistance Central Committee spokesman announced in Amman tonight that in view of the bloody events in Irbid and elsewhere, the Palestine Resistance has decided to consider the joint statement issued yesterday by the Jordanian government and the Central Committee as null and void because the Jordanian authority has violated this agreement."

Damascus HS

### BOX 3

#### THE HIJACK AFFAIR

On September 7, 1970, a PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) spokesman announced that PFLP commandos had hijacked three commercial airplanes: a Swissair DC-8 with 155 passengers and crew, a TWA Boeing 707 with 155 passengers and crew and a Pan American Boeing 747 jumbo jet with 170 passengers and crew.


The jumbo jet was taken to Cairo Airport and blown up after all passengers and crew had disembarked. The other two planes were taken to "Revolution Airport" in Jordan, an airstrip 45 miles in the desert east of Amman.

Two days later, on September 9, a fourth plane, a BOAC VC-10 with 115 passengers and crew was hijacked and taken to "Revolution Airport."

All passengers and crews were taken as hostages by PFLP. The spokesman added that under civil law, the area belonged to nobody. It was a PFLP base guarded by PFLP fighters and controlled by PFLP commandos. Notice was given that, "if anyone tried to approach the airfield, PFLP would blow up the aircraft and passengers," and they listed their conditions for releasing the planes and passengers.\*

\*For complete details on the hijackings see Appendix I.





IHT, 14 Sep. 1970

#### IV

### Brink of Civil War

**Wednesday, September 9:** "Jordan last night was on the brink of civil war as the capital, Amman, became a battlefield of exploding shells, mortar bombs and machine gun fire. All communications from the city have been cut. Power is off. It is impossible to move through the streets. In the city's leading hotel, the Intercontinental, more than 200 guests—mostly foreigners—are pinned in the basement shelters."

John Bulloch, *D. Telegraph*, 9 Sep. 1970

"In Amman, Reuters reported the capital was paralyzed and the country apparently on the brink of total chaos. The news agency said King Hussein was facing the country's gravest crisis since the June 1967 war, and that he entrusted full powers to General Haditha, the only military leader trusted by the commandos, after an emergency cabinet meeting today.

"A committee of the Arab League was reported trying to reach Amman in an effort to mediate a truce, but the airport was turning away flights today.

"After a day of fierce fighting, the radio of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization broadcast a committee statement calling for a purge of 'rotten elements' and the creation of a 'national Jordanian government as the only one capable of maintaining law and order.'"

John L. Hess, *NYT*, 9 Sep. 1970

"There was no immediate report of army casualties in the worsening conflict which moved King Hussein to vest full military powers in his Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mashhour Haditha. The young general, known to be pro-Palestinian, immediately radioed orders to all army units throughout the country to 'cease shooting at once or face severest military penalty.'

"The government afterwards announced it was conducting an urgent inquiry into the causes of the new fighting Tuesday and Wednesday. It resulted in the collapse of a seven-point agreement between the two sides only ten hours after it was announced. A government spokesman said Army officers responsible for the attacks on commando bases in the north Jordanian town of Irbid will be punished.



"Wednesday's investiture of full military powers in Gen. Haditha evidently pleased the commandos. In his statement ordering commandos to cease fire, Arafat paid tribute to Haditha's 'swift action to bring bloodshed to an immediate end.' Before the new cease-fire was ordered Arafat had dispatched telegrams to King Hussein and presidents of Arab countries to intervene personally to halt 'the new bloodbath' in Jordan."

*Daily Star*, 10 Sep. 1970

**Thursday, September 10:** 15.30 GMT "... The granting of full powers to the Jordanian Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Mashhour Haditha is the last chance for those in authority who claim that they care for the lives of the masses and that they are sincere in their call for a return to normal. The Chief of Staff now has the responsibility of purging the Army and all its affiliated organs of all plotters and enemies of the revolution and the people. He also has a responsibility of trying in public before the masses all those who have committed massacres so that they will receive their due punishment for the bloodshed they have caused and the crimes they have committed."

"At the same time, the Chief of Staff has the responsibility of sending the whole army back to the front, after purging it and reorienting it to resume its role of defending Jordan—the land and the people—and of fighting the Zionist enemy. If the full powers vested in the Chief of Staff enable him to fulfill these demands, then normal life will be restored."

Baghdad "Voice of Assifa"\*

"The guns fell silent in Amman Thursday morning as King Hussein's government and the Palestine commandos put into force their third cease-fire agreement in five days. The agreement is basically the same as the ones reached last Saturday and on Tuesday. Neither lasted more than a few hours before fighting broke out again, Wednesday's battles being the most fierce in the city in any of the four crises that have rocked Jordan since November, 1968."

"The key figure on the government side at the high-level talks Thursday was the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Mashhour Haditha ... His task now is to maintain discipline over the tank and artillery units led by hardline officers who the commandos say bombarded commando bases in defiance of higher orders after the two previous cease-fires."

*Daily Star*, 10 Sep. 1970

\*Hereafter Baghdad "VA".

**Friday, September 11:** "British nationals acting on Foreign Office advice yesterday began leaving Jordan after another night of fierce clashes between Army troops and Palestine guerillas."

*Financial T.*, 11 Sep. 1970

"The British Embassy has already advised any Britons without urgent business to leave Amman. Only newspapermen have ignored the advice."

Peter Berkett, *Sunday Telegraph*,\* 13 Sep. 1970

All Germans in Jordan had left Amman by September 11.

**Saturday, September 12:** "The next round between King Hussein and the guerillas—it is inevitable—will probably be activated more by what happens at the New York peace talks than by events out at 'Revolution Airport.'\*\* The Palestinian guerillas and the king seem to be on a fundamentally irreconcilable course."

"Peace hangs by a slender thread. There are conflicting views on where Hussein stands in relation to his Army hotheads and the guerillas. Some people believe that only by standing aside—or holding the ring, as he seemed to do this week when he handed over power temporarily to his loyal and moderate Chief of Staff, General Haditha—can he preserve the delicate balance."

"Others however see him as an unchallenged master in his own house, as determined as his right wingers to crush the guerillas. But they say, *he has to play the game until the time is ripe for action. And then he will strike.* Whichever theory is correct, the final outcome is likely to be the same costly tragedy, for the fundamental aims of the two sides are too contradictory to permit a workable compromise. A new element of bitterness between the two sides, reflected vividly in Fat'h's newspaper, has made an effective compromise less likely than ever. The latest round of fighting was not as bad as the June flare-up, but it took the threatened resignation of General Haditha, who enjoyed the trust of the guerillas, and his subsequent investment with full powers to stop the fighting developing into a full-scale civil war."

John de St. Jorre, *Observer*, 13 Sep. 1970

At 17.30 GMT was broadcast the result of a session of the Jordan National Congress's follow-up committee. They reported that certain people among the authorities were exercising actual control over the State's major departments—especially in the Jordanian Armed Forces, the Public Security, and the General Intelligence Service, and that they were the cause of the "previously perpetrated

\*Hereafter *S. Telegraph*.

\*\*See the Hijack Affair, Appendix I.



massacres in the country." The follow-up committee announced that those "corrupt" people would lead the country into a civil war in which "thousands of civilians, fighters, and soldiers will fall victim." It then expressed support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization Central Committee's statement of September 10, 1970, on the need to purge this danger from Jordan.

In England: "Twice last week, Princess Muna was preparing to take the children home to Jordan for what remained of the summer holidays before the two princes start autumn term next week at their boarding school in Surrey. Each time, a personal call from King Hussein, with whom she has been in daily touch by telephone, advised her to cancel arrangements."

Winifred Carr, *D. Telegraph*, 12 Sep. 1970

**Sunday, September 13:** "Jordanian troops and Palestine commandos clash in Irbid. Twelve commandos are killed when troops open fire from 106 mm. guns on their two vehicles."

*Fateh*, 17 Sep. 1970

"The Jordanian Army and units of the Palestine Liberation Army fought what was described as a 'bloody clash' in northern Jordan yesterday. Several were killed on each side, Amman radio reported. The radio said Jordanian Army headquarters had taken strict measures against those responsible. It was the first reported troop-guerilla clash since the two sides agreed to cease fire on Thursday after two weeks of sporadic fighting."

Associated Press, 13 Sep. 1970

**Monday, September 14:** "The U.S. is said to feel now that the monarch has lost effective control of Jordan, and that unless action against the commandos is taken now, the commandos sooner or later would seize control of the government in Amman."

"Informed sources said King Hussein reinstated Zeid Ben Shaker under pressure from the royal family, and after the king's militant advisers persuaded the monarch that following their falling-out with President Nasser, the commandos were on the defensive and that it would be easy to deal with them. General Ben Shaker immediately after his reappointment ordered the Third Armoured Brigade, which he commanded before the king dismissed him last June, into action against the commandos."

"As chaos set in inside Amman, King Hussein's attitude changed to one of reconciliation with the commandos. But he could not get the Third Brigade to abide by the cease-fire, as officers of the brigade continued to insist on taking their orders from Ben Shaker."

*Financial T*, 15 Sep. 1970

18.30 GMT "Masses of our great Arab nation, the Voice of Assifa comes to you from free Algeria in order to resume its contact with the Arab masses on the road of the Palestine Armed Revolution and in the cause of eliminating the existence of Zionism. The Voice of Assifa cannot be stifled or stopped."\*

*Fateh*, 21 Aug. 1970

**Tuesday, September 15:** "A strange calm descended on the Jordanian capital early this week. Outwardly the town had resumed its normal aspect, but tension crackled everywhere. People were edgy, expecting further eruptions of violence at any time. Few children were going to school. Families were laying in supplies of food in preparation for new fighting that would isolate Jordan from the outside world."

"King Hussein reportedly again hardened his position. Arabs who saw him over the weekend found him adamant, determined to have his way and quickly. They quoted him as saying 'My army is getting impatient.' The king is understood to have decided to deliver a 'final warning' to the Central Committee of the Palestinian Resistance. The CCPR—in which Fat'h plays a key role—has also been forced to adopt a firm line. Everything indicates that it would have preferred to call off the trial of strength with the Jordanian authorities. But in many parts of the country, feda'iyen are being murdered or assaulted by Jordanian forces."

Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde W*, 16 Sep. 1970

"The latest round of fighting between the Jordanian Army and Palestinian commandos has led to complete liquidation of commando presence in southern Jordan, commando sources told me Monday. They feared that the clashes were part of a long-term plan to liquidate the whole commando movement gradually and noted that in Irbid where the commandos repelled an attack last week, special forces returned to attack the resistance elements Sunday."

"Following demonstrations against Palestinian commandos in such towns and villages as Ma'an, Shobak, Karak, and Tafileh, the clashes followed the same pattern. First, the army softened up the commandos by shelling their bases outside inhabited areas, then moving on them, while inside Bedouins and special forces attacked commando offices. By the end of the fighting over 70 commandos,

\*Algeria joined Syria and Iraq in permitting the PLO Central Committee to broadcast radio programs. The committee had faced opposition previously from Egypt and the Sudan. In July, after Nasser accepted the Rogers peace initiative, Cairo's 'Voice of Assifa' began to attack the plan. The Egyptian authorities counteracted by closing the station on July 28. The PLO continued broadcasting from Khartoum, Sudan, until they were told to submit their programs to censorship in mid-August, aimed at "ensuring that the programs did not conflict with Sudan's acceptance of the latest U.S. Middle East proposals."



according to commando estimates, were killed, many others were injured and a number were taken prisoners. All their offices and bases were overrun."

*Daily Star*, 15 Sep. 1970

"From Beirut, Harold Jackson cables that reports from commando sources say that the guerillas have been virtually eliminated in the south of Jordan. They accuse King Hussein of arming the Bedouin tribes and training them to operate against the Palestinians. According to these reports, a meeting of Bedouin leaders agreed to act against the commandos."

David Hirst, *Guardian*, 15 Sep. 1970

At 12.42 GMT, the Syrian Arab News Agency reported: "According to reliable reports received by feda'i sources here today, the Zionist enemy has been making large-scale military movements towards the cease-fire lines. According to these reports, troop-carriers were seen this week for the first time moving to northern Palestine. The enemy has also transported large numbers of field batteries toward the front lines. This confirms earlier reports that the Zionist enemy is preparing for fresh aggression with the cooperation of the imperialist circles which have lately threatened to invade the area."

On Tuesday, September 15, a new agreement was signed by Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, the Jordanian Prime Minister, and the PLO to end the four weeks of intermittent clashes which had claimed a casualty toll of over 600.

Amin Shible, chairman of the five-member committee made the following statement on the Jordanian-PLO agreement at 21.00 GMT over Amman radio: "It pleases me to announce to the Jordanian citizens and the Arab nation that an agreement was reached today between the Jordanian government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation under the supervision of the five-member committee to remove all appearances of tension in Amman and other Jordanian towns as from Wednesday morning, September 16, 1970."

"But the agreement—like all the others in the past—was doomed to instant failure. Two hours after the cease-fire was announced on radio Amman, [Prime Minister] Rifa'i (who along with a group of moderate Palestinians had been appointed in June as a concession to the feda'iyeen) was out of office. According to one Moslem diplomat, when Rifa'i presented the agreement to Hussein in a late-night meeting in the palace, the king cried, 'I've been betrayed,' and immediately dismissed the government. Other palace sources, however, said that the Army was responsible for the government's ouster. Incensed by what they considered yet another humiliating retreat, top military officials demanded Hussein's support and threatened to overthrow him if he balked. After three hours of haggling, Hussein agreed to the palace coup."

*Newsweek*, 28 Sep. 1970

"The first urgent intelligence that the region was on the brink of convulsion arrived in Washington on the night of September 15, as many of the administrations' highest officials gathered in Virginia's Airlie House to honor Defence Secretary Melvin Laird, who was given a 'Statesman in Medicine' award. Henry Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, received word that *Hussein had marshalled his troops for a showdown with the feda'iyeen*,\* that civil war in Jordan was imminent, and that the British Foreign Office was on the London-Washington line asking what the U.S. planned to do about it."

*Time*, 5 Oct. 1970

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\*Italics ours.



## V

### THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

On September 15, Hussein addressed a letter to Brigadier Mohammed Daoud assigning him to the post of Premier and instructing him to form a "provisional military cabinet to work to frustrate the 'hostile plan,'\* to restore the correct state of affairs, to ensure security, restore order and impose the state's authority and protection on its subjects, and to *protect the Resistance from the same 'hostile plan' and achieve positive and effective cooperation with it.*"

**Wednesday, September 16:** At 03.35 GMT, Cairo radio reported the following press headlines: "Fierce fighting has broken out in Amman between the Resistance and the Army despite all efforts"; "Fierce fighting creates a serious crisis in Jordan"; and "Conflicting reports on cabinet resignation prior to formation of a military cabinet."

At 04.00 GMT, Amman radio broadcast King Hussein's letter to Brig. Mohammad Daoud instructing him to form a "provisional military cabinet." In subsequent broadcasts the radio gave the decree naming the ministers in the new government; reported Lt. Gen. Mashhour Haditha's letter of resignation to King Hussein; and announced the appointment of Field Marshal Habis Majali as Commander in Chief and of various officers as provincial governors. At 06.00 GMT King Hussein broadcast a call for unity. At 06.42 GMT the radio broadcast "an important statement" calling for public support for the new government in its task of restoring order. At 07.43 GMT it broadcast a short appeal to the feda'iyeen for discipline, unity and the removal of arms from the militia.

In a speech to his "brother citizens" on Amman radio at 06.00 GMT, "the king ... said that the military government should cooperate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Arafat, and the Palestine Liberation Army of which Arafat was recently made Commander in Chief. This appeared to be an attempt by the king to isolate the extremist sections of the resistance movement, but the speedy reaction of the Central Committee seemed to rule out this possibility.

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\*The 'hostile plan' to which Hussein refers in this letter and in later communiques is a secret threat he claims has been directed against both the Resistance Movement and the Jordanian regime.



BOX 4

JORDAN'S PRIME MINISTERS AND CABINETS ..  
AN ELITE FRATERNITY

Since the June 1967 War, King Hussein has changed prime ministers and cabinets as one changes clothes.

Sa'd Jum'ah was appointed on 23 April 1967. He resigned on 2 August 1967. But having won the war for Jordan, he was asked to form a new cabinet on 2 August 1967 which lasted until 7 October 1967. On 7 October 1967 Bahjat al-Talhuni formed a cabinet which lasted until 24 March 1969. Abdul Moneim Rifa'i formed the next cabinet which lasted until 12 August 1969 and again Bahjat al-Talhuni was asked to form another cabinet which lasted until 27 June 1970 when he resigned following the June five-day battles and confrontation between King Hussein and the Palestinian commandos. Abdul Moneim Rifa'i was again appointed on 27 June 1970 and he was dismissed on 15 September 1970 as the result of an agreement he signed with the Palestinian commandos the same day.

On 15 September 1970 Brig. Mohammad Daoud was appointed Premier of a military cabinet. He resigned on 26 September 1970 while in Cairo as the king's representative to the Arab summit talks. He requested, and was granted, political asylum from Col. Kaddafi, leader of Libya.

On 26 September 1970, Ahmad Toukan formed a half-military, half-civilian government, but was asked to resign on 28 October 1970 when a new government was formed under the premiership of Wasfi Tal.

"The word was being spread that the aims of the new cabinet were to ensure that the Army obeyed orders not to attack the guerillas. But the commandos would not accept this. They saw the hand of their arch-foe King Hussein's uncle, Sherif Nasser Ben Jamil, behind the new appointments."

J. Bulloch, J. Mossman, G. Kemp, *Guardian*, 15 Sep. 1970

The king had convinced himself that he would restore order to Jordan—even if he had to liquidate the Palestinians and destroy much of his capital city in the process. An official announcement said martial law had been declared and a curfew was imposed on Amman and Zarqa.

At 16.00 GMT King Hussein's letter to the new Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Habis Majali was broadcast on Amman radio: "I extend to you a greeting of confidence and brotherhood of arms, a greeting to one of our best men ... a soldier who is an example of dignity and honour and an example of a father whom all his children feel is anxious to preserve their dignity and character, a soldier who is anxious to keep them as good military men in honour, purity and manliness.

"In entrusting you with the position of Commander in Chief, with the public security forces placed under your command, I hand the trust over to you. This trust is our armed forces which is to me, my life, the life of the people and the nation and the hope of everyone. I have complete confidence in your ability fully to discharge your duty. Our country is passing through a dangerous stage and is facing a menace aimed against it and our entire nation, its future and cause. I therefore expect you to fulfil your role with military discipline and precision in facing any challenge or any evil destructive attempt."

Majali replied: "I present to My Lord, His Exalted Majesty, my profound loyalty and lasting affection together with my extreme pride for the supreme royal confidence in appointing me to the post of Jordanian Commander in Chief, particularly in these difficult conditions for our dear country which are posing a great menace to this country and our entire Arab nation. The loyalty to your throne and dedication to Your Majesty for which I have been known, My Lord, are a product of my belief in the mission of the throne and its sovereign, and stem from my appreciation for the great services the Hashemite family has rendered to the Arab nation in general and to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in particular. These brilliant services have reached the peak and continued to shine since God's will wanted Your Majesty to take over the reins of leadership in this country and the trust and responsibility of governing it.

"We have known you, My Lord, since that old day, as the father of the people, their protector and guide, and as supreme commander of the Army, you dedicated to the glory of your homeland and nation...

"... The Jordanian armed forces—whose glories you have always lauded, you, the maker of these glories, and in whose valiance and heroism you take pride, you, the symbol of this valiance and heroism—remain the same as you have known them all your life. They remain an example of fidelity to you and loyalty to your throne.

"Your will, My Lord, was that I return to my post commanding the armed forces. I am confident that with the continuous guidance and permanent compassion of Your Majesty, I shall keep the trust in the manner which pleases Your



*Majesty, God, and the homeland. I shall discharge my task in accordance with the dictates of my duty as a faithful Jordanian Arab soldier.*"\*

Amman HS

"By placing Jordan under military rule, King Hussein has deliberately gambled with the prospect of full-scale civil war."

Kenneth Clarke, *D. Telegraph*, 17 Sep. 1970

"Of course Hussein cannot seriously hope to stand aside from the direct confrontation between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian guerillas which seems certain to follow the appointment of this hardest-of-hard-line cabinets. The Army officers have declared their plans to strike 'with an iron fist' against all troublemakers."

*Financial T*, 17 Sep. 1970

"Hussein's move in placing Jordan under martial and fascist control followed an interview with the Paris-based *Le Figaro* in which he announced 'The situation cannot go on ... there must be peace or war [with the feda'iyeen].' Radio Amman told the armed forces 'the government is now in your hands.'

"Mr. Arafat called for the formation of a 'national coalition government in which the guerillas, the people, and all other elements in the country would be represented.' This is the first time that the guerillas have asked for a representation in Jordan's central government. Hitherto they have maintained that such office would impair the progress of the 'Palestine Revolution.'

"In recent fighting in the north of Jordan, guerillas have taken control of the city of Irbid and the important town of Zarqa, fifteen miles north of Amman, where the country's sole oil refinery is situated."

*Fateh*, 17 Sep. 1970

"Before martial law was declared, the General Union of Palestinian Workers backed by the Central Committee [and the Jordanian National Congress follow-up committee] called for a strike to begin this weekend and to last until King Hussein met guerilla demands.\*\* Jordan's General Federation of Petroleum Workers and Employees, which has 15,000 members, at least 75 percent of them Palestinian, said it would back the strike. The refinery is supplied with crude oil from Saudi Arabia by a pipeline..."

\*Italics ours.

\*\*This, in fact, was the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples' declaration of civil disobedience.

"Mr Arafat, leader of the major Fat'h commando organization, sent messages to Arab heads of state asking for their intervention in the crisis. The Central Committee also lifted suspension from the committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, originally ousted for carrying out the hijacking of three Western airlines and 400 passengers last week."

CSM, 17 Sep. 1970

Yasser Arafat made this "open appeal" to Arab kings and presidents at 11.30 GMT: "Brother Arab kings and presidents, a revolutionary greeting. At this serious time for our Arab nation when the forces of evil are combining against this nation, the Palestine revolution is facing a plot by the lackey, imperialist and Zionist forces aimed at its very existence.

"The recent events in Jordan and the efforts to exhaust the forces of our people by barbarous and brutal operations void of national feeling and national responsibility: the massacres in the south carried out at Ma'an, Tafleeh, Shobak, Karak and Hasa and aimed at our refugee people ... the massacres in the north committed by the 40th Armoured Brigade and several artillery and infantry regiments against feda'i bases which have remained steadfast against the repeated and brutal Israeli raids for three years and the brutal attack on Amman and Zarqa with artillery and machine guns, an attack repeated more than once and with unimaginable brutality.

"... Brother Arab kings and presidents—at dawn today, September 16, 1970, we were surprised by the formation of a military government and the appointment of army officers as military governors in all areas of the country, along with the initiation of a malicious buildup against the revolution and the people planned only a few hours after the agreement reached between the Central Committee and Abdul Moneim Rifa'i's government under the supervision of the Arab five-man committee—the agreement preparing to restore normality to the country and establish firm fraternal relations between the government and the Jordanian Army on the one hand and the Palestine revolution and the Jordanian and Palestinian people on the other.

"This serious initiative has condemned and exposed the plan of the authority, backed by the imperialist-Zionist forces, to strike the Palestine revolution in preparation for peace with the Zionist enemy—a peace which would be supported and protected by a U.S. imperialist invasion of our countries posing a grave danger to the march of our Arab nation.

"In the name of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents all the organizations of the Palestine revolution, I appeal to



you in these serious and delicate circumstances to shoulder your patriotic, historic and Arab responsibilities in helping the Palestine revolution, which is facing the most violent imperialist onslaught.

"We appeal to you to undertake your responsibilities and intervene to stop this profuse blood letting planned and implemented by the agents and all the suspicious forces in dear Jordan against our heroic and courageous people and their national domestic unity.

"God bear witness that I have informed you. Revolution until victory."

Baghdad "Voice of the Palestinian Revolution"\*

16.00 GMT "The Jordanian authorities have taken the expected step. For more than two months the Jordanian regime has been preparing the ground for the step it took yesterday. Just as the signs of a possible agreement between the Central Committee of the Resistance and the now ousted Jordanian government became evident, an agreement which would have put an end to daily bloodshed, the regime pounced on the agreement the day it was announced and revealed its premeditated plan to continue to strike at the feda'i movement until it had been finally liquidated."

Damascus "VPR"

"Amman radio Wednesday broadcast a government order to the feda'iyen militia to hand over their weapons to their parent commando organizations. The radio said the move was intended to redistribute these weapons to all citizens irrespective of regional consideration—that is, irrespective of whether they were of Palestinian origin or East Bank Jordanians. Observers here said the effect of the order, if it was obeyed, would be to disarm the great majority of the feda'iyen in Amman.

"The bulk of commando forces in the capital, and the ones who played the major role in the fighting last June and earlier this month, were not the full-time commandos waging the commando war against Israel but the part-time militia who swarm out of the refugee camps to take over large sectors of the city whenever there is a crisis with the authorities.

"Sawt al-Assifa\*\* radio indicated that the government appeal would be rejected when it said 'the arms were distributed by the revolution and not by the authorities.'

\*Hereafter Baghdad "VPR".

\*\*Voice of Assifa.

"Amman radio for its part broadcast patriotic songs, some of them calling on the army to crush the enemies of the king."

*Daily Star*, 17 Sep. 1970

"Under cover of the dark King Hussein's new military commanders moved at least fifty tanks and scores of armoured cars into positions in the suburbs of Amman within easy shelling range of the refugee camps and the guerilla headquarters. . ."

\*Peter Snow and David Phillips, *Leila's Hijack War*, Pan Books, Ltd., London, 1970, p. 91. Hereafter Snow and Phillips.



# BOX 5

## KING HUSSEIN'S ARMY VERSUS THE PALESTINIANS

"The battle between army and guerillas was not an even one. In addition to 25,000 regulars, the feda'iyeen could muster 25,000 rag tag militia. Against this sizable but largely undisciplined unit stood the king's 56,000 man force, the best drilled and most efficient army in the Arab world. Originally trained by Britain's Sir John Bagot Glubb, the army's three armored and nine infantry brigades are equipped with 300 Patton and Centurion tanks, 270 armored and scout cars and 350 armored personnel carriers."\*

Several authorities gave analyses of the strength of the forces that faced each other before the September war. The following is our own summary, based on various reliable Arab and foreign sources:

### THE JORDANIAN ARMY:

Total Armed Forces		60,250
Army	58,000	
Navy	250	
Air Force	2,000	
Paramilitary Forces		40,000
National Guard	30,000	
Armed Police	7,500	
Third Security Brigade	2,500	
2 Armoured Brigades		
9 Infantry Brigades		
1 Security Brigade		
1 Royal Guards Batallion		
1 Anti-aircraft Regiment		
3 Regiments of 25-pounders		
1 Regiment of 2-pounders		
160 M-47 Patton Tanks		
160 Centurion Tanks		
9 Chariotter Tanks		
130 Saladin Armoured Cars		
140 Ferret Scout Cars		
250 M-113 APC's		
100 Saracen APC's		

\*Time, September 28, 1970.

8 Navy Patrol Craft	
1 Squadron (18) F-104A Interceptors	
2 Squadrons (20) FGAG and FGAG Hunter Aircraft	
4 C-47 Transport Aircraft	
2 Doves and Devons	
9 Helicopters (6 Alouettes and 3 Whirlwinds)	
30 105mm and 155mm Howitzers	
25 203mm Guns	
500 Jeep-mounted 106mm Recoilless Guns	
1000 Mortars of various calibers	

### THE PALESTINIANS:

Total Armed Forces		8,600
Palestine Liberation Army	3,600	
Commando Fighters	5,000	
Paramilitary Forces		10,000
Militia	8,500	
Cubs	1,500	
1 Armoured Brigade		
1 Infantry Brigade		
50 T-34 Russian Tanks		
25 Armoured Cars		
25 Jeep-mounted Anti-tank Guns		
150 Rocket Launchers		
750 RBJ Rockets		
150 Mortars of various calibers		
50 Dushkas		

**Note:** The Palestinians were outnumbered by five to one in their armed forces (excluding the paramilitary forces). Both mass and firepower were on the side of the Jordanian regime.

During the fighting, the Jordanian Army was supported by the Saudi Arabian Brigade—about 2,500—which was stationed in the south of Jordan in the Dead Sea area.

From the beginning of July, 1970, the Jordanian Army had been receiving regular shipments of huge quantities of arms and ammunition from the U.S.A. and Britain. From the middle of July until the middle of September, the build-up was increased by air lifts into Amman and Mafrak, reaching on some days—more than thirty flights daily, unloading unspecified quantities of guns, mortars, shells and ammunition,



## VI

### TEN DAYS OF HELL

*In almost a quarter of a century of foreign reporting, I cannot recall anything remotely similar to what I have seen in Jordan. I have witnessed inter-tribal massacres in Africa and the slow, blood-letting in Vietnam. But there has been nothing like the urban devastation—both in lives and property—that Amman has suffered. And that includes Budapest, when the Russians smashed the Hungarian revolt in 1956.*

*Arnaud de Borchgrave, Senior Edition  
Newsweek, 5 October 1970.*

**Thursday, September 17:** On Thursday, September 17, the order to attack the Palestinians was given.

"Nevertheless, having decided on a showdown, Hussein was badly advised by army leaders under Field Marshal Habes Majali. They assured the king that the fighting would be wrapped up in 24 hours at the most. How wrong they were quickly became evident in Amman."

*Newsweek, 5 Oct. 1970*

"Heavy shelling on the city's outskirts jolts Amman awake at 4 a.m. By 5 o'clock the city is rocked by heavy firing. At 10 a.m. the south of Jordan is dominated by the Bedouin tribesmen. Guerilla reports say that the Bedouins have liquidated guerilla headquarters in southern cities."

*Russ Braley, Daily News, 24 Sep. 1970*

"Jordan was sealed off from the outside world. Aviation officials closed down the airport. The borders were closed to traffic and telephone and telex lines were out of order. The only channels of information were official Amman radio, which played martial music and issued government statements throughout the day."

*IHT, 18 Sep. 1970*



Amman radio announced at 04.50 GMT: "The Jordanian armed forces are continuing their operations to restore order and security in the capital and to silence the shooting. The curfew will be in force until further notice. Citizens are asked to observe the curfew. Otherwise they will expose themselves to being shot immediately."

At 04.52 GMT, a statement by the Military Governor General's spokesman was broadcast: "The Jordanian armed forces have restored security and order in the town of Zarqa. Resistance elements in this town have joined the Jordanian armed forces. The situation there is quiet and very good. There were no casualties worth mentioning."

"Each side accused the other of beginning the open warfare but *the evidence seemed to show that Army columns moved into position and began shelling at the pre-arranged zero hour.*\* At almost the same time as troops with tanks and armoured vehicles moved into the Jordanian capital other forces went into action in the commando stronghold of Zarqa, fifteen miles to the northeast, Sweileh to the northwest and Salt, which Fat'h, the main commando group, had been using as its operational headquarters.

"Field Marshal Majali came close to a formal declaration of war on the Palestine commandos when he announced an immediate curfew in Amman. His order said violators would be 'shot on sight,' which meant that every guerilla manning a road block or rooftop would be an immediate target for the Army. The military curfew order was taken as a declaration of war by the commandos. And it was meant to be. It was backed with tanks, armoured cars and artillery as the military government installed in Jordan only 24 hours earlier showed that this time there could be no compromise. The radio warned people not to allow guerillas into their homes. It said no harm would come to people who observed the curfew and did not harbour commandos."

J. Bulloch and K. Clarke, *D. Telegraph*, 18 Sep. 1970

Amman radio again broadcast a message to Jordanians at 05.33 GMT: "Brother citizens, your armed forces have so far adhered to their pledge to avoid inflicting losses in life and property during their operations to restore order and security to the people. They have used the minimum amount of force for this purpose. They hope they will not be forced to increase the violence of their reply to those shooting at them. They are capable of increasing it ten-fold. While anxious to safeguard the lives of citizens, they affirm they will give the brother feda'iyeen a last chance to stop shooting, to carry out their duty and to leave the capital immediately with their arms and equipment for the frontline in order to spare their blood and the blood of our brother citizens."

\*Italics ours.

At 06.00 GMT a message was broadcast to the Army: "Heroes of the Jordanian armed forces, preserve the Palestine Liberation Army. Do not fire on it unless it fires on you. It is a fraternal army which has closely cooperated with us in crisis. It is a part of our hearts and conscience. We stand with this army in one rank for the sake of God until victory."

From Baghdad at 09.12 GMT, an announcer said: "The criminals will never stop their treacherous crime. They want Amman to burn. The revolution is holding fast ... The barbarous shelling of all quarters and houses in Amman and Zarqa has been continuing for 29 hours." And at 09.25 GMT: "We have just received the following: 'Despite the violent and bestial shelling, morale is high. We continue to control all key positions in Amman and its outskirts. Our fighters have stopped the advance of tanks which tried to enter the city and destroyed or damaged several of them. Battles continue.'"

Baghdad "VPR"

At 09.33 GMT, this message from Damascus was heard: "From the Palestine Resistance Central Committee to the Iraqi forces in Jordan; the decisive battle we are waging against the lackey authorities in Jordan is the battle of the whole Arab nation and requires the unity of all efforts for victory. We ask you to participate in the battle and to intervene immediately in support of the revolution forces to overthrow the treacherous and plotting rule."

Damascus "VPR"

Damascus then reported that the battle was continuing in Ramtha. Baghdad radio gave further reports on the Jordan Army; at 10.43 GMT: "It has moved the 40th Brigade to steadfast Irbid and shelled it with heavy artillery"; later at 10.52 GMT: "Since 5.00 it has been shelling Salt town with heavy artillery. The 6th Regiment, which was prepared by the Arab nation to strike the Zionist enemy, is doing this barbarous shelling. The military authority today violently, brutally and indiscriminately shelled the Jabal Hashimi."

Baghdad "VPR"

The Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee's message to the Arab League Secretary General was broadcast at 11.15 GMT: "...They reinstated Brigadier Zeid Ben Shaker in the Army as Assistant Jordanian Chief of Staff, a more ... [strategic] ... post than Shaker's former position. This is in addition to a series of measures adopted by the hostile elements behind Rifa'i's back. They introduced a series of changes in the Army command on dismissal, reorganization and deportation under the pretext of training scholarships."

Damascus "VPR"



The following statement was issued at 11.30 GMT by the Jordanian Military Governor-General: "Brother citizens, military units are on their way to control all the key quarters of the capital. All armed men in these quarters must proceed immediately towards their brothers, the members of the Jordanian armed forces, in order to be spared."

Amman HS

The Libyan radio said in its 13.00 GMT commentary that the "explosion" in Jordan was an attempt by the Jordanian regime to liquidate the Palestine Resistance and that it was threatening to bring about an imperialist landing operation.\* The radio called on the Arab nation to act to "save the Resistance."

13.16 GMT: "The Jordanian-Palestinian masses are now exposed to a war of annihilation. The question is, why are many kings and presidents keeping silent about this crisis? Our masses demand that attitudes be defined. Silence means plotting against the revolution and the Arab nation. The masses and the revolution understand nothing else."

Baghdad "VPR"

"Thus it appears that the establishment now in control of the three Middle East states which have accepted the American formula are eager for a negotiated settlement. Considering the desirability of such an arrangement from the standpoint of the Western world, it would appear that the outcome of the present crisis in Jordan will be of vast significance. This allows for speculation that American interest in the Jordanian drama is such that discreet but powerful U.S. force may have a hand in trying to turn the tide in King Hussein's favor."

Jay Bushinsky, CSM, 18 Sep. 1970

Damascus reported U.S. activity at 16.17 GMT: "At 10.00 today three U.S. aircraft carrying ammunition landed at Beirut from Istanbul. They refueled at Beirut and left for Amman. This is a sign of the beginning."

Damascus "VPR"

At 17.40 GMT the Central Committee broadcast the following message: "Amman radio alleges that the Jordan Army controls fourteen areas in the city. The Central Committee utterly denies this claim. The lackey authority has attempted to storm a number of positions in Jabal Hussein, Wahdat, Jabal Akdar, Hashimi and Nuzhah. Although in the attack on Amman they used more than two armoured brigades in addition to field artillery, they could not achieve any of their objectives."

\*For details on the U.S. Sixth Fleet movement, see Appendix IV.

At 19.00 GMT Cairo radio reported that President Nasser had met Colonel Kaddafi at Mersa Matruh to "discuss developments in the Arab situation."

At 20.00 GMT Algiers radio broadcast a message from Qa'id Ahmad, the official responsible for the FLN (National Liberation Front), to Yasser Arafat pledging Algerian solidarity with the Palestinian people.


At 20.25 GMT the Central Committee broadcast this statement: "To our steadfast people, upon orders given to us, we have decided the following: The northern province area from Baqa'a in the south to the northern borders of our dear Jordan which include Baqa'a, Jarash, Ajlun, Ramtha and Irbid are considered liberated areas subject to the control of the fighters."

Baghdad "VPR"

20.25 GMT: "Amman is burning and death roams in it ... The criminal whom they call king used to boast about his love for his people and tribes. Today he sets fire to Amman, his people and tribes. He kills the women in their homes and the children in their streets. His name used to be Hussein, but brothers his name today is Nero—the hateful madman and murderer. Amman is burning at the hands of Nero. Woe to all who watch Amman's children burn and do nothing. They should take up arms and call on the people and the tribes to kill the murderer of the women and children ..."

Damascus "VPR"

## NERO OF AMMAN



Al-Sayyad, 24 Sep. 1971



22.27 GMT: "At the time when the shelling of Amman with heavy artillery is intensifying, a fierce battle is now taking place between the forces of the revolution and the regime's forces in Zarqa."

Baghdad "VPR"

"The Amman radio says the commandos started the fighting but it is clearly the army that is on the offensive. On the hilly outskirts of town, tanks appear, their gun barrels pointing toward the center of town. Armored cars, armored personnel carriers and army trucks roll down Shariya Safarat—Street of the Embassies—the boulevard that runs past the hotel and passes through the diplomatic quarter on its way toward Amman's crowded heart.

"Across the street troops and guerillas fight on and off for hours for control of an unfinished concrete building that makes a fine citadel. The guerillas in their ill-assorted uniforms are visible darting along the shadowy balconies until the army's firepower, including an armored car, evidently dislodges them and they disappear.

"As the firing continues, columns of smoke rise from several points among the hills. The army is striking at guerilla headquarters and at refugee camps on the outskirts."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970

As his capital, Amman, was being burnt and destroyed, and as his people were being killed by his army, Hussein took time off to indulge in his hobby as a radio ham.

"Just after 7.15 p.m. at 95 Collingwood Gardens, Ilford, in Essex, a 20-year old student and radio amateur, Laurie Margolis was listening in on his set. Suddenly: 'Hullo Gulf. Hussein on the mike.'

'Come in Your Majesty,' said Laurie.

'You are 5 by 8 (loud and clear),' said King Hussein. He was taking some time off from the war in his amateur radio room at the Hummar Palace, 2,000 miles away from Ilford.

'I understand you have some relations in London at the moment. If there is any help I can give them, I should be delighted.'

'Thank you very much, my friend Laurie, they seem to be all right. I am so grateful to you for all your kindness. I hope all goes well,' said the king.

'The best of luck, Your Majesty, and we hope all this will work out for you.'

'Roger, God Bless Laurie, and thank you very much indeed.'

"The king then spoke to Gordon Vine in Brixworth, Northamptonshire: 'It is a sad time here. But we are putting our house in order and soon it will all be organized.'

"It was to take King Hussein's tanks another week to do the job. But it was far from clear even by then that they had managed to put his house in order."

Snow and Phillips, p. 101-102

"Hundreds of Palestinians and Jordanians were butchered in various parts of Jordan September 17, as Palestinian and Jordanian revolutionaries moved to repel a fierce military onslaught by King Hussein and his newly-appointed military cabinet against the Palestinian Resistance Movement.

"As we go to press, violent fighting is reported throughout Jordan in what appears to be a final showdown between the Palestinian Revolution and Jordan's reactionary regime."

*Fateh*, 17 Sep. 1970

"King Hussein's new government was at pains to justify its actions. Its spokesman said the military action was forced on it by a foreign-inspired plot against Jordan.

"But the bulk of Hussein's support will come from those officers who are itching to get their hands on the Palestinians. Of the politicians the king can count on is the influential Wasfi Tal, the former Prime Minister. At the same time a number of former officers and intelligence men dismissed earlier this year under commando pressure have returned to power such as Rassoul Kilani, former chief of intelligence."

Robert Graham, *Financial T*, 17 Sep. 1970

"UAR Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Sadek, flies to Jordan with joint messages from the UAR, Libyan and Sudanese presidents to Hussein and Abu Ammar. Sadek's trip follows emergency consultations between the three heads of state. The message lauds Hussein's 'restraint,' calls for immediate end of the fighting, proposes talks to lay down relations between the Palestinian Revolution and the lackey regime in Jordan and warns about the dangers of foreign intervention."

*Fateh*, 30 Sep. 1970

**Friday, September 18: 05.46 GMT:** "The commander and officers of the Hussein Brigade met and decided that the entire brigade should join the revolution. They include: Mahmud Da'as, commander of the engineer regiment in Jarash. This is a decision on an entire brigade joining the revolution."

Baghdad "VPR"



"After a day of savage fighting, Jordan's new military governor Field Marshal Majali claimed last night to be in almost full control of Amman and offered the Palestinian guerillas a 'last chance to stop firing and save your lives.' But there were hundreds of dead and wounded in the streets as the guerillas with rifles, rocket launchers and machine guns tried to stop a drive into the city by the Army's tanks.

"It was clear that the Army's strategy was to secure the south of Jordan, mop up resistance in Amman, and then move on to crack the hard core of guerillas who are firmly in control of several northern towns.

"Guerilla appeals to Syria, Lebanon and Iraq for aid received no military response."

*D. Telegraph, 18 Sep. 1970*

"Field Marshal Majali, Commander in Chief, called on [the feda'iyeen] during the day to surrender to 'the advancing Jordanian forces.' In a sarcastic footnote, which perhaps revealed the government's final objective, the statement said: 'To facilitate the withdrawal by the guerillas, the Army is prepared to give any help in getting to any point on the cease-fire line with Israel.'"

*John Bulloch, Ibid.*

"Heavy barrages of machine-gun fire and fire from larger weapons begin again after dawn. The shooting makes clear what the radio reports: The commandos have rejected a ceasefire offer made by the strongman in the new military government, Field Marshal Habes Majali."

*Eric Pace, NYT, 18 Sep. 1970*

"The Army, which had moved armoured columns into Amman and other centres early in the day, claimed to be controlling the whole of the capital after heavy street fighting. But at the same time they spoke of 'strong' action against 'pockets of resistance.' These pockets include the vast Wahdat refugee camp, which came under attack by Jordanian troops near midnight ..."

*J. Bulloch and K. Clarke, Daily Telegraph, 18 Sep. 1970*

Reports continued from Bagdad. 11.15 GMT: "Artillery shelling is continuing in a number of areas. A violent artillery engagement has taken place in Ramtha town. Fifteen tanks are heading from Mafrak to Ramtha."\*

*Baghdad "VPR"*

\*Ramtha is the key to the commando supply line from Syria. The 40th Tank Brigade was ordered to cut the supply line and "secure the vital road into Syria. The attack failed. Once again the Jordanian Army was surprised at the determination of the guerillas to resist them, and at their skill in using what anti-tank weapons they had." Snow and Phillips, p. 102.

Amman radio once again reassured the Jordanian citizens at 16.23 GMT: "Be patient a little longer and we will rid you once and for all of the disturbance to your peace, the looting and plundering of your funds and property, the violation of the privacy of your homes, and the disruption of your businesses. All this state of affairs existed to satisfy persons with rotten consciences who did not fear God. Patience, patience, because with God's help, calm and safety will follow."

Then at 17.29 GMT: "Honest feda'iyeen, our brethren of the Liberation Army, be confident that we are with you with our hearts and emotions. We address you from our hearts, not our tongues. *We assure you of our good intentions.*"\*

*Amman HS*

#### Saturday, September 19:

At 08.22 GMT, Nasser's message to King Hussein as broadcast on Cairo radio included the following: "Our information indicates that the losses are terrible. Our assessments are that the consequences are fraught with danger. Thousands of innocent people are under fire or bleeding in the streets. This is a situation our nation cannot accept. This is a disgrace to our conscience and puts us to shame before future generations of ours and the world—our enemy as well as our friend."

*Cairo HS*

On the other side of the Jordan River, Israel was concerned with the outcome of the battles raging in Amman and north Jordan. The following was heard at 11.30 GMT: "I am convinced that this time the Jordanian military establishment, faced with the grim prospect of losing everything, forced the king's hand and would have revolted but for his acquiescence in their demands. They have many accounts to settle and if one adds to this the fact that this struggle means 'to be, or not to be' as far as they are concerned one reaches the present, bitter, cruel civil war in which there may be little room for quarter or compromise.

"For Israel the struggle can be a fateful one. For the character of the regime on the other side has a direct influence on the security of the Beit Shean and the Jordan Valley settlements, the Dead Sea area and Eilat. Basically, we are witnessing an internal Palestinian struggle, unless outside forces intervene. But such intervention, with its military and political implications for Israel, would of necessity influence Israel's attitude to developments."

*Haim Herzog, Weekly Newsreel, Israel*

"There is scattered firing through the night and more shelling at dawn, again concentrated on the northern and eastern flanks of the town. More armor rolls

\*Italics ours.



past the hotel but the volume of fire seems lower and the noise of battle farther away. This dovetails with the Amman radio's statement that the government has gained control over more of the city.

"The tension seems to ease in the neighborhood in the afternoon after a mortar round explodes not far from the hotel. At four in the afternoon Field Marshal Majali's ultimatum to the commandos goes into force: Surrender or be killed. But loud detonations and a burst of machine-gun fire sound through the city as the deadline falls.

"A Jordanian officer has left statements at the hotel proclaiming that troops have been 'instructed to strictly use the utmost minimum of force and wherever possible to preserve and spare the lives of all civilians and unarmed personnel in the city.' But one wonders.

"Fires still burn on the outskirts of the city as night comes on. There are occasional explosions and shots until dawn."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970

Everyday after September 16 an army officer would declare to the journalists trapped in the Jordan Intercontinental Hotel that it was the last day of fighting. "Tomorrow we move into the center of Amman and flush the commandos out of there and clean up the city." The foreign pressmen thought, "this is an old one"; they had heard it before.

Libyan radio reported a new development at 13.00 GMT: "At a press conference this morning at the Palestine Liberation Movement Fat'h office in Tripoli, Abu Tariq, Fat'h representative to Libya, said that Jordanian tanks were now moving to strike at the feda'iyeen while Jordanian aircraft were operating for the first time to bomb the feda'i positions relentlessly and mercilessly."

On Cairo radio at 14.00 GMT was announced that Abu Tariq, reported that the Libyan government was to transfer to the feda'iyeen the financial aid which it had stopped giving to Jordan. He said the Palestine revolution is asking Iraq and Syria to honour their promises and give the feda'iyeen ammunition and men instead of mere sentiments.

Cairo HS

Arab radios broadcast appeals by Arab leaders to end the fighting in Jordan, including those from President Bourguiba of Tunis and President Charles Helou of Lebanon. President Numeiry of the Sudan, according to Omdurman radio, demanded "an immediate stop to the fighting" adding that Sudan unreservedly supported the right of the Palestine revolution to "an armed struggle to liberate their land from Israeli occupation."

Sunday, September 20:

"In Western capitals later that morning there was a diplomatic flap at the very highest level. King Hussein had sent a secret message to the West that showed he was ready to go to desperate lengths to save his kingdom from being taken over by the Palestinians and their friends from Syria. He had done something that it was never thought any Arab would ever dare to do—even in an extreme situation. He had indicated that if the West would not help him, he would *like to see the Israelis intervene*."

"It is true that the king was overlooking, in this dire situation, the political backlash from the Arabs that such an 'alliance' would provoke."

Snow and Phillips, pp. 118-119

At 10.12 GMT a report came from Damascus: "For the past hour, the Israeli Air Force has been supporting the Jordanian forces by bombing units of our revolutionaries in the Ramtha region. Thus the chapters of the plot unfold; thus the complete cooperation between Israel and the puppet authorities becomes clear in the attempt to kill the Palestinian revolution. But we will not surrender or retreat."

Damascus "VPR"

11.50 GMT: "Our masses: When the king ordered the shelling of Amman, outside regimes said the king had shown restraint and that they blessed this restraint. Immediately the Zionist enemy participated in the operation to liquidate the revolution ... Today, the Zionist enemy is actually supporting the regime in Jordan. But the Arab fronts remain silent ..."

Baghdad "VPR"

**And from the Jordanian International Hotel:** "I crawl into the roof restaurant to get a panoramic view. A gaunt French correspondent, already there, motions for me to lie low to avoid provoking Army snipers, who have orders to keep correspondents off the top floor.

"To the north there is a furious racket of gunfire around a big dun building, said to be a school, on Jebel Luweibda. Later we learn that the king has decided to clean the feda'iyeen off the hill today because they have been sniping across at the diplomatic quarter. We see the Army go into that direction. An armored car and three armored personnel carriers roar past the hotel toward a neighborhood 500 yards away that has already been battered by shellfire. More machine-gun fire. Several mortar shells slam into the neighborhood. But the fighting continues. 'The feda'iyeen there are having their little Stalingrad,' the Frenchman mutters.

"In the afternoon the curfew is temporarily lifted and the Army lets us out for the first time. The city is shattered with women peering out of smashed windows.



We strolled a hundred yards down Shariya Safarat and back. Ruin, grief, the detritus of war at every hand."

Eric Pace, NYT, 23 Sep. 1970

"Palestine Liberation Army scores complete victory over Hussein's 40th Armored Brigade in a 36-hour battle fought round the northern town of Ramtha. The victory is won by the PLA's Hitten Brigade."

Fateh, 21 Sep. 1970

Although Nasser's representative, Sadek, had been in Amman for three days trying to reach a conciliation between the fighting groups in Amman, his efforts were in vain. In a personal attempt, Nasser telegraphed a message to Hussein from which the following was taken: "The latest report I have received from Lt. Gen. Mohammed Sadek shows that there are big potential dangers in what is happening in Amman and that these dangers will affect our nation and its march, struggle and hopes for a long time. Some elements of the Jordanian Army continue to open fire despite Your Majesty's assurances at a time when I know the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization Central Committee has accepted the cease-fire."

"I request Your Majesty's immediate personal intervention so that Jordanian Army units will observe the cease-fire. I demand by every national struggle and historical right that you now stand firm for the safety of our nation's unity, security and holy war which must continue against the enemy."

Cairo HS

Hussein wrote back to Nasser: "I heard your fraternal and sincere appeal with all my heart and soul. Once again I would like to affirm to Your Excellency that the tribulation which befell Arab Jordan, its people, armed forces and honest feda'iyeen is a sign of a horrible plot hatched by enemies. Although, together with my brother, I am the last who agrees to the shedding of Arab blood other than on the battlefield against the common enemy, I am confident that my brother is the first to refuse to offer Jordan as easy prey to the enemy."

"It pleases me to convey to His Excellency my brother the appearance of encouraging signs for a meeting between the brothers in which, I hope, what we seek to achieve will be realized. Once again, I express my gratitude to my brother. God is our help."

Amman HS

It is clear from his reply that Hussein was playing for time. He did not mention the cease-fire in his reply and he postponed making any comments until the Cairo summit meeting which had been proposed by the UAR, Libya and the Sudan on September 17.

# Monday, September 21:

The following is a pooled dispatch by foreign correspondents in Amman, which was relayed from Jordan by noncommercial circuits.

"The Army briefly lifted its order to shoot on sight today and the women of Amman went into the smashed streets, dodging sniper fire to seek food for their families. They carried shopping baskets past the dead and wounded as King Hussein's Army ruthlessly hunted guerillas who had ignored cease-fire appeals. Snipers in mosques and on the roofs of luxury apartment houses were blasted by cannon fire."

"The fight for Amman and for the throne is in its final stages. It has cost more time and more lives than the two-day battle the king's commanders had forecast."

"The pavements are littered with cartridge cases. Buildings everywhere have the black holes of artillery hits. Fires burn on the hillsides. From the Intercontinental Hotel you could see an armored car systematically pounding a block of flats, floor by floor. A sniper had been reported there. The shells went in orange streaks low across the valley and burst through the living rooms."

"A sniper near the British embassy was killed by a soldier; the Army blew up the building in which he was hiding. One sniper got a lucky shot through the embassy which put the transmitter to London out of action. The staff had to revert to Morse code until the generator was repaired. A soldier standing near journalists who went to the embassy during the curfew hiatus was wounded by a sniper bullet."

"The return fire was erratic. A soldier swung his jeep-mounted machine gun at the hotel and put a burst through the hotel lobby which scattered newsmen. Photographers have been told they will be shot if they take pictures."

"The problem of evacuating Westerners from Amman is still difficult. Although the Army is holding the main airfield, it is within mortar range of guerillas, who are now fighting desperately for their lives. Their resistance is weaker but fierce and all over the city they come out in quiet moments from dugouts and release deadly fire at anything that moves."

"On the first day of the fighting, the Red Cross headquarters was blasted into wreckage. Until yesterday, when they reached the hotel, five Red Cross personnel had been crouching in the cellar with refugee women and children from neighboring houses."

The News, 21 Sep. 1970



At 11.04 GMT, the Palestine Red Crescent Society appealed to all Arab Red Crescent and International Red Cross Societies: "As a result of the ruthless shelling of our people in camps, cities and villages in Jordan, thousands of wounded have died due to lack of medical care. Despite the shelling of the Palestine Red Crescent Society, hospitals and ambulances, the medical staff is doing its duty under the severest conditions. Jordan is now threatened with the spread of epidemics because thousands of dead people have been left in the streets and under the debris. Thousands of civilians in camps and villages are threatened with death from hunger and thirst, because of the blockade which has been imposed for a week. The Palestine Red Crescent Society calls on all societies immediately to intervene to save the wounded and to perform their humanitarian duty."

Baghdad "VPR"

Response came from the West Bank at 09.00 GMT: "The Military Governors of Ramalla and Nablus have granted a request for a delegation of doctors from Judea and Samaria to go to Jordan. The doctors are awaiting permission from the Jordanian government which should be relayed by the Jordanian radio. In Nablus and Birah, rallies of doctors and notables were held at which it was decided to send the doctors and to organise blood donations throughout the West Bank for the victims of the fighting in Jordan."

Israel HS

Medical help began to come on September 20. "The Algerian official party, FLN, sends \$45,000 as a first 'emergency' aid to the Palestinian Red Crescent."

*Fateh*, 30 Sep. 1970

Contributions for medical supplies and food were made by countries all over the world. By October 2, the International Red Cross had received over \$1.5 million. Some countries were not as generous as others: for example the host country of the International Committee of the Red Cross:

"The Swiss people, who strongly resented the guerilla hijacking of airliners, are holding back, and thus far have contributed only \$350 to the appeal of the Swiss Red Cross Society."

NYT, 2 Oct. 1970

"Late that evening, a DC-6 aircraft with Red Cross markings on it touched down in Beirut. Somehow it had managed to fly in and out of Amman. The pilot confided to airport officials that he would never try flying in or out of Amman again at night.

'It's jumpy out there,' he said.

A man in a suit, looking grey-faced and shaken, climbed down the steps. He

was Marcel Boissard, the Red Cross chief in Beirut. 'It's a catastrophe,' he said."

Snow and Phillips, pp. 123

"The Jordanian government reported tonight over the Amman radio that 'Syrian armored troops backed by heavy artillery crossed the Jordanian border during the day for the second time.'"

NYT, 20 Sep. 1970

"What mattered [militarily] was what was going on in north Jordan, and it looked no better for King Hussein than it had the day before. His tanks were pulling back from the area of Irbid and Ramtha to take up positions well to the south of the road between Irbid and Ma'raq. It seems probable, though not certain, that Brigadier Ghasid told his men to avoid too close an engagement with the enemy until reinforcements arrived from Amman and his tank crews had had some time to regain their strength after four days' hard fighting. Besides, Irbid, Ramtha, Ajlun and many other towns in the area were now firmly in the hands of the guerillas and strongly supported by the Syrian tanks.

"Reports from Dera showed that the invading force was still parading under the colours of the Palestine Liberation Army, and at least one independent observer reported that *all* the soldiers he had talked to crossing the frontier *spoke with Palestinian accents*."

Snow and Phillips, pp. 124-25

On Amman radio at 18.28 GMT that night was broadcast this announcement: "From Hussein, Supreme Commander of the Jordanian Armed Forces, to all commanders, officers, and men of the valiant armed forces in Amman: In response to the call of conscience and national duty, in order to put an end to tragedies imposed by the plot against our country—against both its army and dear citizens—and in appreciation of our great responsibilities at this historic point in the life of Jordan and all Arabs, I order absolute and strict observance of the cease-fire as from this moment."

**Tuesday, September 22:** "But as dawn broke that morning King Hussein's position still looked desperate. There was hardly a town north of Amman that he could call his own—and parts of Amman itself were still in the hands of the guerillas."

Snow and Phillips, p. 129

"Fierce fighting continues in Amman. In north Jordan, revolutionaries repulse counter-attack on Irbid, down a jet near Ramtha and bring Jarash under full control."

*Fateh*, 30 Sep. 1970

"On Monday, the fight was as fierce as ever. But on Tuesday the curfew was lifted again. This time, inhabitants now desperate, came out in the streets searching



for food and wailing over the death and devastation around them. But food was hard to find. By then, most of the provision stores had either been wrecked or looted. Yesterday the commandos still seemed to be holding on in force in the winding streets of the city center."

Patrick Massey, *Evening Standard*, \*23 Sep. 1970

"Last night King Hussein announced still another cease-fire but through the night troops exchanged tracer streams with guerillas who rejected it. The Army is taking advantage of the lull to round up Palestinian youths of commando age. Several are kicked in the shins as they are herded into a garage near the Inter-continental and held for interrogation. Elsewhere patrols move through the streets picking up suspects.

"Tension remains high because guerillas broadcasting from Damascus denounce the cease-fire as a trick. ... The Army again seems confident of its control in Amman. A military spokesman who strides into the hotel lobby says, 'Every hour is better than every other hour.'"

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970

"Today the curfew is lifted and we get a chance to move around. Every building we see on a walk downtown has been damaged. Cars and army vehicles are burned black. Bedouin soldiers, faces smeared black for night fighting, check our identities. We are stopped at the base of the ravine because the narrow streets down there where no armor can go are still in guerilla hands. Now we see many bodies in the streets."

"We learn that a Russian cameraman peered out a window in Shepard's Hotel and was shot dead."

Russ Braley, *The News*, 23 Sep. 1970

"The heads of state of Libya, Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan and Kuwait are in the Egyptian capital. Iraq, Algeria and Morocco have announced they will not participate. Egypt's Minister of Information, Mr. Mohammed Heykal, told a press conference: '... What we are trying to do, as a group of interested nations, is to halt the bloodshed in Jordan.'

"Egypt put pressure on King Hussein and Syria's president Nureddin Atassi today to attend this evening's Arab summit meeting in Cairo. President Nasser cabled the king to say that his personal attendance was 'vital and essential.' But a Jordanian official in Cairo told reporters: 'The king has appointed his delegation. ... It is here. That is all I can say.'"

*Standard*, 22 Sep. 1970

Hussein's newly appointed Prime Minister Brigadier Mohammed Daoud, head of the Jordanian delegation, did not attend the summit meetings.\*\*

\*Hereafter *Standard*.

\*\*See Box 6.

BOX 6

THE KING'S PREMIER: BRIGADIER MOHAMMED DAOUD

September 15

King Hussein instructed Mohammed Daoud to form a "provisional military cabinet."

September 16

Military government announced.

Amman radio broadcasts a government order to the feda'iyeen militia to hand over their weapons.

Under cover of darkness, Hussein's military commanders moved fifty tanks and scores of armored cars into attack positions against the feda'iyeen and the Palestinian refugees.

September 17

Government order rejected by commandos.

Jordan was sealed off from the outside world.

Curfew was imposed in Amman and Zarqa.

Heavy shelling of commando positions and refugee camps commenced.

Hundreds of Palestinians were killed in various parts of Jordan.

September 18

Commander in Chief Majali called on feda'iyeen to surrender. He claimed to be in full control of Amman.

September 19

The "Voice of the Palestine Revolution" broadcast from Baghdad at 22.55 GMT Mohammed Daoud's daughter, Mona (who had joined the ranks of the Revolution) reading a letter to her father:

"Dear Father, Mohammed Daoud. I do not know how to address you. I am so ashamed of what you are doing. ... I cannot believe that Amman, Salt and Zarqa are burning. The lackey authorities are setting them on fire. Fire is burning the youth, the women, the children and the old people. I wish I had never been born; I wish I had never seen you so that no one could say I was your daughter—the daughter of the executioner Moham-



med Daoud ... Father, I will join the ranks of the fighters to liberate Amman and Palestine. Goodbye, father. You may find me among the debris caused by the napalm bombs—your bombs. It is a revolution until victory. Your daughter."

#### September 20

Daoud agreed to King Hussein's desperate proposed action to have the Israeli's intervene on their side against the commandos.

#### September 21

He left Amman for Cairo, ostensibly to represent Hussein in the 'summit' scheduled to open Tuesday, September 22.

#### September 22

He did not participate in the summit meetings held.

#### September 23

The Libyan news agency reported that Daoud had repeatedly asked to meet Libyan Premier Colonel Kaddafi in Cairo but that Kaddafi had refused.

Daoud stressed that he had no connection with the fighting in Jordan and that he would remain faithful to "my beloved Palestine."

#### September 24

Daoud disappeared from his suite at the Nile Hilton Hotel, where he left a copy of his letter of resignation to his "Exalted Majesty King Hussein" which he had delivered to the Jordanian Ambassador in Cairo. He officially asked Kaddafi for political asylum in Libya and his request was granted.

#### September 28

Daoud reappeared at the Hilton and met Yasser Arafat and assured him of full support for the "Palestine Revolution." With him were his daughter, Mona, and her husband, Ahmad Abdul Hawa.

"Abu Ammar cables Arab heads of state convening in Cairo declining to attend the conference. He states:

'Amman is burning for the sixth day. Thousands of our people are under the debris ... Bodies have rotted. Thousands of homes have been destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of our people are homeless. Our dead are scattered in the streets. Hunger and thirst are killing our children, women and aged. ... It is an unprecedented carnage. It is a bloodbath. ... In the name of the people I invite you to move your conference to Amman immediately to witness for yourselves the size of the crime and the odiousness of the massacre. In such event, our masses would feel that part of their nation has come after six days to shoulder its responsibility.'

*Fateh*, 30 Sep. 1970

**Wednesday, September 23:** "In Amman, the pounding of the guns went on all day. Behind the Intercontinental Hotel, houses were burning and orange tracers were lighting the sky on a hill about a mile away. It was where the Popular Front had its headquarters."

Snow and Phillips, p. 141

"Stores in the hotel's shopping arcade have been looted by the troops in idle moments, but the hotel has been untouched so far—except by shot and shell."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970

08.10 GMT: "Yesterday, during the Knesset session to debate the situation in Jordan, Menahem Begin, Zionist criminal and perpetrator of the Deir Yassin massacre, gloated over what is happening to the Palestinian masses and revolution. The criminal terrorist Begin described Hussein and his supporters as heroes. He described their crimes as heroic acts, and openly said that Hussein and the other criminals had done more than the Israeli Army, and that these criminals had rendered a service to Israel not rendered by the staunchest Israeli allies and friends."

Baghdad "VPR"

"Israeli authorities today ... felt that the king would keep his throne but would not be able to continue to rule, and that the revenge implanted in the Palestinians might ultimately spell his doom."

James Feron, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970



Arab heads of state convening in Cairo sent a four-man team to Jordan, led by President Numeiry of the Sudan.

At 09.00 GMT, Cairo radio reported that "the Arab summit delegation conferred with King Hussein immediately after its arrival in Amman last night, amid news about escalating fighting in northern Jordan and while Amman was burning for the sixth day."

On September 23, 1970 at 14.58 GMT, Major General Ja'afar Numeiry broadcast a message to the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. He told them about an agreement reached on the basis of proposals put forward by Abu Ayad (Salah Khalaf), between the Resistance Movement and Hussein for an immediate and permanent cease-fire. It must be emphasized that Abu Ayad, together with Abu Lutuf, Ibrahim Bakr, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah and Colonel Samir Khatib had been captured on September 20, and were prisoners at the time.

At 15.06 GMT King Hussein announced over Amman radio that the agreement had been approved and agreed to consider it as a basis for the organisation of the "joint march on the road to victory and liberation."

16.30 GMT: "The Central Committee of the Revolution has heard about the arrival of the Arab summit delegation in Jordan to discuss the situation and hear all points of view. The brother kings and presidents have been in Jordan for about 24 hours, during which we have tried twice and by all means to contact them. Since they are at a place too far from Amman, it is difficult for our fighters to contact them. Therefore, we consider it our duty to invite the members of the delegation to come to Amman so that we can explain to them the revolution's point of view and acquaint them with the facts and the seriousness of the situation in Amman."

Damascus "VPR"

At 17.33 GMT was broadcast Yasser Arafat's cable to President Nasser in response to the announcement of the signed agreement: "We have been surprised to hear that an agreement which the revolution knows nothing about has been declared in the names of brothers who are in fact prisoners, do not represent the Palestinian revolution at present, do not exercise any responsibility and do not know our positions or the positions of the other side. For the fourth time they declare a cease-fire but do not abide by it... Your intervention is hoped for. We hope that a meeting will be held between us and the summit delegation to clarify the facts and their seriousness. The massacre by those in Amman is still going on. The massacre has begun to be serious in Irbid."

Damascus "VPR"

At 22.18 GMT Sudanese leader Numeiry sent the following message to King Hussein on Cairo radio: "On our return to Cairo we received information on the renewal of fighting in Irbid. If this is true it is considered contrary to what we agreed on for an immediate cease-fire, especially in Irbid, about which I informed ... the kings and presidents meeting in Cairo. We are waiting to hear a quick confirmation from you that you are respecting what we have agreed on..."

"Dominating everything else for the moment is the decision of the Jordan Army Command—supported by the Bedouin chiefs—to fight this battle to an end—with or without Hussein."

John Kimche, *Standard*, 23 Sep. 1970

"King Hussein flashed a V-for-Victory sign last night and declared: 'I believe the brunt of the problem is over.' The king, in military uniform, received a pool group of four foreign correspondents at his country palace ten miles northwest of Amman. He said, 'I've been approaching the Big Four and putting them in the picture. It's a pretty explosive situation, with so many sides and angles. We are going to defend our sovereignty and we have confidence we can handle the situation.'"

NYT, 23 Sep. 1970

"The United States, feeling that the most acute phase of the Jordanian crisis has apparently passed, announced tonight that it would attempt to evacuate peacefully more than 100 Americans from Jordan tomorrow aboard a chartered commercial airliner. American officials said the evacuation plans, under consideration for a week, did not include provisions for the 38 American hostages held by Palestinian guerillas. Their whereabouts is still unknown, although they are reported to be in northern Jordan."

Hedrick Smith, *NYT*, 23 Sep. 1970

Thursday, September 24:

King Hussein's reply to Numeiry was broadcast over Amman radio at 07.05 GMT as follows: "I wish to assure Your Excellency that there is no truth at all in the reports that fighting is raging or has resumed between the Army and the Resistance in Irbid. ... Yesterday I issued strict orders to all military units and commanders to cease firing and to uphold the agreement in spirit and letter. ... Please accept my profound love and appreciation for you and my brothers the Arab leaders."



Baghdad retorted at 12.28 GMT: "Our masses: The king today cabled the summit conference in Cairo to deny what the news agencies had reported about the Jordanian Army's violation of the cease-fire. He continued to shell the innocent civilians in Amman and Irbid. The king is lying for the seventh time. He lies to the summit conference, alleging that he is abiding by the agreement and that his forces are not firing."

Baghdad "VPR"

At 13.30 GMT King Hussein cabled the following to the Arab kings and presidents: "While the Jordanian armed forces are adhering to the cease-fire, while sincere efforts are being made to restore security and normal life, and while we need to concentrate on dealing with the requirements of the humanitarian situation and relief of our people, I regret to see certain Arab radio stations spreading inflammatory and false reports and speaking about renewal of fighting here and there. These are unfounded reports, greatly hindering our sincere efforts to put a final end to the tribulation and to remedy its effects."

Amman HS

17.00 GMT "Extreme anxiety today overshadowed the meeting of the Arab presidents and kings in the light of the course of events in Amman and the deterioration of the situation in Jordan despite the cable received this morning by the Sudanese President, Ja'afar Numeiry, from King Hussein that he had issued strict orders to all military units to cease fire. News has been received after this, that the promise has been broken. This prompted the formation of a delegation to leave for Amman this evening under the leadership of President Ja'afar Numeiry."

Cairo "VA"

"A mediation mission headed by Premier Ja'afar Numeiry of the Sudan returned to Jordan tonight to inquire into the reasons for continued fighting despite assurances by the Jordanian monarch that his troops had been ordered to stop shooting. An Egyptian spokesman said tonight that 'a theme of deep concern' about repeated announcements of a cease-fire without implementation had marked the discussions today of the Arab leaders. General Numeiry, accompanied by a guerilla leader and four Arab government officials, was said to have flown to Jordan 'to reach a decisive settlement on this point.'"

NYT, 24 Sep. 1970

After arriving in Amman, Numeiry broadcast this appeal to Arafat at 20.06 GMT: "... On behalf of the delegation which arrived in Amman tonight, we request you to suggest, by any means possible, how we can contact you, and the place and time of the meeting. Since the matter is important and urgent, I request you to reply immediately, I repeat immediately. Thank you."

Amman HS

Arafat replied three hours later: "Let the meeting take place at about 01.00 tonight. We suggest you come in your vehicles on the road connecting the Caravan Hotel, Alia School and the UAR Embassy building in Jabal Luweibda. Our delegate will meet you there to lead you to the meeting place. We have instructed the revolution forces in Jabal Luweibda to safeguard your arrival and not challenge your vehicles. It will be safer for you if you stress to the other side that they abide by a cease-fire in Jabal Luweibda tonight. Until we meet, we extend greetings from your struggling brothers."

Damascus "VPR"

"The Israeli Deputy Premier, Yigal Allon, warned King Hussein of Jordan tonight that his decisive military victory meant he must accept full responsibility for guerilla actions along the cease-fire line with Israel. Mr. Allon, speaking to foreign newsmen, said the monarch would be in more trouble than he had been before the civil war if he permitted the guerillas to resume shelling Israeli settlements."

"He was responding to King Hussein's cease-fire offer to the guerillas, that they evacuate the cities of Jordan and be free to concentrate on the fight against the 'common enemy', Israel. In reaffirming a long-standing Israeli policy, Mr. Allon added: 'As far as we are concerned, the legal government and its regular forces should accept complete responsibility for anything happening from their soil, because sovereignty is indivisible.'"

NYT, 23 Sep. 1970

"The President, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General went off golfing at Burning Tree this afternoon (with, of all people, George Meany, the labor leader) to celebrate the end of the most nerve-racking week of the unending crisis in the Middle East. They thought that along with King Hussein they had won at least this particular round, if not by a knockout then surely on points."

"No one here pretends to know whether King Hussein's military achievement was sufficient to make him an effective partner for negotiations for a long-term settlement with Israel. *He will have to isolate the militant Palestinians in his country\** to go into serious bargaining and he will have to demonstrate firm control over them to make the Israelis believe he can enforce and keep a future agreement."

Max Frankel, NYT, 23 Sep. 1970

**Friday, September 25:** 04.30 GMT "... Pointing to the situation in the West Bank, Allon said the inhabitants of this bank must realize in light of the behav-

\*Italics ours.



jour of the royal family in Jordan, that Israel could help them more than King Hussein himself. Therefore they should not rely on any foreigner in solving their problems but must refer to Israel, which was ready to help them socially, culturally and economically, even politically."

Israel HS

Amman radio appealed to both sides to observe the cease-fire at 08.52 GMT: "The delegation representing the conference of Arab kings and presidents will make a tour of some quarters of the capital to inspect them today. All units of the Jordanian armed forces, public security and popular army should facilitate the delegation's task and movement and give it every possible assistance as well as carefully and strictly observing the cease-fire."

Then at 10.43 GMT, Numeiry made the following important statement to the Jordanian people: "Brother citizens, following the return to Amman for a second time by the delegation of the Arab kings and presidents meeting in Cairo, we met with struggling brother Yasser Arafat—Abu Ammar, chairman of the Palestine Resistance Central Committee and Commander in Chief of the Palestine Revolution Forces. Abu Ammar asked me to convey to you this appeal written and signed by him: 'Masses of our great people, our brave revolutionaries, in order to spare innocent blood, to enable citizens to bury their martyrs, treat the wounded, and obtain the necessities of life—water, food and medicine—in my capacity as Commander in Chief of the Palestine Revolution Forces and in response to the appeal by the mission sent by Arab kings and heads of state, I agree to a cease-fire and ask my brothers to observe it, provided the other side does so.'"

10.47 GMT King Hussein again broadcast the cease-fire order: "Brothers, members of the brave Jordanian Armed Forces, in reaffirmation of my order to cease firing, and since the brother commanders of the Palestinian feda'iyeen action have affirmed their readiness to observe the cease-fire fully, following their meeting with the delegation of the brother Arab leaders, *I repeat my order to the Jordanian Armed Forces to observe the cease-fire immediately and completely.*"\* (Apparently, the previous orders were not meant to be obeyed "immediately" and "completely.")

11.30 GMT Then Field Marshall Majali's statement was read by a radio announcer: "In accordance with the speech by His Majesty the King, the Supreme Commander of the Jordanian Armed Forces, in which he ordered everyone to observe the cease-fire, I reaffirm my earlier order regarding the need for all sides to observe immediately and carefully the cease-fire."

Amman HS

\*Italics ours.

"The Allenby Bridge over the Jordan was opened at 9 a.m. A lorry, a jeep and fourteen saloon cars crossed the river. The convoy was carrying food, medical and other supplies from Israeli-occupied territory to the Jordanian victims of the civil war.

"Later in the morning, twenty-nine heavy lorries loaded with sacks of rice, flour, sugar and tins of cooking oil, crossed the bridge and headed after the first convoy. They hoped to bring back wounded to the West Bank where there was plenty of hospital space for them. All the lorries were the property of West Bank Arabs, but the supplies had been collected with the help of the Israeli military authorities.

"As the sun went down behind the hills of the West Bank, the convoy of Red Cross trucks returned to the Allenby Bridge. But instead of being full of wounded people in urgent need of medical attention, they were still piled high with vital supplies. Some had been dropped off in the first villages along the road to Amman, but a few miles into Jordan *the military authorities stopped them and sent them back\** because the Red Cross could not satisfy the soldiers that the cargo was exclusively made up of relief supplies."

Snow and Phillips, pp. 151, 155

The Numeiry delegation left for Cairo at 6:00 p.m. Yasser Arafat went with

**Saturday, September 26:** "At 10 p.m. the [Arab] leaders, including Arafat, but with no representative of King Hussein's government present, filed into the Hall of 1001 Nights at the Hilton. For four hours the delegation, prompted occasionally by Arafat, told President Nasser what they had experienced in Amman, how they had been treated by the king and how they felt the Jordanian Army had gone all out to crush the guerillas whatever the cost in civilian casualties.

"At two o'clock in the morning President Nasser had heard enough. He drafted an immediate cable to King Hussein in which he talked more bitterly than ever before of the 'horrifying massacre' that he now understood was being perpetrated in Jordan."

Snow and Phillips, p. 156

\*Italics ours.



04.00 GMT "In the name of the Arab heads of state who are now meeting in Cairo, I regret to inform you of our great anxiety after listening to the report by brother Numeiry and the other members of the delegation representing us who returned from Amman tonight. The report ... confirms beyond any doubt several facts.

- (1) The Jordanian authorities insist on continuing to fire despite all efforts (for a cease-fire).
- (2) All the promises made to us have been completely ignored and deprived of any real value.
- (3) Despite every claim to the contrary, there is a plan to liquidate the Palestine Resistance.
- (4) There is a fearful massacre taking place now in Jordan against all Arab and human values.
- (5) The delegation of the Presidents, which has returned from Amman, feels that it has been unjustifiably subjected to evasiveness.

"In view of all this, we have agreed that Brother Premier Ja'afar Numeiry will hold a press conference at which he will review ... the details of the report he has submitted to us. ... But what is happening now leaves no room for anything else. The truth deserves to be stated. ..."

Nasser, Cairo HS

King Hussein's return cable to Nasser was broadcast at 07.05 GMT: "Your Excellency, there is no insistence on our part except on one thing—saving our country and serving our cause and nation. I affirm to you that the armed forces have observed and will continue to observe the cease-fire in the face of unceasing and unbearable provocations.

"We, Your Excellency, have not and will not think of liquidating the Palestine Resistance. It is of us and for us. It grew and developed with our consent and protection. All we want is to protect our country so that all arms are directed against one common enemy."

Hussein, Amman HS

"Conference sources said there was a widespread view among delegates here that King Hussein had deliberately tried to liquidate the Palestine Resistance

during the past week of fighting. Some delegates affirmed their belief that this action was taken in connivance with the United States, the sources said."

*Daily Star*, 26 Sep. 1970

"The meeting called in Cairo last week by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser was no better—and perhaps worse [than previous summit meetings on the Palestine problem]. Three Arab nations boycotted Nasser's summit outright; Morocco, Algeria and Iraq. Morocco's King Hassan probably stayed away simply to avoid entanglements in a far-away fight. The other two did so out of sympathy with the guerillas. Libya's youthful new strongman, Colonel Muammar Kaddafi, who has remained outwardly loyal to Nasser, attended the conference—but only after siding strongly with the Palestinians and offering to send Libyan troops into the fight on the commando's side. Nothing ever came of that ..."

*Time*, 5 Oct. 1970

The Libyan news agency had reported on Wednesday, September 23, that Brigadier Daoud had repeatedly asked to meet the Libyan Premier Colonel Kaddafi in Cairo, but that Kaddafi had refused.

On September 27, Hussein's Premier Mohammed Daoud submitted his resignation to the king in a letter addressed from Cairo. The same day, he asked for political asylum in Libya and his request was granted.

"The break in diplomatic relations (between Jordan and Libya) was announced shortly after Libyan leader Col. Muammar Kaddafi had offered asylum to former Jordanian Premier Brig. Mohammed Daoud, who resigned dramatically on Thursday night."

*Daily Star*, 26 Sep. 1970

At 08.00 GMT, the Cairo Home Service and the Voice of the Arabs program broadcast Numeiry's press conference about events in Jordan. The Sudanese leader said that following an apparent agreement on Friday between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat for a cease-fire, the Jordanian Army continued "murderous and brutal bombardments" in Amman. He said that he had telephoned to the Jordanian king to protest and that he had held the telephone so the king could hear the shellfire.

"'I will do my duty now,' the king said after long silence," General Numeiry related. He dispatched four aides to the embassy, who then telephoned the Jordanian Army's operations center and the shelling stopped immediately.

Numeiry's broadcast included the following: "The situation is terrible and savage. There are 25,000 killed and wounded. Some 14,000 youths have been



arrested in their homes, simply because they are youths able to bear arms—but they had no arms. Women were molested and stores destroyed and pillaged by the Army. The Ashrafiyah hospital was shelled and hundreds of children, women and disabled people were taken and put on the street, where motorised vehicles were brought to crush them.

"It is strange that the shooting stopped instantly after the contact with the Chief of Operations. This proves to us that there was a plan aimed at forcing us to leave immediately. It also proves false the Jordanian authorities' allegations that to effect a cease-fire was difficult because of the time it took to transmit orders and instructions in the various areas.

"In any case, we came out of Amman with the collective conviction that there was a full plan to exterminate all men of the valiant Palestine Resistance and all the Palestinians in Amman. The plan is being carried out despite all promises and agreements. There is nothing to stop this plan from being implemented. In the light of all these details, the delegation drew such conclusions as made it certain that what was happening in Jordan was an organised plot and a premeditated plan to crush the Palestinian people as a whole, as I have said. The Jordanian authority has been and still is resorting to falsification and deception for the purpose of gaining time so that it can carry out its plan. We have learned that the Jordanian authorities assessment of the situation was that the extermination would be completed in three days at most. But this conclusion was wrong because eight days have passed and the Jordanian forces are still unable to control Amman. They will not be able to do so for another three months, in my personal view."\*

Cairo HS and "VA"

At 12.43 GMT, King Hussein sent a cable to President Nasser in which he said: "Your Excellency, brother Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the UAR, I was surprised by the proceedings of Chairman Major General Numeiry's press conference in Cairo this morning. In view of the serious distortions and accusations attacking us and defaming our policy, our country, and our struggling and united people; and in view of the possible grave consequences of his statements at this press conference; unless you take the initiative to correct them and to inform the brother kings and presidents of the truth of the situation, I draw your attention to all the responsibilities which will result from the distortion of the truth and the fumbling in clouds and illusions.

"... Moreover, we have been accused of having sought, and of still seeking, to destroy the Palestinian people, who are actually our people and relatives and with whom we have shared the pains, aspirations, and bitter and good life to

\*The full text of the Press Conference is in Appendix II.

the extent that there are no more Palestinians and Jordanians among us but one people ...

"We can produce ample information, documents and arguments for anyone who wants to be further convinced and better informed, and to prove our innocence, submit our accounts, and reveal ... that it was not we who worked to shatter or who sought to harm our national unity ...

"We have always called, sought, and worked to frustrate the elements of this plot and to avert what has taken place. As for the Resistance, I have always been and will remain, with our brother leaders, among the foremost in supporting, defending and preserving it."

Hussein, Amman HS

At 13.18 GMT, Hussein entrusted Ahmed Toukan to form a new cabinet, and at 22.30 he contacted President Nasser by telephone and expressed his willingness to go to Cairo where the kings and presidents of the Arab nations were still meeting.

**Sunday, September 27:** King Hussein arrived in Cairo at 11.20 a.m. to participate in the meetings of Arab kings and presidents. He was received at Cairo Airport by President Nasser and the Tunisian Premier Bahi Ladgham.

"At 12.30, just before lunch, King Hussein and President Nasser drove up to the Nile Hilton in Cairo. An hour later the summit conference assembled again in the Hall of the 1001 Nights. First in was Yasser Arafat. He was clean-shaven, for the first time that many onlookers could remember, he wore his kaffia, his army shirt, and dark glasses."

Snow and Phillips, p. 161

18.38 GMT: "The text of the agreement reached by the Arab kings and presidents meeting in Cairo was released here tonight. The agreement is designed to put an end to Arab bloodshed in Jordan and to the tragedy of the past ten days there."

Cairo HS

"The fourteen points of the agreement, according to Cairo radio, include a halt to all fighting and propaganda warfare, withdrawal of all Army and guerilla forces from Amman and guerilla regroupment on the front line with Israel, and the 'restoration' of the pre-civil war situation in Irbid and other large cities. If either Jordanian or Palestinian violate any provision, 'all of the signatory Arab states will take collective measures against the violating party.'"

John K. Cooley, CSM, 29 Sep. 1970



"The two sides have reached a compromise solution which is basically the same as that accepted by the commandos with the government of Abdul Moneim Rifa'i on September 15, the day before King Hussein formed his military government. It has thus left both sides with remarkably little to show for the bitter fighting of the last ten days."

Robert Graham, *Financial T.*, 28 Sep. 1970

**Monday, September 28:** "The civil war that had convulsed the Arab world was officially over and with it, so it seemed, the immediate crisis, but as the Arabs began to pick up the pieces and international diplomacy regained its poise, a final blow was to come. It was so total a blow that it seemed bound to impale the memory of these three weeks on the minds of all who lived through them."

Snow and Phillips, pp. 163-164

With the week ending Sunday, September 27, Nasser was completely worn out. He was pushing himself to the limit of his endurance. His close friend Mohammed Heykal, Minister of Information and editor of *Al-Abram*, reminded him of his doctor's advice to rest and that he had had a heart attack only late last year. But Nasser refused to rest while the massacre was still going on in Jordan: "There are men, women and children dying in Jordan," he said. "This is a race against death."

*Al-Abram*, 2 Oct. 1970

The next day, Nasser died at 6.15 GMT.

At about 11.00 GMT all Cairo radio channels were linked and a recital of verses from the Koran began. At 19.59 GMT the announcer introduced Anwar Sadat, the Vice President, who announced the death of President Nasser after "an acute heart attack."

**"Nasser is dead.**

"His signature was inscribed on an agreement intended to end the human carnage and genocide in Jordan. The last task with which he crowned his lifetime struggle was to get the Arab heads of state together in Cairo to shoulder their responsibility in redeeming an Arab country, in protecting an Arab revolution and in sparing Arab blood from being shed at Arab hands. In so doing, he exhausted himself. He rather immolated himself to help the Arabs redress their harms in Jordan rather than wail their loss.

"This summarizes Nasser's life—a life marked by relentless labor and complete dedication for the Arabs and their cause."

*Fateh*, 30 Sep. 1970

"The death of Mr. Nasser is thought by specialists here on the Middle East to be another reason for focusing more closely on the Palestinian movement. For years thousands of Palestinians looked to the Egyptian president, rather than militant commando groups, for leadership. With his passing, most specialists doubt that any other Egyptian or Arab leader can serve as an equal counterpoise for commando leaders.

"In the high-level reappraisal of Middle East policy now reportedly under way in the National Security staff system, one possibility under consideration is shifting the focus of American diplomacy away from the Arab governments toward the Palestinians. Throughout the administration, officials now speak of the Palestinian movement as a more potent political and military force than they thought before the Jordanian civil war and the death of Mr. Nasser."

NYT, 29 Sep. 1970



## VII

### WHAT THEY SAID

*Yasser Arafat:*

"There is a sea of blood. Some 20,000 of our people are dead or wounded and separated from us. From among our dead, from among the debris of our patient, steadfast people, I address you. . . . I appeal to you to move your conference to Amman immediately so that you may see for yourself the magnitude of the crime and the ugliness of the massacre . . ."

Statement to Arab Heads of State  
Damascus "VPR", 22 Sep. 1970

*Gerald Kemp, Sunday Telegraph:*

"Operation overkill, the decision to fight the guerillas in Amman by saturation shelling and mortaring rather than by using infantry in street-to-street fighting, was planned by the Jordanian Army months before the final crunch came. The Army commanders were ready with their battle plans drawn up and it was obvious to anyone in the city during the fighting that the formations of British-made armoured cars—Saladins, Saracens and Ferrets—knew in advance exactly what they had to do.

"The men who decided that the battle of Amman should be fought with heavy armour were the generals, brigadiers and colonels who many believe dictate their policies to King Hussein.

"Was operation overkill really necessary? It was the only way the Army were prepared to fight the commandos. It seemed from what I saw of the battle, that the military were prepared for colossal civilian casualties in their bid to win. The Jordanian armour moved in for the kill with chilling efficiency. Watching the Saladins and Saracens hammering houses where snipers were holed up was a nerve-racking experience.

"Their overkill tactics have been condemned by President Nasser as a 'horrificing massacre,' and a violation of 'all Arab and human principles.' Because of the



tragic results of these tactics, many feel that the king will never again be able to walk the streets of his capital."

*S. Telegraph*, 27 Sep. 1970

*Murray Sayle and Bryan Moynahan*, Sunday Times:

"King Hussein's army, jubilant over its victory, has been looting shops, hotels, and homes for food, clothing, and luxury goods. The soldiers wander about the town in fresh clothes, with white handkerchiefs from the local haberdashery over their mouths to stifle the stink of death rising from the ruins.

"But early on Thursday, September 17, the battle for Amman began. King Hussein and the Jordanian High Command had decided it must destroy the guerilla forces in the capital. The fighting came as no surprise to anyone, only its violence.

"The classic military technique of defeating a hidden infiltrated guerilla force in a crowded city is to soften it up with artillery and then move in with infantry, killing the enemy house by house. But Hussein knew he could not count on the loyalty of his two infantry divisions, each 15,000 men. ... Using tanks, armoured personnel carriers, rockets, and recoilless rifles is a cruel, bloody, and inefficient way to overwhelm a crowded city...

"Army frustration grew with their inability to clear the constantly changing pockets of resistance. Armoured car crews and subsequently infantrymen spent a day or more clearing an area to find the feda'iyeen long gone. Tied down they retaliated with indiscriminate machine gunning and mortar fire.

"Smoke poured continuously from the big refugee camps at Jabal Hussein and Wahdat, but Hussein's troops, faces pitted and black with cordite and shaking from excitement and the recoil of their weapons, were unconcerned. 'Those are not our people there. They wanted to make our country a second Palestine.'

"Hussein in being forced to use the primitive, rural Bedouin tribesmen, traditionally contemptuous of houses, towns and those who live in them, has had to wreak the maximum havoc on his own capital city, and the maximum suffering on the innocent civilians caught between the two sides."

*S. Times*, 27 Sep. 1970

*Newsweek*:

"There seems to be no doubt that some of the Jordanian troops, particularly the Bedouins, went completely berserk. They shelled houses without apparent reason. They revived an old Bedouin custom of breaking the fingers of some of their

prisoners so that their captives would not soon be able to pull a trigger against them. And foreigners who have seen the carnage wrought by the Bedouins in the Palestinian refugee camps are absolutely disgusted. Said one European: 'It was sheer butchery.'

"Sidewalks were littered with empty shells. Some of the city's limestone homes had begun to crumble under the attacks. And all around, there were casualties—men, women and children, some dead, some wounded and crying for help. But the ambulance driver raced on, afraid to stop.

"Nothing—not even a white ambulance bearing the distinctive mark of the Red Cross—was safe in Amman last week. Throughout the city, the savagery of the fighting knew no limits. ... All in all, it was some of the bloodiest fighting in the bloody history of the Middle East."

*Newsweek*, 5 Oct. 1970

*Time*:

"Caught in the middle of the battle, Amman's 600,000 residents endured a week of agony. Most took refuge in their cellars, but many were buried alive when artillery began to pound the city. Quickly, electricity failed and the water supply was cut off. Though city dwellers were running out of food, Majali threatened that anyone found out of doors would be shot on sight. The few who ventured out found the streets cluttered with wrecked vehicles and littered with land mines.

"Grimly the Army's Bedouin soldiers stalked the streets, seeking guerillas and occasionally looting shops. Many had their faces blackened, a traditional means of preventing identification and forestalling later feuds with the families of their victims. Amman became a city of sordid sounds—the crumbling of limestone buildings under the artillery barrage, the snap of rifle fire and the whoosh of shells, the cries of the wounded, and the wailing of women who had seen their families slain.

"Amman's Palestinian majority was angered mainly, however, by the savagery of the Bedouins. 'A sea of blood separates us from them,' cried Arafat. This anger spread among Arabs elsewhere. In Jerusalem one day last week, 200 Arabs suddenly rushed out from noonday prayers at Al Aqsa mosque and ran through the streets screaming 'Kill Hussein! Kill Hussein!'"

*Time*, 5 Oct. 1970

"Even neutral Jordanians were repelled by the brutality of Hussein's army. In Amman, Bedouin soldiers slew wounded guerillas some while they lay help-



less on stretchers. Others looted stores and houses and raped women at gun-point."

*Ibid*, 26 Oct. 1970

*Golda Meir:*

"We feel with the Jordanian people," she [said]. "We feel sorry for them." She added that she was sure all Israelis "look across the Jordan river and feel with the people of Jordan of the terrible tragedy that they are facing, with the tens of thousands of casualties in these few days."

Henry Tanner, *NYT*, 20 Sep. 1970

*Dr. Saad Maasher:*

"At the Maasher Hospital, which has accommodation for only 50 patients, there were now 125. Michael Nicholson met Dr. Saad Maasher sitting exhausted in the garden. The doctor told him a story: 'I had no idea the army would behave like this. About fifteen soldiers arrived in jeeps. Two armoured cars placed themselves outside with their guns pointing straight at us. One of the soldiers—an ordinary soldier: he had no rank—came to me and demanded to search the hospital. He said we were sheltering commandos. He said he and his men would find them and take them away. I said that as a doctor I treated anyone.

"The soldiers then went into every ward searching. When the soldiers couldn't open a door, they fired bullets into it. When they couldn't open the door into the compartment that houses the lift machinery, they threw a grenade into the lift shaft and blew it up.

"On the second floor they found some young men who were being treated for bullet and shrapnel wounds. One was severely injured. The fifteen soldiers carried them down, loaded them in their jeeps and drove off. The wounded cried in pain as the jeeps jolted away from the hospital.

"An hour later the hospital was shelled and machine gunned. Our generator was damaged and we are having to work by candlelight."

Snow and Phillips, p. 154-155.

*Algeria's Special Representative to the United Nations:*

"Speaking in the debate on world affairs [in the General Assembly] Mohammed Yazid charged that the U.S. and its Zionist allies had found in Jordan reactionary forces to carry out a filthy criminal task, that of murdering tens of thousand of Palestinians.

"These massacres were carried out under military umbrellas provided by Washington and Tel Aviv, and with an important logistic participation by the U.S." the Algerian delegate said."

*Fateh*, 20 Oct. 1970

*Gerd Heidemann, Stern:*

"For ten days and nights during the civil war in Jordan, the commandos were telling me about the massacre being perpetrated by the Royal Bedouin Army. I believed them—but proof was not available. *Now I have found the evidence and I was able to photograph what the Jordan government is trying to hide by various means: The wholesale liquidation against the Palestinians.\**

"The king's soldiers (Bedouin) have cut the Palestinians to pieces and stabbed them to death—men, women and children—with hatchets and knives. In the mosque square, on the steps leading into the mosque, in the mosque itself and even on the steps of the *minbar* (mosque platform).

"And in their thirst for blood, the Bedouin moved from there to the Ashrafiyah Hospital, where they snatched the wounded Palestinians from their beds and stabbed them with knives within the sights of the doctors. Then they forced the nurses and doctors to leave the hospital.

"The decisive point in all what has happened is the following: Hussein cannot behave as if the massacre did not take place and he cannot undo what has been done. Regardless of whether the number of those killed and wounded in the refugee camps were two thousand (as the Army Command says) or twenty thousand (as Arafat says), this will not have a big effect on Jordan's future. The decisive fact is that conciliation between Hussein and the Palestinians has become impossible and that the Palestinians now demand what Hussein has made possible for his Bedouins: *Revenge*.

"I hadn't advanced a few steps inside the mosque on Jabal Ashrafiyah in Amman when I felt that my feet were wet. Blood had penetrated through my canvas shoes. I had to walk over torn bodies and through dismembered heads and limbs. The atmosphere around was suffocating. I wanted to go out quickly into the open air. Then I saw the child, a girl about eight years old laid down in front of the mosque, that holy place. The head was bashed down to the nose, and the lips were parted with the last scream of terror.

\*Italics ours.



"The Bedouins do this without hesitation.' This is what a man standing near the corpse said. This was one man spared from thousands of Palestinians in the Wahdat refugee camp, burning after it had been shelled by tanks and heavy artillery continuously over the ten days of the war. The man had crawled and hidden inside the big mosque of Ashrafiyah, believing that he would find safety on a holy spot. 'But God was sleeping,' the man complained to me through his tears."

*Stern*, No. 42, Oct. 1970, Hamburg, pp. 29-30.

*King Hussein:*

"I tried my utmost to avoid the recent disaster but when it did come I had to face it. It is not an easy thing to use force in one's own country but the issue had to be met. Fortunately, the damage caused was limited.' *On that point there is considerable argument.*"

C.L. Sulzberger, *IHT*, 28 Oct. 1970

*French Television Correspondent, Channel 1:*

"The information that I received from the International Committee of the Red Cross [while in Amman] indicates that between two and three thousand people were burned by phosphorous bombs in Wahdat camp in Amman."

*Al-Nahar*, 25 Sep. 1970

## BOX 7

### THE PENTAGON STATEMENT

**September 25, 1970:** In Washington, the Pentagon announced that the United States was prepared to give Jordan weapons to replace those lost in the fighting. The official, Deputy Secretary of Defence David Packard, suggested weapons might be included beyond those King Hussein possessed when the fighting broke out the week before, as well as Lockheed F-104A Interceptors.

"Mr. Packard said the Pentagon was encouraged by the success of King Hussein's army, equipped largely with American and British tanks and planes, and that the army replenishments would be made 'to make sure they have a continuing military capability.'"

Michael Getler, *IHT*, 28 Sep. 1970

Packard also said that "even if Jordan's armed strength were doubled, this would not jeopardize Israel's security." William Beecher reported in *New York Times*, September 26, 1970 from Washington: Mr. Packard's statements "might also be an attempt to lend diplomatic support to King Hussein by pointing out that the U.S. is interested in strengthening his position toward both the Palestinian guerillas and the Syrians to the north."

"American transport planes are landing munitions for the Jordanian Army at 'Revolution Airfield,' the desert strip where three hijacked airlines were blown up a month ago by Palestinian guerillas. The delivery of arms and ammunition to replace those expended by the Jordanian Army in its war last month with the guerillas, was disclosed yesterday by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in Washington.

"It is assumed here that no mention of the arrangement has been made previously to avoid emphasizing the ties between the United States and Jordan during the inter-Arab negotiations for a settlement of the dispute between King Hussein and the Palestinian movement.

"Another point of possible embarrassment, it was noted, was that the only route that American military air transports could take without asking permission of Arab governments was over Israel."

John L. Hess, *NYT*, 13 Oct. 1970

*The Pentagon was happy that the weapons and ammunition supplied to King Hussein were used in the right place, at the right time and against the right people.*

"In Jordan, King Hussein has been in a strong position since he defeated the Palestinian guerillas last September. The U.S. urged Hussein to take on the feda'iyen, and according to one Amman diplomat, so did 'his officers, his Cabinet, his brothers and even his mother.' Since then a total of \$70 million worth of military and economic aid has been, or is to be, sent to Hussein. State Department aids report that assistance for Jordan is presently one of the least difficult items to get through State Department echelons—or through Congress."

*Time*, 8 March 1971

*Newsweek:*

"As the Jordanian Army planned it, the battle against the feda'iyen was to have taken less than a day; six hours of artillery barrages to soften up commando positions, then armor and infantry sweeps to mop up what was left. But things didn't turn out that way—and the result was perhaps the bloodiest civil war in the history of the bloodied Middle East.



## THE TRAGEDY OF JORDAN

Made in U.S.A.

Special for killing the Palestinian people  
Strictly forbidden to be used against Israel



Jordanian tank

Al-Ahram, 13 Oct. 1971

"But for all its signs of renewed life, the city was still dominated last week by the persistent pall of death. ... In the Jabal Ashrafiyah section of the capital, soldiers used a bulldozer to push earth over some 50 swollen corpses sprawled in a mass roadside grave. Nearby, at the heavily shelled Ashrafiyah hospital, a half dozen bloodstained corpses—some in commando uniform, others covered only by sheets—lay scattered on the floor."

Newsweek, 12 Oct. 1970

Bruce Van Voorst, Newsweek:

"I couldn't help thinking of Hiroshima. Around the entire perimeter of the camp,\* the Army—blasting building by building—had totally destroyed a belt of houses some 30 to 50 yards wide. Only the rubble remained—in many cases seared yellow by deadly phosphorous explosions.

"And yet, unbelievable as it seems, the devastation near the heart of the camp was even worse. Within yards of a clinic where some 1000 people had huddled during the peak of the fighting, army artillery had leveled an area as big as a football field—flattening it so thoroughly that I had little difficulty walking through the remains. Here had been real carnage, whole families crouching in holes in the floor, or when lucky, in small cellars, simply disappearing as roofs caved in on them."

Newsweek, 12 Oct. 1970

Russ Braley, The News:

"Western diplomats expressed belief today that King Hussein might survive Jordan's civil war, but that the fighting's carnage would permanently damage him. 'Hussein might survive this, but he could not possibly survive American military aid, which would mark him as a tool of imperialism and Zionism to almost all Arabs,' a diplomat said. 'Hussein now is identified with the worst disaster in Jordan's history. If he wins, he will have to be guarded 24 hours a day. The Arab world's trend toward radicalism probably will increase.'

"Hussein apparently was promised victory in a day or two by his officers and by Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, who resigned and vanished in Cairo. But more guerillas had more arms hidden and fought with more tenacity than Hussein expected. And Hussein's army, forty percent Palestinians, fought without enthusiasm, preferring heavy weapons attacks at a distance to close-in fighting necessary to clean out guerilla pockets in Amman.

\*Van Voorst was among the first Western journalists to visit the Wahdat refugee camp.



"Worst of all the Bedouin component of the Army made it a cruel holy war against Palestinians in some areas, perhaps making impossible any restoration of Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation."

*The News*, 26 Sep. 1970

*Evening Standard*:

"The systematic pursuit of the guerillas by the Bedouins in Irbid was described by one Israeli as 'a pogrom, you know what that is.'"

*E Standard*, 23 Sep. 1970

*London Times*:

"Clearly Jordan has been hit by what in terms of human life is a major disaster, comparable to an earthquake or hurricane, far beyond the capacity of its own medical resources."

*London T*, 19 Sep. 1970

#### BOX 8

#### NEWS ANALYSIS

"These news-analysis articles reflect how the events in Jordan are interpreted in Cairo, Jerusalem and Washington. National interests and varying factual information have produced different conclusions, including these on key factors in the crisis:

**"King Hussein:** The Israelis feel that he has lost power to his generals, but Washington thinks he has prevailed. Cairo wants him to remain, but is not displeased by their feeling that his power is weakened.

**"The Palestinians:** Jerusalem sees the extremists on the defensive, but Washington thinks that the king has yet to prove he can control them. Cairo feels that a commando presence, purged of extremists, continues to be a valuable pressure on Israel.

**"Middle East Peace:** Cairo feels that a total victory by either the king or the commandos would have set back the chances of peace, and Jerusalem sees a ray of hope—that moderate Palestinian voices may be stronger now. Washington feels it can again turn its full attention to getting Soviet missiles out of Egypt's demilitarized zone."

*NYT*, 25 Sep. 1970

*Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser*:

"The Jordanian authorities insist on continuing to fire despite all efforts [for a cease-fire]. ... There is a plan to liquidate the Palestine Resistance. There is a fearful massacre taking place now in Jordan against all Arab and human values."

Cairo HS, 26 Sep. 1970

*Wilborn Hampton*, *Evening Standard*:

"Amman is committing suicide. I stick my head out and see no window glass unbroken, no wall unpocked by bullet holes. The streets of Amman are paved with rubble, spent shells and the dead. Some Ammanites tell me of soldiers smashing into houses and breaking the fingers of all the men and boys in those houses in which they find spent cartridges, their evidence of guerilla activity. They tell me of street corner executions. I myself can see some of the dead. No one seems able to even guess the full total. In the streets I see cars crunched into boxes by the army tanks. I hear the cries of the wounded lying helpless. I see Bedouin Army troops rounding up Palestinian boys as guerilla suspects.

"Red Cross officials tell me thousands of wounded lie untended in the suburban guerilla camps bombarded for days by the Army. I see the Army gunners training 77 mm artillery and 50 caliber machine guns on shanties on the slopes of the valley behind the hotel."

*E Standard*, 23 Sep. 1970

*Newsweek*:

"The battle in Jordan is over, but Hussein's war has just begun," said an Israeli foreign ministry official. "He had a chance to transform the monarchy into a presidency and become the leader of a Palestinian republic, but what can he be king of now? He can never rule the Palestinians again in any meaningful sense—only the Bedouins."

*Newsweek*, 5 Oct. 1970

*Sudan's President Brigadier General Ja'afar Numeiry*:

"We left Amman with the unanimous impression that there was a complete scheme to liquidate all members of the Palestine Resistance Movement, as well as all Palestinians residing in Amman. ... There is a people being butchered at the hands of an organized army."



## VIII

### THE AFTERMATH

*It is the right of any people to resist occupation. I still support the honest resistance man, the honest fedd'i. I still consider myself a fedd'i.*

*King Hussein to Murray Sayle  
S Times, 27 Sep. 1970*

In Jordan—and elsewhere—the aftermath of the September civil war began to focus on one issue: What will be the effect on peace in the Middle East?

"King Hussein has won a battle but he has lost the war in Jordan" according to U.S. State Department officials. "But we're simply not counting on Hussein's being around for too much longer," said one U.S. diplomat."

*Rodney McLeish, S. Times, 27 Sep. 1970*

"Hussein's victory, however, was bought at an enormous cost. Two years ago, in the midst of a less sanguinary struggle with the feda'iyeen, the . . . little monarch warned: 'If I don't rule this country, then I shall burn it.' He still rules, but much of his country is already in ruins; and the Palestinians, who account for approximately two thirds of his 2,200,000\* people, are not likely to forget how he cracked down on the guerillas."

*Newsweek, 5 Oct. 1970*

This was a battle won at the cost of political and human disaster. Hussein's first interest was to remove potential dangers to his throne and the Hashemite dynasty and patrimony of East Jordan (the former Transjordan) to which his kingdom has been shrunk by the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. His second interest was in the implementation of the "peace plan." The stumbling

*West Bank Population	675,000	Palestinians	675,000	100%
East Bank Population	1,575,000	Palestinians	1,900,000	57%
Total Jordanian Population	2,250,000	Palestinians	1,575,000	70%



block—the Palestinians—had to be removed. "Thus King Hussein has been forced once more to accept that the Palestinian problem can be solved by military action only if he *eliminates a large proportion of the population.*"

*Financial T*, 28 Sep. 1970

"Hussein himself has now made this strategy unworkable. The shock of his indiscriminate attack on Amman has alienated the very people—the politically and economically middle-of-the-road Palestinians—on whom he would have had to count for support. Indeed Hussein's continuance in power, far from being an essential element for a peace settlement, is now likely to become a major obstacle to it."

*Observer*, 27 Sep. 1970

"The fighting has inflicted yet another bout of suffering on the Palestinians. For [them], it is a tragic irony that they have endured these heavy losses from the Arabs, not the Israelis. They have proved that they will not just disappear. They cannot be wished out of existence by anyone."

*Guardian*, 28 Sep. 1970

"The Jordan war has shown that the Palestinians will now fight to the death rather than have their fate once more settled over their heads, whether the motive is to preserve Hussein's throne or to satisfy the interests of Israel and those of the various Arab governments."

*Observer*, 29 Sep. 1970

"Officially, the Jordan crisis has been buried under the agreement signed last week by King Hussein and the Palestinian guerilla leader, Yasser Arafat. But the bitter taste of last month's civil war lingers and there is no guarantee that fighting will not be resumed. The agreement is backed by ten Arab states, whose peace-keeping force is now in Jordan. But what will this force do if fighting is renewed?"

*Ibid.*, 18 Oct. 1970

On paper—but on paper only—an agreement was reached in Cairo. But nothing that took place in the summit or in the dozens of committee meetings that followed, contributed notably to the purpose for which they were convened: To bring about peace between the commandos and Hussein.

"King Hussein said he hoped that the Palestinian guerillas would respect the agreement which he had concluded with them. 'If they do not abandon the

towns we shall compel them to do so,' he declared. News of the agreement worked out between the Tunisian Prime Minister and the guerillas reached him as he was giving the interview. 'Let us leave it to the Tunisians,' he said. 'If we have to fight again, at least we shall have demonstrated our goodwill and we shall have the surety of the Arab world.'"

*London T*, 3 Oct. 1970

**Eleven days later:** "Addressing some fifty foreign journalists in his first international news conference since the recent civil war, the 34-year old king said he was hopeful that there would be unity and order in his kingdom. He was at pains not to offend the Arab commandos or feda'iyeen after having signed a (new) peace agreement last night with Yasser Arafat, their main leader. The king looked pale in his field marshal's uniform as he said that the latest fighting had been an 'unfortunate disaster' and 'the saddest and most difficult period of my life.'"

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 14 Oct. 1970

"Jordan today is a country divided. Loss of life and material damage, terrible as they are, seem slight compared with the utter desolation within the people, East Bankers and Palestinians alike. The shock of the fratricidal war was greater and deeper by far than that of the Arab defeat in June 1967. As they mourn their dead, tend their wounded, clear away the wreckage of their shattered homes, Palestinians express hatred for King Hussein and his army which appears, at the moment, too terrible ever to overcome.

"Palestinians are skeptical. 'This tragedy has shown us clearly that in a real emergency we can rely only on ourselves' a Fat'h source said. 'Arab promises of support do not go beyond the spoken word in most cases, either out of fear or reaction by Israel and the big powers, or because each leader fears for his own regime.'

" 'The main concern of the Arab regimes is to maintain and enforce the political status quo in their countries,' he said. 'No Arab regime will give genuine, active, full-scale support to a revolutionary movement that is truly revolutionary and inspires its own masses.'

" 'The Palestinians are alone,' he concluded, 'imprisoned in a set of circles.' He drew around a blob of ink—Israel, the Arab regimes, the big powers, the United Nations."

Irene Beeson, *OFNS*, 13 Oct. 1970  
*Daily Star*, 14 Oct. 1970



## BOX 9

### THREE VIEWS ON WASHINGTON AND THE PALESTINIANS

"Official Washington has known all along what ought to be done for the Palestinians. More than a year ago, on December 11, 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers said: 'There can be no lasting peace in the Middle East without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 made homeless. . . . The problem posed by the refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration towards hope and justice.'"

Joseph C. Harsch, *CMS*, 1 Oct. 1970

"The veto power of the Palestinians, who claim Israeli territory as their own, is thus deemed to be a major element of the situation. Yet the United States government knows next to nothing about them or their leaders. It does not know how to reach them, politically or physically, and it concedes that it sees no means of giving them a place in the negotiations or a stake in the outcome."


Max Frankel, *NYT*, 15 Sep. 1970

"The Palestinian Resistance Movement is a significant force in Middle Eastern politics, and one with which the United States must reckon if it wishes to see a settlement of the problems of the region favorable to its interests. The Palestinians have become a significant force because they have been mobilized in the course of a process of modernization which has affected their norms, values and attitudes. While there remain many Palestinians not yet fully mobilized, among those who have been the influence of nationalist revolutions throughout the developing nations has been important. The Palestinian leadership therefore views the world in the framework of a nationalist, revolutionary ideology, and this viewpoint shapes their reactions to events. In their attitudes toward their environment, they have become activists, and seek to influence conditions, rather than to accept them. This has serious implications for the Middle East and for United States policy. It appears that the United States will have a very difficult task before it in maintaining any degree of influence of friendship in the area. As the people of Palestine are now prepared to act decisively in their own interests, and will not be easily

deterred by outside influences, the United States cannot prepare a viable policy without reference to the Palestine Liberation Movement, or a manner contrary to the interests of that movement."

Tareq Y. Ismael, "The Palestine Emergence and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Middle East Forum*, Vol. XVII, Nos. 2, 3, Beirut, 1970, pp. 70-71.

### AIR DROPS



(Dessin de KONK.)

*Le Monde*, 26 Sep. 1970

"In this climate of opinion, any goodwill the American relief aid might have engendered among the commandos and their sympathizers seems to have been more than offset by the simultaneous delivery of American military equipment to bolster the Royal Jordanian Army."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 21 Oct. 1970



BOX 10

A NEW GENERATION OF PALESTINIANS

"This is the new generation of Palestinians whom John Foster Dulles meant when he said, 'the solution to the Palestine problem would only come with time—when a new generation of Palestinians emerged free from association with Palestine and without memory of the land and its past.' Far from proving Dulles right, the new Palestinian generation has produced a guerilla movement dedicated to the principle that national liberation can only be achieved by armed struggle."

Dr. Hisham Sharabi, "Palestine Guerillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness," *Middle East Forum*, Vol. XLVI, Nos. 2, 3, 1970, p. 19.

"... The emergence over the last three years of the Palestinian guerillas and people [has proved there is] a new entity and force to be reckoned with before a solution is sought and peace achieved. The world is suddenly reminded of an added complication and a great irony about the Arab-Israeli conflict: that the present state of tension stems exclusively from the plight that befell the Palestinian refugees 22 years ago. But up till 1967, the world chose to forget that the problem belonged to those people; that they were the ones whose lives were most devastatingly affected by it and to whom offers for a solution should have been addressed, not to the Syrians, the Egyptians and other Arabs. These latter had not lost their homelands, their territories, their dignity and been forced to live in refugee camps in abject poverty a few miles (in some cases a few yards) away from their towns, villages, orchards and all the intangible realities they once loved.

"Having lived as a stateless person for nearly all of my 26 years has given me enough hangups to come out of my ears and engulfed my very being at times. ...

"I belong to no nation, but damn you all, I belong to a people;\* a versatile and ingenious people who have the highest literacy rate in the Middle East, who have 64,000 university graduates, who are on the faculties of all the major universities in the region and who man the most sensitive positions in technology and the arts from Beirut to Dhahran and from Suna'a to Amman, and whose only sin was to refuse any solution to their problem other than return to their homeland.\*

"Now we are on the scene and determined—to fight, to talk, to reason, to listen. We merely want to go back to our homeland. We do not want a hodge-podge Palestine state carved out of the West Bank, nor do we want an absurd puppet state subservient to anyone.

"I say we merely want to go back to our homeland. My father never made it. Maybe I won't make it either and my son will. But if he does not, I feel sure his son will make the pledge: Never to forget thee, Palestine."

F. Turki, *Fateh*, 21 Aug. 1970

\*Italics ours.

"One lesson above all others stands out after the devastating civil war in Jordan. It is that no peace is possible unless the unhappy Palestinian people are allowed a say in shaping it."

CSM, 29 Sep. 1970

"During the intervening months nothing was done either to give them hope of a brighter 'future' or to channel their thinking away from 'bitterness and frustration' towards 'hope and justice.' The sad thing is that nothing was done to give them the idea they too can benefit from a stable settlement in the Middle East. The established governments in the Middle East would benefit. Their citizens would benefit. But until now there has been no reason why the refugees should want peace. So far as they could see their only chance of regaining a permanent home was through war. But somehow, somewhere, someone ought to be working out a plan to give the refugees their 'just settlement.' For without it there never will be 'lasting peace in the Middle East.'"

Joseph C. Harsch, *ibid.*, 1 Oct. 1970

"... The reality of the Jarring talks would be improved if the Palestinians were given what the Rogers formula did not allow for: separate institutional recognition in the talks. If they are treated as outcasts, they will be driven to behave like gangsters."

Sunday T, 27 Sep. 1970

"The Palestinians have consistently been the most unrepresented group in the Middle East. There will be no lasting peace if they are again the losers in the compromises that any form of settlement must entail."

Guardian, 28 Sep. 1970



Until 1967, the Arab states, Israel, and the great powers all dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict as though the Palestinians did not exist. Now—and in spite of the Jordan civil war and all attempts at liquidating the Palestinian Liberation Movement—any decision concerning Palestine would be impossible to carry out without the Palestinians' concurrence.

"For the king, his clouded victory in the civil war could well prove a Pyrrhic one. Many Arab and Western observers agreed last week that Hussein's position as king may be barely tenable. Never a favorite among his fellow Arab rulers, the king has now lost almost all support. Palestinians living under Israeli occupation on the Jordan's West Bank last week talked proudly of 'our revolution.' Algeria and Libya, at one point during the civil war, made moves to join on the side of the feda'iyeen. Libya also cut off its annual \$25.2 million subsidy to Jordan and so did Kuwait, which was contributing \$39.2 million. Even Hussein's lukewarm friends like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser can no longer be counted on for support. After guerilla chieftain Arafat skipped out of Jordan and met with Nasser in Cairo to brief him on the battle, Egypt's President fired off a scathing protest accusing Hussein of lying, breaking promises and perpetrating 'a horrible massacre.'

"The king is left with few foreign friends, surrounded by implacable foes and plagued by a shortage of funds. A majority of the people in his kingdom are potential antagonists, and a sizeable portion of his country is in Israeli hands. During the fighting in Amman, the 34-year old monarch kept a helicopter standing by at Hummar in case he lost the battle and was forced to flee after seventeen years on a troubled throne. In the days to come, Hussein may regret that he never gave his pilot the order to fly."

*Newsweek*, 5 Oct. 1970

## Appendix I

### THE HIJACK AFFAIR

"... Our blows are directed at the weak parts in the enemy's structure, to throw him into confusion..."

"The operations of the Front demonstrate that the safety and life of any imprisoned member of the Revolution is no less valuable than the safety or life of any Westerner, and that it will not permit Arab lands or Arabs to be considered as fair game for abuse..."

"Has it been said that these operations expose the lives of innocent people to danger? In today's world, no one is innocent, no one is neutral. A man is either with the oppressor or the oppressed. He who takes no interest in politics gives his blessing to the prevailing order..."\*

"... [PFLP's] over-riding objectives were these: To dramatize internationally the plight of the Palestinians and their determination to try to force the world to return them to Palestine: to show the rest of the Palestine commando movement that desperate measures could work; and to show Arabs and other governments that the commandos would have no part in a settlement with Israel that did not get them home."

Snow and Phillips, p. 26.

On Sunday, September 6, 1970, the "Voice of the Palestine Revolution" from Baghdad broadcast the following report at 18.29 GMT: "A Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine spokesman said tonight that the jet aircraft belonging to Swissair hijacked by our revolutionaries had landed safely at a military airport somewhere in Jordan with its 155 crew and passengers. These will be held as hostages until our revolutionaries detained in Swiss prisons are released."

The Swissair DC-8 was seized over France at 11.15 GMT while on a flight from Zurich to New York.

Thirteen minutes later, a PFLP spokesman said, "Brothers, we have just received the following: Our revolutionaries are now in control of a Pan American aircraft."

\*Policy document published by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 1970.



They were not able to land at Beirut airport because the aircraft is a Boeing 747 and Beirut cannot accommodate it. More strikes against U.S. interests, revolutionaries. Greetings to all the revolutionaries."

The Pan American Jumbo Jet with 180 passengers and crew was seized over the Bay of Biscay at 1.30 GMT while on a flight from Amsterdam to New York. The two Palestinian hijackers, Samir Ibrahim and Ali Ali, both born in Jerusalem, planned to take the Jumbo directly to Cairo airport, but the pilot took it to Beirut, claiming that he was short of fuel. Beirut airport control radioed that the runway was too short for this type of aircraft, but the Jumbo was landed safely. At Beirut airport, PFLP commandos came on board with explosives; one of them remained with the hijackers. After refuelling, the plane left Beirut at 23.40 GMT, arriving in Cairo at 2.20 GMT, September 7.

About three hours later, at 05.05 GMT Cairo radio announced that, after the passengers had been disembarked safely, the hijackers blew up the aircraft by setting it on fire.

This was the first of four aircraft to be blown up, costing about \$30,000,000. One of the three commandos said, "Hitting them in their pocketbooks may bring the .... to their senses."

A PFLP spokesman said that Cairo was chosen "to express protest against the Egyptian government policy in accepting the Rogers' peace proposals."

At 16.00 GMT on September 6, Israel announced that she had withdrawn from the peace talks.

On the same day, at 21.37 GMT, Amman home service broadcast the following message: "Officials have received information that two aircraft—one TWA and one Swissair, have landed safely at a Jordanian desert area suitable for emergency landings. Ambulance teams have gone to the area. We will report further details as received."\*

**September 7:** 09.55 GMT "An authoritative Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine source stated a short while ago that if anyone tried to approach the airfield where the two hijacked aircraft were parked, the PFLP would blow up the two aircraft with their passengers. The source added that under civil law, the area belonged to nobody. It was a PFLP base guarded by PFLP fighters and controlled by PFLP commandos.

\*In fact, the TWA Boeing 707 with 155 passengers and crew on board was the first aircraft to be seized over Belgium at 10.15 GMT while on a flight from Lydda to New York via Athens and Frankfurt. The hijackers boarded the plane at Frankfurt.

"The source said the following were the PFLP's demands; the immediate release of [three PFLP] feda'iyeen detained in Zurich and their return to Jordan, the dispatch of the body of the martyr killed in the El-Al operation and the immediate return to Amman from London of the feda'i girl [Leila Khaled] who had accompanied him, and the immediate release of three Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) feda'iyeen now detained in West Germany.

"The source said that the PFLP would continue to detain Israelis and those Israelis holding dual Israeli-U.S. citizenship, Swiss, British, and West German passengers until these demands were met. No Israeli passengers would be released until all feda'iyeen were released from enemy prisons."

Iraq News Agency

Nine minutes later: "Brothers, we have just received the following: Our revolutionaries are now in control of a Zionist El-Al aircraft; the aircraft is now heading for a secret airfield."

The announcer did not know that the attempt on El-Al had failed. The hijack attempt on the Boeing 707 with 170 passengers and crew on board took place over the English Channel at 11.45 GMT. The plane was on a flight from Lydda to New York via Amsterdam. The hijackers, Leila Khaled\* and 'Rene' Arguello\*\* boarded the plane at Amsterdam. During the attempt and the scuffle that ensued, Shlomo Vider, a steward who tried to grab Arguello, was knocked on the head and seriously wounded; Arguello was shot; Leila was overpowered and the aircraft made an emergency landing at Heathrow Airport, England. Detective Merson of Scotland Yard went on board and an argument broke between him and the crew who did not want the two hijackers to be taken off the plane. But despite opposition, they were taken off and put in an ambulance. Vider was put in another. Arguello died before reaching the hospital and Leila was detained by the police, for one night at West Drayton Station and then for twenty-three nights at Ealing Police Station.

\*Leila Khaled is a Palestinian Arab commando, born in Haifa, Palestine, in 1944. Like most of the other hijackers, she was driven out of Palestine in 1948 with her mother and seven brothers and sisters. Leila lived in Lebanon as a Palestinian refugee. As a student at the American University of Beirut, she met the new generation of Palestinians who vowed to go back to Palestine one day. In 1967, she joined PFLP. From then on, she believed in armed struggle as the only way back. This was not the first hijack operation for Leila. In August 1969, on a flight from Rome, she hijacked a TWA Boeing 707 with another commando and blew it up at Damascus airport.

\*\*Patrick Joseph Arguello (movement name: Rene) was not an Arab. He was an American, born in San Francisco in 1943 of an Anglo-Irish mother and a Nicaraguan father. In his letters to his family he wrote of his belief in revolution. When he visited the refugee camps in Jordan, he was shocked at 'the most unbelievable conditions' and he decided then and there to join PFLP. His brother Robert says, 'We sometimes thought he might be killed fighting a battle in some South American jungle. We never dreamed he would die for the cause of Palestine.' Leila Khaled, his co-hijacker on El-Al, said that after getting wounded, he was tied up and shot four times by El-Al security guards.



12.06 GMT: "An official Jordanian source has stated that the Jordanian authorities concerned are now ... making the necessary arrangements to move the passengers of the aircraft which landed in Jordanian desert territory ... to suitable places. The source said that both aircraft were safe and the condition of all passengers was good."

Amman HS

17.00 GMT "In reply to a question by our political correspondent, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated this evening that the handling of the matter of the hijacked aircraft is in the hands of the governments concerned. Israel expects these government to insist that the Jordanian government fulfill its international commitments and free all passengers, crews and aircraft unconditionally and without delay."

Israel HS

17.52 GMT "A PFLP spokesman announced at a press conference here this afternoon that the PFLP had chosen this time to hijack the four aircraft because the Palestine revolution was faced with most serious liquidationist attempts..."

Syrian Arab News Agency

**September 9:** "Palestine feda'iyeen today hijacked a BOAC VC-10 which was on its way from Bahrain to Beirut. The pilot was forced to land at 12.39 GMT at Beirut International Airport for refuelling. [The plane was carrying 105 passengers and crew. At Beirut airport, three feda'iyeen came on board. One was a girl commando who began handing the passengers landing cards to 'Revolution Airport.'] The aircraft took off from Beirut airport at 14.30."

Beirut HS

**September 10:** "In a situation inflamed by the Middle East peace moves and the commando hijacking to Jordan of three Western airliners the country Wednesday night seemed to be plunging into the worst crisis since the June War of 1967, according to observers here."

*Daily Star*, 10 Sep. 1970

**September 11:** From Baghdad came reports of the hostages; at 17.30 GMT: "Your Palestine revolution ... is ensuring the comfort and safety of the foreign passengers and protecting them. The Palestine Red Crescent is supplying the passengers with their needs and comforts..."

At 18.08 GMT, the PLO Central Committee issued the following statement: "The Resistance, which has emerged from the ranks of our dispersed people, in adopting these humane measures warns the imperialist countries against an exaggerated show of care for the safety of passengers to justify the military

intervention in our country which they have been planning in order to impose a peaceful solution in the interests of the Zionist enemy and imperialists."

Baghdad "VPR"

"The most explosive force in the Near East, of course, emanates from the Palestinian Arabs. The plane hijackings have been the work of Palestinians belonging to the extremist People's Front for Palestine Liberation under Dr. George Habbash."

"... It is easy to understand why the gents of the Palestinian cause are desperate men. For the Palestinians are a nation dispossessed. Most of them fled or were driven from their homes when the state of Israel was established in 1948. Now they exist as stateless refugees. Being proud heirs to an ancient cultural tradition, many of them highly-educated, their expectations run high. But for years they were used as pawns by the Arab states, and tricked by their own leaders. The gap between ambition and achievement bred a mood of seething frustration, resentment, and hatred. And out of that mood were born the hijack and the guerilla fighters."

"As it happens, there is a time tested remedy for meeting this kind of frustration—the remedy of nationhood. If they had a state to run—cities to police, mails to deliver, roads to build—the Palestinians would not now be seizing planes and undermining other countries. This is why serious people, surveying the possibilities for peace in the Near East, have always figured there needed to be some kind of Palestine entity."

"But the recent current peace initiative, a jerry-built, slapdash affair leaves no opening for a Palestinian entity. It addresses itself to, and thus enshrines, the present states of Israel, Jordan and Egypt. To the Palestinians it offers only compensation for lost lands, or possible returns to Israel."

Joseph Kraft, *IHT*, 11 Sep. 1970

**September 12:** 19.03 GMT "The armed men of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine this afternoon blew up the three aircraft detained in the Jordanian desert. Reliable sources said that all the passengers of these aircraft were safe and none of them had been hurt. Prior to this, the passengers of these aircraft had been conveyed to Amman."

Amman HS

"The VC-10 had landed to cheers from the guerillas. When it went up in a cloud of black smoke and orange flames, they cheered again. The next to go was the TWA jet, followed reluctantly by the Swissair DC-8; the guerillas had to fire shots into the fuselage to help trigger the gelignite. The smoke could be seen from the balconies of the Intercontinental Hotel, forty-five miles away."

Snow and Phillips, p. 62



The Palestine Revolution Central Committee decided to suspend the PFLP membership because it allegedly violated the Central Committee's decision of September 10.

**September 13:** 15.00 GMT "... Some 350 West Bank residents and about 100 Gaza Strip residents have been arrested, including 80 women. The Israeli military spokesman confirmed that six West Bank and Gaza Strip residents were deported yesterday."

**September 14:** 05.00 GMT "*Davar* says these arrests must not be regarded as mere reaction to terrorist threats to the lives of the 40(sic) hostages. The people arrested are suspected of helping terrorists in their operations against Israel and of maintaining contacts with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The paper hopes it is now clear to the hijacking gang that any harm done to the hostages and any attempt to discriminate between them will result in a drastic reaction.

"*Yedi'ot Hadashot* says the world understands that the arrests made by Israel among residents of the territories suspected of collaboration with the PFLP were designed to exchange the detainees for Israelis and Jews held by the terrorists in Jordan."

Israel HS

Two TWA airline pilots James A. Majer and Alfred A. Kiburis said: "These people did not intimidate us. They were very polite," and "we've been treated very well."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 14 Sep. 1970

**September 15:** "That the PFLP has succeeded in taking control of the desert airstrip and even issued its own visas to passengers of the three hijacked airliners was evidence of how powerful the commando authority had grown on Jordanian territory. Although 'Revolution Airport' as the PFLP called it, was surrounded by Jordanian troops, they were helpless when it came to taking any action against the guerillas."

*Financial T*, 15 Sep. 1970

**September 16:** "The hijacking of three airliners by Palestinian guerillas 'is the shame of the Arab world,' King Hussein of Jordan said in an interview with *Le Figaro* [Paris] today. 'Things cannot go on as they are at present,' he said. 'Every day Jordan is sinking a little farther. There must be either peace—or war. The feda'iyen (guerillas) must respect the agreements made with the government or take the consequences.'"

*London T*, 15 Sep. 1970

This was taken as a declaration of war by the commandos. The PFLP was invited to rejoin the Central Committee. Heavy shelling by the Army began the following day.

"What are the longer-term lessons in this story? The Popular Front's operation was a combination of two techniques of revolutionary terrorism developed during the past few years—the hijacking of aircraft and the taking of hostages (though the latter is as old as history).

"[There must be concerted] attempts to get at the political and social basis of these actions and, where possible, to improve them. In the case of the Middle East, this means pressing on more urgently with the efforts already begun on the initiative of the Americans to get a peace settlement which the Super Powers can guarantee, but at the same time making a more deliberate effort to involve the Palestinians more directly in the search for peace. If some of them now act like desperadoes, it is partly because for many years they have been offered no constructive role in deciding their own fate and, therefore, feel like outlaws. But a Middle East peace which cannot command the support of the majority of Palestinians and which they have had no responsibility for making will not last long."

*Observer*, 13 Sep. 1970

Major Potts, one of the seventeen hostages to leave Amman at noon of September 26 on a MEA flight to Cyprus, summed up his detention in Jordan as follows: "I can only say that I met a hell of a lot of these guerilla chaps," said Major Potts "... and they were nice fellows. I got quite fond of some of them. And if only they would be weaned away from all this political stuff, they would be good chaps to help win their homeland back. Which I think they deserve, frankly. They deserve their part of it anyway. I've got a lot of sympathy for them."

Snow and Phillips, p. 158.

Captain Goulborn, captain of the British Overseas Airways Corporation aircraft: "You have got to be fair to them, whatever water they had, we had our share. They treated us very properly all the time and gave us water when we needed it."

*Daily Star*, 27 Sep. 1970

The last six hostages were released on September 29. Did PFLP's hijackings succeed?



"Well, it is true that they failed in their attempt to blackmail the Israelis. But is it also true that they succeeded in blackmailing Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. And if they failed to plant the word 'PALESTINE'\* on the map, they succeeded in their own outrageous way in planting it in the minds of those who would not normally have bothered with it."

Snow and Phillips, p. 174

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\*Emphasis ours.

## Appendix II

### NUMEIRY'S PRESS CONFERENCE

The full text of Sudanese President Ja'afar Numeiry's press conference in Cairo, September 26, is reproduced below:

On our return from Amman last night (Sept. 25), I presented, on the mission's behalf, to the (Arab) heads of state a detailed report depicting a true image of conditions in Jordan and describing what our mission undertook there. After the kings and presidents had heard this report, they decided that, together with the other members of the delegation, I would hold this press conference to relay to you, on their behalf, the details of the said report as well as what the kings and presidents decided to add to it.

I had the honor of heading the (Arab peace) delegation which comprised: Hussein Shafe'i, member of the Higher Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union; Bahi Ladgham, Tunisia's prime minister; Saad Abdallah, Kuwait's defense and interior minister; Dr. Rashad Pharaon, the personal representative of King Feisal, who has not been able to attend this conference because of sudden illness; Farouk Abou Issa, Sudan's foreign minister; and Gen. Mohammad Sadek, the UAR chief of staff.

The delegation arrived in Amman at 7 p.m. and immediately called on King Hussein. At the onset of the meeting, I informed him of the mission's authorities, emphasizing that Jordan had not abided by the cease-fire we had agreed upon with him and that the mission had returned promptly to Amman to sound out his view. I indicated to him that one of our functions was to contact Abu Ammar (PLO chief executive and Fat'h's official spokesman), which we were unable to do during our first trip to Amman in the wake of the first session of the Cairo conference of the Arab heads of state.

After that, I gave the opportunity to my colleagues to express their views and make their own comments. All of them took the floor. We all agreed on the following:

1. That the conference of the (Arab) heads of state was still in session in Cairo and that the mission will not return (to Cairo) except with specific results binding both parties and reassuring both the conferees as well as the Arab masses,



2. The need to stop fighting, even for a specific period which would give the opportunity to all to acquaint themselves with the facts—particularly that the number of deaths is estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000.
3. The sovereignty of the Jordanian state over its own territory is undeniable and is not subject to discussion.
4. The issue is not a constitutional one concerning Jordan alone. It is rather an historical and humanitarian responsibility affecting the whole Arab nation.
5. The escalation of bloody events in Jordan is increasing national and international beliefs that the agreement we reached was motivated by either temptation or a desire to pressure persons who were held prisoners.
6. Meeting Yasser Arafat is an urgent necessity under these tragic circumstances and agreement with him would be tantamount to agreement with the genuine commandos, not the infiltrators and suspects in the ranks of the resistance.
7. King Hussein has to issue a statement, reiterating the full and immediate adherence of the Jordanian armed forces to the cease-fire.

#### HUSSEIN'S VIEW

At this point, I would like to summarize King Hussein's view as follows:

1. There are noncommando elements who wish to destroy this country. They are elements planted in the commando movement. There are reports about the influx (into Jordan) of trucks loaded with feda'iyen. Both Syria and Iraq are launching vehement radio campaigns against us from their respective stations.
2. The northern areas of Jordan are occupied, particularly Irbid, which is Jordan's second city as well as the backbone of the country's agricultural wealth. Amman is completely secure. There is nothing in it except a few pockets of resistance which we are trying to mop up in order to restore normal life to the city.
3. With regards to our intended meeting with Abu Ammar, the king said this didn't concern him and he left it up to the mission to decide what it wants to do. He said he had no objection to authorize the broadcasting of a message (to Abu Ammar) through the radio station. He said he held Yasser Arafat fully responsible for all that had taken place. Concerning threats to Arafat's life, he said they were not unfounded. He concluded by telling the mission: "Try to exert all efforts but I shall implement the decisions I have taken." He repeated this sentence three times.

#### CONTACTS WITH ABU AMMAR

The mission set up its headquarters at the UAR Embassy (in Amman), making use of the radio and wireless stations to receive Yasser Arafat's answer.

Yasser Arafat's answer came around 11.30 p.m., setting the meeting time for 1 a.m. and the meeting place at Jabal Luweibda. The message sent to Brother Arafat read:

"Struggling Brother Yasser Arafat, in my name and on behalf of the delegation which arrived in Amman tonight, I beg of you to suggest to us, through any available means, how we can contact you and the place and time of the meeting. Since the matter is important and urgent, please act immediately. I repeat: immediately. Thank you."

Arafat's answer came as follows: "Brother President Ja'afar Mohammad Numeiry, I heard your message through Amman radio concerning an immediate meeting. In answer to your plea, I suggest that we meet tonight at 1 a.m. We suggest that you arrive by car to the UAR Embassy in Jabal Luweibda through the road linking the Caravan Hotel to Alya School. An emissary will meet you there and accompany you to the meeting place. We have instructed Palestinian revolutionaries to cease-fire. We have insisted on that. I hope you will insist on the other party to observe a cease-fire in Jabal Luweibda. Until we meet, your brother Yasser Arafat."

After that, I contacted King Hussein and asked him to provide us with cars to transport us to the rendezvous point. I asked him to secure a cease-fire in the meeting area—particularly that Arafat had asked for this in his message while emphasizing that his own men would not fire under any condition that night in Jabal Luweibda.

The king stalled. He did not keep his word about providing us with transportation. Nor did a high-ranking officer in his armed forces whom I had asked to accompany us. This held us until 2.15 a.m. and prompted me to postpone the meeting with Abu Ammar until between 2 and 2.30 a.m. instead of 1 a.m. We even thought of cancelling the meeting altogether for fear on his life, particularly that we had learned that the meeting area would be shelled (by Hussein's troops) at 5 a.m. The cars finally arrived and we decided to go.

We reached the rendezvous place at about 3 a.m.

Earlier, we (the delegates) had discussed our approach to Abu Ammar and agreed on the following:



1. That we should sound him out about the cease-fire and its terms and whether he intended to stay in Amman or wished to accompany us to Cairo.
2. That should a cease-fire be agreed upon, we would endeavor to pull out the Army and the feda'iyeen from the city.
3. That we should sound him out on the question of medical and food supplies as well as the formation of a committee to supervise distribution of same.

#### MEETING ABU AMMAR

We started our meeting with Abu Ammar by discussing the above. Some members of the (peace) delegation also took the floor before Abu Ammar was given the opportunity to speak.

When Abu Ammar spoke, it was evident that he was extremely upset by the tragedy.

#### ABU AMMAR REVEALS FACTS ABOUT THE PLOT

I shall summarize what he said as follows:

1. The crackdown was barbaric and savage-like. It was similar to what happened in Karbala (Iraq, several centuries ago). Complete liquidation of the Palestinian people is being attempted. Casualties are up to 25,000 and there are not 25,000 commandos.
2. The Amman authorities had evacuated Jordanians from the city before the crackdown. They subsequently besieged it with three regiments of about 74,000 troops—most of which were pulled back to Amman from the frontline (with Israel). He said: "while you were conferring with him (Hussein) in Hummar ... the house where I was staying was being shelled."
3. One hour after signature of the (13 point) agreement with the five-man Arab League Reconciliation Commission (in mid-September), the Rifai cabinet was toppled and a military cabinet set up.
4. The first thing we were asked to do by the monarch's military government was to turn in our arms. Abu Ammar commented on this saying: "In 1948, we were deceived and we turned in our arms. This time we shall not relinquish our arms. We shall fight from house to house."

5. This is a conspiracy and we have evidence today that the king has brought in a new brigade to attack Jabal Hashimi.

6. Fourteen thousand young men (Palestinians) were rounded up from their houses only for being young and able to carry arms—although they didn't have any arms. The Army then proceeded to rape our women and loot the stores.

7. All that I ask for is a 48-hour cease-fire to bury the dead, but I bet you, you will not be able to arrange for that because this is a planned scheme. Anyway, I would agree to such a cease-fire and I guarantee that we will implement it immediately and fully on condition that the other party does the same.

The Red Cross asked for a 24-hour truce, I agree to that. I also agree that the Army and commandos pull out of Amman. But I don't agree to pull out the militia because he has a militia too.

8. There must be guarantees for implementation of the cease-fire agreement. We propose a cease-fire executive body from the Arab armies. Under the shadow of such an Arab force, the Jordanian troops and the commandos would withdraw from Amman. We will then restore national unity through a national government.

9. Casualties in army ranks are not less than 5,000 and equipment losses include 93 tanks plus other vehicles. The Army is filled with hatred for the feda'iyeen.

10. The commandos control the whole northern province. They are capable of launching guerilla war. This means that the Jordanian armed forces cannot deter the commandos. We can resist and resist for a long time.

This, in brief, is what Abu Ammar had to say.

We returned from our meeting with Abu Ammar at 4.30 p.m. We obtained from him a statement agreeing to cease fire such as the time before. Abu Ammar accompanied us back to our headquarters.

When we got there, we started to discuss our next step. Gunfire had been raging in Amman without interruption since 5.30 a.m.

After agreeing to a plan of action, some of us thought we shouldn't see King Hussein again because he hadn't ceased fire. After a brief discussion, however, it was agreed that we call on King Hussein again. I called him on the phone at 8.45 a.m. and told him we had accomplished our task of conferring with Abu Ammar and that we were on our way to confer with him.



We then headed for his palace at Hummar, reaching it at 9.15 a.m. King Hussein received us at 9.40 a.m. I told him about the horrible destruction caused by the tanks and artillery. I invited him to broadcast a statement in his own voice, saying that I myself would read out the statement of Abu Ammar. I told him that the efforts exerted this dawn by members of the delegation, particularly the aged among them, to stop the bloodshed should be greatly appreciated and acted upon.

To ensure execution, I suggested that we place at the disposal of both parties a number of Arab officers. The king agreed and we decided to set-up this (cease-fire) supervision body under the command of an Egyptian officer and the participation of four others from the UAR and two from each of the Sudan, Kuwait, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

I wish to read to you the agreement reached between King Hussein and the delegation as announced over radio Amman. My statement read:

"Fellow citizens, upon the return of the Arab heads of state mission to Amman for the second time, we met with our struggling brother Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), chairman of the Central Committee of the Palestinian Resistance Movement and Commander in Chief of the Palestinian Revolution Forces, as well as with a number of his brethren from the Resistance Command. Due to circumstances and complications you are well aware of, and because of his inability to address you personally, he has asked me to read to you this statement written by his own hand and carrying his own signature:

"Masses of our great people, heroic revolutionaries, to spare innocent blood; for citizens to bury their dead, patch their wounds and secure their basic needs in water, food and medicine; in response to the appeal of delegates from the conference of Arab heads of state currently convening in Cairo who arrived in Amman under the chairmanship of General Ja'afar Numeiry, in order to foil the schemes and ill intentions of the enemies of our nation; and in my capacity as Commander in Chief of the Palestinian Revolution Forces, I consent to a cease-fire and order all forces of the Palestinian Revolution to cease fire immediately. The Palestinian Revolution will abide by this decision only if the other party abides by it. Signed: Yasser Arafat, Commander in Chief of the Palestinian Revolution, September 24, 1970."

Copies of this statement can be made and distributed to those who wish to have them.

## HUSSEIN'S RADIO MESSAGE

After that, King Hussein addressed members of the Jordanian armed forces saying:

"Reiterating the cease-fire order, and after the brotherly leaders of the Palestinian commando movement confirmed their readiness to observe the cease-fire strictly in their meeting with the Arab delegation, I repeat my order to the Jordanian armed forces to cease fire fully and immediately.

"At the same time, saboteurs, those who have been misled and the misleaders should repent ... we accepted an agreement proposed to us by some brethren from the Palestine Liberation Organization to put an end once and for all for the crisis at its roots. The said agreement had been also approved by the Arab (peace) delegation in the course of their first visit to Amman. I ask all of you to cooperate with honesty to help us in our efforts to restore peace, security and normal life to our people and beloved country. God bless you."

I (Numeiry) personally made the following concluding statement (over radio Amman): "My brethren in Jordan, you have heard the two messages addressed to you by King Hussein and Yasser Arafat to observe cease-fire immediately to spare blood.

"To safeguard our nation against the threats of imperialist plots and to protect the heroic Palestinian Revolution, I appeal to you in the name of the Arab kings and presidents convening in Cairo, and in the name of the masses of our struggling Arab nation, to observe the cease-fire immediately in preparation for implementation of the agreement reached and announced earlier ..."

After that, and on a suggestion from King Hussein, we agreed to set up a joint committee comprising representatives of the Jordanian government and the feda'iyeen to implement the agreement and go over its details. The delegation approved the suggestion. King Hussein asked that the said committee help the delegation in distributing the aid flowing in to Jordan. We told him that the Cairo conference had appointed a Relief Committee to undertake this task.

I then asked him to release the 14,000 Palestinians rounded up from their homes simply because they can carry arms. His answer was that the Army was now screening them to see if there were foreigners among them. He promised to release the Palestinians and Jordanians among them, if any.

## CRUSHING CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN THE STREETS

On our way back from the Hummar Palace to the UAR Embassy after this meet-



ing and after the statements were broadcast over radio Amman, shelling went on unabated and gunfire continued throughout Amman and the hills, particularly in areas of Palestinian concentration, in Ashrafiyah, in Jabal Luweibda and in Masarwa. Moreover, Ashrafiyah Hospital was shelled with artillery, and hundreds of children, women and aged people were moved to the streets while vehicles were summoned to crush them; physicians as well as male and female nurses were also kidnapped and threatened—all this in order to force the Palestinian commandos to evacuate the whole area.

We continued to observe the situation until 1.30 p.m. when General Habis Majali, the Military Governor, issued a communiqué claiming that the detonations being heard are to be attributed to attempts by the Engineering Corps to clear the area from mines planted there.

Members of the delegation had no choice but to contact the General Military Command and draw its attention. This was done by General Sadek, who spoke to the Command on my behalf, emphasizing that we had succeeded in stopping fire from the feda'iyeen side while they continue to be subjected to continuous artillery shelling and collective massacre by the Jordanian armed forces.

Sheikh Saad Abdallah talked to the command in the same sense and so did Bahi Ladgham, who said "This is a criminal scheme being implemented on Israel's behalf, this is a genocide being committed against the Palestinian people. The delegation cannot assume this responsibility."

Dr. Rashad Pharaon and Farouk Abu Issa spoke to them (the Army Command) too. Abu Issa talked to them on my behalf, asking them to relay his words to King Hussein. He asked them to cancel the order transferring the two Sudanese officers, without our consultation, to the Irbid area. He asked them to inform King Hussein that, in my capacity as head of the delegation, I had decided to submit an urgent report to the Arab heads of state convening in Cairo explaining the situation to them and informing them of the continuous violation of the cease-fire agreement by the Jordanian authorities.

A few minutes after these talks with the Higher Command, sniper bullets were being fired towards the Egyptian Embassy where we were staying, and this aroused my anxiety and frustration to such an extent that I put a call through to King Hussein personally and informed him of the eminent danger that was threatening the lives of the Committee members. I even made him listen over the telephone line to the sound of bullets. He was silent, and followed by saying: I am doing my duty now. After that he sent us Brigadier Mohammed Khalil, Deputy Chief of Operations, and Zuheir Mattar, Chief of Security, who called

the Operations Room from the Embassy and ordered an immediate cease-fire as they had personally seen what was going on. They could not enter the Embassy except after exchanging their car for an armoured tank.

He was very surprised that the firing stopped immediately after they called the Chief of Operations and this was further proof that it was a plan enacted upon to force us towards leaving immediately. It also refuted earlier claims by the Jordanian authorities that it was hard to implement a cease-fire due to difficulties in relaying orders and instructions to the troops in various areas, particularly that this was time-consuming. This further emphasized for us the fact that the relaying of orders did reach the troops speedily, and that the organizational structure of the Jordanian Army was very efficient. After the firing on us stopped, it resumed less intensely, and we could hear the sound of bullets from all areas in Amman, and see the smoke rising from most places. Yesterday on our way to the airport from the Embassy, we were riding an armoured car, and it was very surprising that the Army fired on us while in this car, and so we decided to relate this incident with all the other incidents to the conference of the Chiefs of State and we have.

We left Amman at seven o'clock (yesterday) local time, in the midst of all this inconvenience and constant shelling from field artillery, tanks as well as medium and heavy guns. While at the airport we saw several projectors being directed at Jabal Ashrafiyah and the Wahdat camp to assist the artillery in zeroing on them once more. Anyway, we left Amman with the unanimous impression that there was a complete scheme to liquidate all members of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, as well as all Palestinians residing in Amman. This scheme is being implemented in spite of all promises and agreement. Nothing will stand in the way of its implementation.

The delegation saw as a result of all these facts brought to light that what is taking place in Jordan is definitely a pre-planned and organized scheme for annihilating the entire Palestinian nation, as I said, and liquidating the Palestinian Resistance and that the Jordanian authorities were and still are lying and stalling for time until they attain their goal. We have knowledge that the evaluations of the situation as the Jordanian authorities had planned would have resulted in this total annihilation over a period of three days at the most, but arriving at such a conclusion was wrong, for eight days have already passed and the Jordanian Army still does not control Amman, and it will not be able to for another three months, this being my personal opinion.

At last, and before all of you friends, I would like to express my deep felt gratitude and highest esteem to the members of the Committee who have joined me on this commission and they are: Hussein Shafi, Bahi Ladgham, Sheikh



Said Abdallah, Doctor Rashad Pharaon, Major General Mohammad Sadek and Farouk Abu Issa, as well as all the accompanying gentlemen of the different delegations who have worked tirelessly and continuously and under severe strains as well as eminent dangers that have placed all their lives in danger a number of times. For them all my esteem and gratitude. I also have to express my deep gratitude to the entire Egyptian Embassy and people who have shared their food with us and welcomed us in their Embassy, and rendered us all possible help towards accomplishing our mission, while placing all their facilities at our disposal, all of which helped us to accomplish our mission fully.

Lastly I would like to thank all the press people who have attended this conference. I would also like to present my gratitude and that of my commission to you all for following up the news of this major disaster the likes of which I have never seen, hoping that it will find amongst you all every attention and sincerity because out there is a people being butchered at the hands of an organized army. Thank you.

*From Fateh, 30 Sep. 1970.*

### Appendix III

#### CASUALTIES

*God is my witness. A massacre has been committed. Thousands of people are under the debris. Bodies have rotted. Hundreds of thousands of people are homeless. Our dead are scattered in the streets. Hunger and thirst are killing our remaining children, women and old men.*

*Yasser Arafat in a letter to Arab leaders  
September 22, 1970*

"Amid the conflicting stream of statements by the authorities and the commandos each claiming to be in control of the key sectors of Amman it was impossible to determine the real tactical position in the capital where the Palestinian Red Crescent reported hundreds of dead and wounded in the savage fighting."

*Daily Star, 18 Sep. 1970*

"Countless civilians were dying in the streets for want of medical aid, the reports said. Presumably they were caught in crossfire. . . Reports reaching Beirut said casualties in two days of fighting mounted into the thousands."

*Ibid., 19 Sep. 1970*


"Reports from Amman said there were appalling scenes in the shell-torn streets. Bodies of the dead and wounded were lying where they fell, unable to be reached by medical teams; and an Arab correspondent who managed to get out a brief message said: 'Loss of life is increasing at astonishing speed. The wounded run into thousands.'"

*J. Bulloch and K. Clarke, D. Telegraph, 19 Sep. 1970*

"Amman airport was closed but at least one Egyptian Red Crescent mercy flight landed at another airstrip to drop off badly needed medical supplies for the estimated 5,000 casualties in the city."

*Associated Press, 21 Sep. 1970*





*New Hill in Jordan*

IHT, 26 Sep. 1970

"A Red Cross doctor, Dr. Henri Bossar, who was on board [the Red Cross DC-6 which returned from Amman] would not say why the plane had returned empty. 'Medical needs in Jordan are so big I can make no comment at present,' he said."

*Guardian*, 21 Sep. 1970

"M. Marcel Boissard, the Red Cross delegate who went on the flight ... did not think there was any immediate danger of an epidemic, although one of the evacuated wounded, a Swedish cameraman, who had been hit in the leg said: 'There are bodies all over the streets.'"

Kenneth Clarke, *D Telegraph*, 22 Sep. 1970

"Zarqa ... a big defeat for the Jordanian tanks with losses of 200 dead and 500 wounded."

*Ibid.*, 23 Sep. 1970

"One of the reasons put forward here [Tel Aviv] for the delay in permitting the Red Cross to operate in Jordan is that the authorities are probably trying to clear the dead and wounded off the streets of Amman before the arrival of the Red Cross."

*Financial T*, 24 Sep. 1970

The first *official* estimate of casualties was given by the Military Governor General, Field Marshal Habes Majali on Amman radio. At 12.32 GMT, he broadcast: "Some news agencies are trying to give astronomical, extremely exaggerated figures about the numbers of casualties resulting from the clashes in Amman. We wish to stress that according to preliminary estimates by the Health Ministry, the Royal Medical Services, the Civil Defense Directorate, the International Red Cross and the Jordanian Red Crescent, the number of casualties is between 1,300 and 1,600, including both killed and wounded."

Amman HS, 24 Sep. 1970

"To the people who had been cooped up for seven days in basements and cellars to the constant sound of gunfire, the figure seemed low, absurdly low. Maybe it was. It was only an estimate—an *official* estimate, too."

Snow and Phillips, p. 143-144.

"But the foreign correspondents ... released at last from the International Hotel in Amman, tell stories of horror that do not bear out the government's figure."

*Economist*, 26 Sep. 1970



"Pessimism in the Lebanese capital is based on the extent of the casualties—2,000 Palestinians alone are said to have died in the fighting around Irbid alone."

Edouard Saab, *Le Monde W*, 23 Sep. 1970

"A spokesman for the International Committee for the Red Cross [in Geneva] said tonight that a temporary cease-fire offered the only hope of saving the thousands of wounded in Amman who lack both medical care and food."

Thomas J. Hamilton, *NYT*, 24 Sep. 1970

"Amman is full of dead and wounded. The ambulances cannot cope. Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocke of the Red Cross, told me here yesterday: 'There are many dead and dying in the streets and today we have to go into the refugee camps where we know the carnage has been fearful.'"

Gerard Kemp, *D Telegraph*, 24 Sep. 1970

"It now seems that the casualties will not be less than 15,000 a high proportion of them deaths. The claim by Mr. Yasser Arafat, the guerilla leader, that 7,000 people have been killed in the Jabal Wahdat camp alone in the past six days cannot be taken lightly. The dead have not been counted. They still lie in hundreds in the streets or under the crumbled ruins of houses and dwellings."

Paul Martin, *London T*, 24 Sep. 1970

"Foreign correspondents returned from Amman agree that the scale and savagery of the street fighting was such that the guerilla estimates could well be right. If the 15,000 figure were anything near accurate these seven days' fighting would have spilled more Arab blood than the protracted Arab-Israel war of 1948-49, the Suez war of 1956, or the six-day war of 1967."

*E Standard*, 24 Sep. 1970

"The Jordanian Embassy [in London] tonight denied reports of heavy casualties in Amman and said that the Army had taken extreme caution to avoid unnecessary loss of life."

*NYT*, 24 Sep. 1970

"Jordanian aircraft tanks and artillery resumed their onslaught Thursday on the commando stronghold in north Jordan where the feda'iyeen say almost 1,000 on both sides have died in six days of fighting. Asked about losses in the north Jordan battle, Captain Tarik, who comes from Safad, told me that according to feda'iyeen figures PLA and commando losses up to noon Thursday were

about 450 killed, of whom 400 died in the Jordanian counterattacks of the last three days. He put Jordanian casualties at 500 dead and more than 100 captured, 'as well as hundreds who have joined the revolution and are now fighting on our side.'"

*Daily Star*, 25 Sep. 1970

"To count the casualties would be impossible but the estimates of 15,000 dead could well be true."

Patrick Massey, *Guardian*, 24 Sep. 1970

"The scene inside [Ashrafiyah Hospital] was horrifying. The casualty ward normally has seventy beds, but the doctors told us there were more than 1,000 now. There were dead, dying and wounded."

Gerald Kemp, *D Telegraph*, 25 Sep. 1970

"Doctors who returned to Beirut from Amman yesterday painted a horrifying picture of the shattered Jordanian capital. They estimated that casualties in Amman alone were at least 10,000. Dr. Ahbaith Suleiman, head of a Kuwaiti medical mission, said: 'Ninety percent of those who died did so through lack of medical attention. The wounded are just being thrown on the streets.'"

John Bulloch, *D Telegraph*, 26 Sep. 1970

"Field Marshal Majali, in a statement broadcast on Amman radio Saturday, said it has been established that the number of dead did not exceed 2,500 soldiers, commandos and civilians. He did not make clear whether he was referring to only Amman or to all Jordan."

Ian McDowall, *Daily Star*, 27 Sep. 1970

"The king was frank about the cost of the fighting. 'The dead could go as high as 2,000—we don't know exactly yet,' he said."

Murray Sayle, *S Times*, 27 Sep. 1970

"The king, whose first cease-fire order last Saturday was not observed, mentioned only the fighting in Amman, where the Red Cross say there are up to 10,000 casualties following five days of battles."

*D Telegraph*, 27 Sep. 1970

"Casualties were heavy. In the six day war with Israel three years ago, Jordan suffered only 162 dead and wounded. Last week, after three days of intensive fighting, reports put the casualties at more than 5,000 in a nation of 2,200,000."

*Time*, 28 Sep. 1970



"Captain Sayal Mohammed of the Fourth Division Armored Corps, First Royal Guard Brigade told newsmen how his troops had fought yard by yard along King Hussein Street. '... We lost 25 dead and 30 wounded along this street and I suppose we killed about 1,000 commandos.'"

Dennis Neeld, *Daily Star*, 29 Sep. 1970

"Critics of the government charge that the dead are being buried in mass graves to conceal the extent of the killings. Commando broadcasts and spokesmen have said that more than 10,000 people were killed in the fighting—which raged in Amman and in cities and towns in the north—while government estimates have generally been fewer than 2,000.

"American and West German correspondents who entered the Palestinian quarter of Amman today for the first time since the civil war began on September 17 found an open mass grave containing more than 40 bodies. The grave was found on a tour of the Ashrafiyah quarter and the neighboring Wahdat Palestinian refugee camp. [It was] a trench about 50-yards long, 20-feet deep and 20-feet wide. It had been dug near the government-controlled Ashrafiyah Hospital, on a hilltop in the southeastern part of the capital.

"Palestinians of the quarter said that the army had dug the trench, and only the government would seem to have the equipment for the task. But soldiers at the hospital barred the correspondents from entering to ask questions and there was no immediate comment from government spokesmen."

Eric Pace, *NYT*, 29 Sep. 1970

"In Amman a royal palace spokesman said the number of civilian dead in the recent clashes between Jordanian troops and the guerillas totaled 541. King Hussein estimated that the army suffered 200 casualties."

Walter Schwartz, *Guardian*, 30 Sep. 1970

"The Jordanian government's latest figure of 600 killed and 1,200 wounded ..."

*Economist*, 3 Oct. 1970

"Whatever the ultimate casualty figures (reports last week indicated that Jordanians were dumping large numbers of dead into bulldozed common graves in an effort to hold down official casualty totals), a staggering death toll would be in keeping with the nature of the conflict."

*Newsweek*, 5 Oct. 1970

"About 750 wounded victims of the Jordanian civil war have died in hospitals, the Red Cross said today. Kal Warras, Finnish coordinator of the joint International Red Cross Committee and League of Red Cross Societies relief pro-

gram, told a news conference [in Geneva] on return from Jordan that there are still more than 4,000 injured, including 500 seriously wounded, in hospitals.

"He said it is 'impossible' to determine how many people were killed outright during the fighting. International Red Cross chief physician Roland Marti said almost all the wounded victims are civilians and most suffered shrapnel wounds. 'There were very few bullet wounds,' he added.

"The relief action up to the end of October will have cost around \$3 million and Mr. Warras said he has just launched an appeal for more funds. Both he and Dr. Marti praised cooperation between the multi-national Red Cross teams on the spot, including the unofficial Palestinian Red Crescent, representing the Palestinian Liberation Organization."

*IHT*, 9 Oct. 1970

"The alliance of Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has sent a medical team into Jordan, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said here [Geneva] Saturday. Observers here noted that it was most unusual for the Soviet Societies to provide aid to countries outside the Communist bloc, especially in close collaboration with Western Red Cross and Red Crescent teams."

Reuters, 10 Oct. 1970

"In the Palestine refugee camps in Amman, an estimated 5,000 families have been left homeless and thousands of children without schools as a result of the recent fighting, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). ... The final cost (to provide shelter for the homeless refugees and to repair schools, health centers and other installations) might run as high as \$3 million. The cost of repairing damaged schools and equipment and replacing lost school supplies is estimated by the agency at over \$1 million."

*Daily Star*, 11 Oct. 1970

"Because so many of the victims of the civil war were missing, the actual death toll throughout Jordan will probably never be known. But while the government was sticking to its calculation that less than 2,000 had been killed in the fighting, estimates by foreign observers ranged much higher. Tunisian Premier Bahi Ladgham, who was in Amman with the Arab truce team, gave credence to guerilla estimates of as many as 20,000 dead, saying that the feda'iyeen figure was 'only relatively exaggerated.'"

*Newsweek*, 12 Oct. 1970

"Palestine commando sources revealed October 16 that 3,440 people were killed and 10,840 wounded in last month's fierce fighting between commandos and Hussein's forces in Jordan. Most of the casualties were civilians.



"The number of people still missing, unreported deaths and a large number of wounded treated privately were not included in the statistics prepared by the Palestine Red Crescent (PRC) in Jordan, the sources said. The PRC said its figures were based on records in hospitals, clinics and first-aid centers all over Jordan.

"In the fighting in Amman, the PRC said, 2,100 people were killed and 8,080 wounded, and in Zarqa 730 killed and 1,200 wounded. In Central Jordan 130 people were killed and 300 wounded. In North Jordan 250 were killed and 800 wounded. And in South Jordan, 250 were killed and 460 wounded."

Reuters, 20 Oct. 1970

"A spokesman for the Nordic branch of the Save the Children Fund said Thursday night it was estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 people died in last month's Jordan fighting. Some 10,000 were believed wounded and 50,000 lost their homes.

"Rol Sholder, a Norwegian who returned here [Stockholm] Wednesday night after a fortnight's visit to Jordan, told reporters that thousands of shocked and maimed children needed convalescence before going back to their homes—if they have any to go back to."

Reuters, 22 Oct. 1970

"The United States has asked the Jordanian government for an estimate of the financial costs arising from last month's civil war ... The reply ... contains the following estimates: The war caused a drop of \$140 million in Jordan's gross national product of about \$500 million. Indemnities for personal and property damage ... will come to \$70 million, representing the cost of repairing public and private facilities and roughly \$7 million for support of the wounded. The military cost is a secret but not a problem. The United States is committed to replace all the losses and to continue a program of military aid, whose scope has not been disclosed."

John L. Hess, NYT, 24 Oct. 1970

"The Arab Relief Agency headed by the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Amman has estimated the damage that befell the Jordanian capital during September, 1970, at over 15 million Jordanian dinars (\$42 million). The damage was itemized as follows:

1) Industrial sector	1,709,556 JD
2) Commercial sector	1,568,129 JD
3) Transport sector	1,388,097 JD
4) Public utilities sector	784,530 JD
5) Private citizens	7,721,522 JD

French News Agency from Amman, 20 Jan. 1970

## Appendix IV

### INTERVENTION

By late August 1970, as the confrontation between the Palestinian commandos and Hussein's regime seemed imminent, other nations that had either direct or indirect interests in the outcome began to align themselves with one side or the other. Iraq was the first Arab country to take a stand. It asserted itself as an ally of the commandos and at the same time as a leader of the forces opposing King Hussein and President Nasser in their acceptance of the Jarring talks.

During the first week of September, both Hussein and the commandos appealed outside Jordan for help—Hussein from the big powers and friendly Arab governments and the Palestinians from the Arab governments. The commandos called for assistance first.

"... Arafat appealed Monday for Arab governments to intervene and prevent more bloodshed between commandos and the Jordan Army."

Daily Star, 1 Sep. 1970

"The Palestine Liberation Organization ... was reported today to have called for an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the fourteen members of the Arab League ..."

NYT, 2 Sep. 1970

Their response: "... There is the four-man Arab League delegation of Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Sudan sent to mediate between the king and the commandos; the Libyan delegate has left and they have been impotent so far."

Financial T, 14 Sep. 1970

Then came King Hussein's appeal: "Jordan has asked the Big Four to help it against any Iraqi menace. Urgent consultations on the request are proceeding, said diplomatic sources in Paris."

Financial T, 5 Sep. 1970

"... But since making the appeal, King Hussein, realizing that no immediate concerted four-power action was possible, changed his tactics and appealed



to the United Arab Republic and other friendly Arab governments to bring pressure upon the Iraq government."

A.M. Rendel, *London T*, 5 Sep. 1970

Hussein received a more magnanimous reply to his appeal than did the commandos: "President Nixon has ordered a task force of the American Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean within air striking distance of Jordan ... [It] includes an aircraft carrier and escorting warships. A landing force of Marines was alerted for possible action and an American airborne brigade in West Germany is also available."

*D Telegraph*, 12 Sep. 1970

Neither Iraq's troops nor the U.S.'s 'task force' prevented the terrible battles which were to follow, but the threat of outside intervention did affect the outcome of the war. Immediately after fighting broke out, the Arab League proposed action. "Abdel Khalek Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League made an urgent appeal to Arab heads of state Thursday to intervene to end the fighting in Jordan between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian commandos."

*Daily Star*, 18 Sep. 1970

Some Arab nations made their positions known soon after the fighting began—others did not voice an opinion until well into the war—and finally others remained silent until the summit conference in Cairo. "Leaders of the Arab world called a conference for today in Cairo to deal with what the United Arab Republic termed the 'deteriorating situation' in Jordan."

*NYT*, 21 Sep. 1970

"Syria, Iraq, and Algeria immediately adopted the side of the commandos in the crisis and labeled the new Jordan government ... as 'fascist.' Cairo radio, which did not comment directly on the Jordanian developments appeared to be supporting the king's measures which were given prominence in the news."

*Daily Star*, 17 Sep. 1970

"A middle group, advocating a combination [rule] of King Hussein and moderate guerillas, includes Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Algeria and Northern Yemen."

"To the right, preferring clearcut rule by King Hussein, are the kings and sheikhs, notably the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Morocco."

*D Telegraph*, 19 Sep. 1970

\* \* \*

## IRAQ

"Indeed, Baghdad is repeatedly claiming that its force in Jordan is 'at the disposal' of the guerillas, implying that the Palestinians could call on the Iraqis in the event of a showdown with Hussein."

Geoffrey Sumner, *S Times*, 30 Aug. 1970

"As Amman echoed to the sound of firing, the Iraqi government issued a direct warning to Jordan not to move against the commandos. Baghdad radio said Iraqi Foreign Minister Abdel Karim Sheikhly told the Jordan Ambassador in Baghdad that Iraqi troops in Jordan 'will not stand idly by' in this event."

*Daily Star*, 2 Sep. 1970

"Baghdad radio said Iraq had threatened to order its 12,000 troops into Jordan unless government troops ceased fire against the commandos."

*Guardian*, 2 Sep. 1970

"... There is evidence that Iraq has begun to reinforce its 12,000 strong contingent in Jordan with the bulk of the 6,000 troops it has stationed in south Syria."

Paul Martin, *London T*, 3 Sep. 1970

"Some 2,000 more Iraqi troops were reported to have moved into the Mafrak region of Jordan from Syria. These latest troop movements have brought the number of Iraqi troops in Jordan up to 20,000."

*D Telegraph*, 7 Sep. 1970

"Despite repeated requests by Arafat yesterday for military assistance from Baghdad, the Iraqi troops have moved back from the positions they held around Zarqa and have gone into their barracks at Mafrak. For the moment, intervention does not appear likely, and Baghdad radio has offered moral, but not military support for the guerillas."

Clare Hollingsworth, Tel Aviv, *D Telegraph*, 18 Sep. 1970

"Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan have been observed moving back out of the line of combat ... A steady stream of Iraqi Soviet-made trucks poured down the highway from Ramtha, Jordan, all day yesterday, hauling Soviet T-34 tanks, antiaircraft guns and heavy artillery. They were heading east and well beyond the combat zone in which King Hussein's army and Palestinians were fighting. ... They took everything with them, including tent poles, folding chairs and even the straw mats they had brought from the banks of the Tigris River."

J.A. Morris, *IHT*, 21 Sep. 1970



"The leftist Iraqi government continues to give vocal support to the commando cause, but the 12,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan have remained out of action despite Baghdad's earlier assertion they were at the commandos' disposal."

NYT, 22 Sep. 1970

"Even more significant in Jordanian eyes was a formal statement from the commander of the Iraqi forces in Jordan, General Jalil, that his troops will not intervene under any circumstances against King Hussein."

E Standard, 23 Sep. 1970

### SYRIA

"Syria today again threatened military intervention to defend Palestinian guerillas against the Jordanian Army. The ruling Socialist Ba'ath party said. ... 'All of Syria's potential has been placed at the disposal of the guerilla leadership in Amman. Syria cannot remain idle towards attempts to liquidate the Palestinian revolution,' [in] the statement broadcast over the state-controlled Damascus radio ..."

IHT, 3 Sep. 1970

"The Syrian Army and Air Force were reported to be on full alert, and the paramilitary people's militia was told in radio broadcasts to be prepared for mobilisation."

D Telegraph, 18 Sep. 1970

"The Jordanian government reported tonight over the Amman radio that 'Syrian armored troops backed by heavy artillery crossed the Jordanian border during the day for the second time.'"

John M. Lee, NYT, 20 Sep. 1970

"King Hussein claimed that the first tanks which crossed into his country were part of 'a Syrian armoured brigade.' But reports from the border said that all the tanks clearly bore the markings of the Palestine Liberation Army. ... In Damascus, President Nureddin Atassi accused King Hussein of 'inventing' the tank battle as an excuse for calling on America to help him."

D Telegraph, 21 Sep. 1970

"Although it is not clear whether the Syrians actually crossed the border at the weekend, there is no doubt that they moved forces south to the border yesterday. Convoys of T52 tanks on transports were seen moving south on the main road from Damascus, as well as infantry in armored personnel carriers. The force stopped late yesterday short of the border."

Paul Martin, London T, 21 Sep. 1970

"British officials concede that there is some confusion about the Syrian troops in Jordan, especially in Ramtha, two miles from the Syrian border, and Irbid eight miles from the border. 'We know that forces, including tanks, have crossed into Jordan and have supplied feda'iyen forces around Irbid and Ramtha,' said one official. 'While it is certain these troops and tanks are Syrian in origin, it is probable that they have been lent to the Palestinians.'"

Bernard Weinraub, NYT, 22 Sep. 1970

"The Syrian Foreign Office statement said: 'Syria urges world opinion to condemn the provocations of the United States and the possibility of its military intervention. After the facts gave the lie to the American and Jordanian allegations of Syrian intervention in Jordan, America placed its troops on the alert and moved more naval units. They are seeking a pretext to act.'"

D Telegraph, 23 Sep. 1970

"The Jordanian Army and Air Force counterattacked Arab guerillas in the north today, and the tanks backing the guerillas retreated toward the Syrian border."

John L. Hess, NYT, 24 Sep. 1970

### LIBYA

"Libya has proposed the creation of a joint Libyan-Algerian force to keep the warring factions in Jordan apart, the Middle East News Agency reported from Cairo yesterday. ... The statement also said Libya agreed to an emergency Arab summit conference to be held in Cairo not later than today."

D Telegraph, 21 Sep. 1970

"... If these two proposals failed to achieve results then 'Libya will act independently.'"

Financial T, 21 Sep. 1970

"... The Libyan leader, Colonel Kaddafi has cut off the £9 million annual subsidy [to Jordan] agreed after the June war."

Ibid.

### SUDAN

Major General Ja'afar Numeiry, President of the Sudan, said on Umdurman radio that the Sudan unreservedly supported the right of the Palestine revolution to "an armed struggle to liberate their land from Israeli occupation," and demanded "an immediate stop to the fighting."



"As the fighting in Jordan grew uglier yesterday, a four-man Arab peace mission, led by General Ja'afar Numeiry ... arrived in Amman in a new attempt to mediate between the two sides."

*London T*, 23 Sep. 1970

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Countries who didn't propose intervention but who expressed verbal support for the Palestinians were numerous.

#### ALGERIA

"Mr. Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister ... confirmed his government's total support for the Palestine guerillas. ... Algeria entirely supports the Palestine Resistance and could not in any way be associated directly or indirectly in any attempt to liquidate it."

*London T*, 19 Sep. 1970

#### MOROCCO

"Algeria's President Boumedienne and Morocco's King Hassan, after meeting in Morocco, avoided public mention of intervention. But King Hassan surprised some observers in not siding with his fellow Arab monarch, King Hussein, and proclaiming his support for the Palestinians instead."

John K. Cooley, *CSM*, 22 Sep. 1970

Privately, however, King Hassan remained with King Hussein and though he gave the commandos some verbal support, he withheld the contributions made to the Resistance Movement by his people.

#### KUWAIT

"Kuwait had first offered to mediate between the Jordanian regime and the commandos then suspended its subsidy to Jordan, leaving Saudi Arabia as the only remaining contributor."

*NYT*, 22 Sep. 1970

"The Kuwaiti government has decided to suspend its financial subsidy to Jordan of £20 million a year, an official announcement said. The decision was taken by the Kuwaiti Cabinet at an emergency conference today."

*Financial T*, 22 Sep. 1970

#### SOUTH YEMEN

"Quoted by semiofficial Aden news agency, an authoritative source in the foreign ministry said South Yemen is closely watching Jordan's regrettable developments and strongly condemns the steps adopted by the Jordanian military government directed against the Palestinian people and its armed struggle and the national liberation movement in Jordan."

*Daily Star*, 18 Sep. 1970

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#### EGYPT

Long a friend of the commandos, yet the first country to agree to the Rogers' peace proposal which the Palestinians denounced, the United Arab Republic's indecision on the events was obvious: "The Egyptians attitude remained equivocal, to say the least. Cairo media have abstained from comment on developments in Jordan, and there was no comment from Egyptian officials. Some diplomatic sources here interpreted this as indirect approval of King Hussein's move. The sources argued that suppression of the commando movement is prerequisite for a successful political settlement in the Middle East, which President Nasser now favours."

*Financial T*, 18 Sep. 1970

"The Egyptians feel that the Palestinian commando movement, purged of disruptive extremists, must be sustained to maintain pressure on Israel and the world and keep the Palestinian cause alive. At the same time, the Egyptians feel King Hussein must retain his throne, at least for the present, because of his vital role as a Western-oriented monarch in influencing attitudes and policies of the United States."

"In the first days of fighting the Egyptians appeared to show understanding for King Hussein's effort to curb the power of the guerillas. ... But as King Hussein's military regime drove mercilessly to beat down the guerillas at any cost in lives and destruction, attitudes in Cairo began to change and sharply worded messages demanding a cease-fire were directed to the 34-year old monarch."

Ray H. Anderson, *NYT*, 24 Sep. 1970

\* \* \*

Other less resolute Arab countries were Lebanon, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia.



## LEBANON

"Lebanon has repeatedly called for a halt to the bloodshed and her sympathies tend toward Hussein, especially since Lebanon also has a commando problem."

NYT, 22 Sep. 1970

## TUNISIA

"Tunisia Saturday called for an emergency Arab summit to halt the bloodshed in Jordan."

Daily Star, 20 Sep. 1970

With a shaky regime to protect, Tunisia was seeking compromises in order to maintain the status quo for Hussein and for herself.

## SAUDI ARABIA

"King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, who also has a throne and a right-wing regime to protect, is counted as King Hussein's major supporter. But he has been conspicuously silent."

NYT, 22 Sep. 1970

"And during the night, Mecca radio transmitted a message to the Jordanian Army saying that Saudi Arabia and King Feisal would not tolerate the taking over of Jordan by the Palestinians or by anyone else."

John Kimche, E Standard, 23 Sep. 1970

\* \* \*

The large non-Arab countries showed a wide range of support, for and against the Palestinians. China, for instance, was on the commandos' side.

## CHINA

"Communist China yesterday issued a statement in which it unequivocally supported the Palestinian guerillas and condemned Jordan and 'reactionary Arab forces.'"

D Telegraph, 23 Sep. 1970

France and Great Britain, on the other hand, merely called for a halt to the fighting and warned against outside intervention.

## FRANCE

"President Pompidou warned today against foreign intervention in Jordan as a danger to world peace. The short, unusual statement from the Elysee Palace was believed to be directed at the Syrians and the Americans. Mr. Pompidou's statement read as follows: 'Faced with the worsening of the situation in the Middle East, and particularly in Jordan, France, which considers unacceptable any act that results in making innocent victims the pawns of a political conflict, deplores that this conflict has degenerated into a blind and bloody clash. She solemnly affirms that foreign intervention is already creating and would create in the future a dangerous situation for world peace.'"

NYT, 21 Sep. 1970

"A second French warning [came] that intervention poses a threat to world peace ... Diplomatic sources in Paris say that France is pursuing an independent course in its Middle East policy, favoring neither the United States' nor the Soviet Union's positions. ... The French warning blamed King Hussein for permitting the skyjackings to result in conflict between the Palestinian and Jordanian forces."

CSM, 25 Sep. 1970

## GREAT BRITAIN

"Although there is no immediate likelihood of intervention, contingency plans exist for the rescue of British nationals. Assuming that the Jordanian Army holds Amman airfield, a battalion of the Strategic Reserve could be there within 24-hours of the decision to go."

Richard Cox, D Telegraph, 18 Sep. 1970

"British forces in Cyprus have been on the alert since yesterday because of the crisis in Jordan, informed sources said here. Leave has been cancelled for all officers and men at the Akrotiri air base and aircraft are said to be ready to take off at any time. A military spokesman said that a British Marine unit was being flown to the Mediterranean from Singapore to join the Royal Navy carrier Albion for exercises in the area."

Ian McDonald, London T, 19 Sep. 1970

"Britain appealed to the Soviet Union to use its influence with the Syrian government toward halting troop movements into Jordan. Although the British had mercifully intervened in 1958 and parachuted down troops into Jordan and saved the throne for Hussein, this time they left almost everything to the U.S.A. because now such an operation was militarily impossible as Cyprus would not allow the use of its territory for operations against any Arab party."



"Britain publicly ruled herself out as a factor by making clear that she would in no circumstances intervene. Meanwhile Britain has also agreed to restock Hussein with ammunition according to a report on Britain's commercial television network, Independent Television News, October 15."

*Fateh*, 20 Oct. 1970

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#### U. S. S. R.

The U.S.S.R.'s attitude on the September events in Jordan was very important because of its influence on Syria as its sole supplier of weapons, and because it was the only power able to stand off the U.S.A. which was showing the greatest interest of all foreign nations.

"Russian warships, which have the use of ports in Syria and Egypt, are also reported to be moving in the same area [as American warships cruising close to Syrian and Lebanese territorial waters]. The Russian Mediterranean fleet is believed to be shadowing the Americans and preparing to mount a show of counterforce off Syria if the American naval build-up continues."

*D Telegraph*, 18 Sep. 1970

"The Soviet Union was believed to be seriously concerned today by reports of Syrian intervention in the Jordan crisis, and Soviet officials were believed to be trying to persuade Damascus to avoid further exacerbations of the situation. The official press agency, Tass, statement issued late last night was aimed primarily at Syria. The statement, after drawing attention to United States fleet movements in the Mediterranean, said that 'plans of foreign military intervention in the conflict in Jordan are being hatched by definite circles in certain countries.'"

*NYT*, 20 Sep. 1970

"Mr. Smirnovsky, Russian Ambassador in London, last night delivered the Kremlin's reply to a British request that it bring influence on Syria to withdraw the forces intervening in Jordan. Russia is believed to be willing to try to help solve the crisis, but it is doubtful if she has pressed for a troop withdrawal."

*D Telegraph*, 23 Sep. 1970

"Russia had 39 surface ships and nine to eleven submarines in the Mediterranean Sea yesterday, according to a spokesman for Marairmed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Sub-Watching Air Patrol."

*D Telegraph*, 24 Sep. 1970

"The Soviet Union announced tonight its embassy in Washington has delivered a warning to the U.S. government against military intervention in Jordan."

*IHT*, 24 Sep. 1970


"[The U.S.S.R.] warned all outside powers not to intervene in the Middle East. Tass said, 'Intervention will tend to widen the war going on in Jordan and will result in making things even worse for all concerned and will be likely to overstep the leaders of Jordan.'

"Syrian intervention, it is thought here [London], probably took the form of forces 'on loan to the Palestine Liberation Army. Whether they were pushed out of Jordan on Wednesday by King Hussein's armor or withdrawn at the request of the Soviet Union is unknown. But what is known is that the Soviets certainly made such a request, in very firm tones.'"

John Allan May, *CSM*, 25 Sep. 1970

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#### INTERVENTION



*Daily Telegraph*, 22 Sep. 1970



## U. S. A.

Without a doubt, the United States was deeply involved in the Jordan war during September. An American newspaper's version of U.S. contingency plans is excerpted below:

"The crisis began developing on Thursday, September 17, when, on that day King Hussein's newly formed military government struck against the armed feda'iyeen, the Palestinian extremists, in a bid to clear them out of Amman and the northern cities and to reassert the royal authority. The king was hoping to complete the operation within 48 hours. On that same day, President Nixon, talking to newspaper editors in Chicago, said that the United States might intervene if Syria or Iraq threatened King Hussein's government.

"On Friday, September 18, the United States received from Jordanian and Israeli sources the first clear reports that some Syrian tanks had crossed into Jordan. By Sunday morning, Israel was reporting the Syrian armor and infantry forces were 'pouring' into Jordan and Amman radio said that a Syrian 'division' had invaded Jordanian territory. Mr. Sisco [Asst. Secretary of State of Near East and South Asian Affairs] is said to have implied that if the Syrians continued their invasion, Israel would probably attack.

"A message from King Hussein that day asked the United States and Britain to consider what quick military support they could send him. The British Ambassador John Freeman called on Secretary Rogers that day (September 21, Monday) to state that Britain would not intervene militarily and to express hopes that the United States would not do so either. It was evident also that other Western European governments would have opposed such United States action. So, instead, the decision was taken to coordinate United States actions closely with those of the Israelis, who had already begun a partial mobilization and movements of tanks toward the northern part of the Jordan River valley.

"On Tuesday, King Hussein, convinced that the United States was supporting him, ordered an attack. Jordanian Hawker Hunter jets attacked the Syrian tanks while Jordanian armor rolled north. By the end of the day there were the first reports of a Syrian withdrawal. Meanwhile, President Nixon had ordered a public deemphasis of United States troop movements, and the emphasis switched to diplomacy.

"By Wednesday, September 23, Washington was confident that King Hussein had won despite the damage to Amman and the continuing sporadic resistance. Two days later on Friday, King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, the guerilla chief, agreed on a cease-fire negotiated in Cairo by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic and other Arab leaders.

"Israel was pleased with the outcome, and Premier Golda Meir praised the American role in the affair."

NYT, 8 Oct. 1970

The day-by-day military build-up by the United States, however, shows better the plans or 'contingencies' it was preparing should King Hussein appear to be losing the war. "Re-establishment of the king's authority in Jordan is seen in Washington as essential to any hopes of success of the current American Middle East peace initiative ..."

D Telegraph, 18 Sep. 1970

"An American national security task force held an emergency session at midnight to discuss the threat of civil war in Jordan. A senior spokesman for the Administration said afterwards that Jordan had not requested nor was the U.S. considering intervention if the crisis worsened. But the meeting which made Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Sisco, assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Kissinger, the national security adviser [and included Mr. Richard Helms, director of the C.I.A. and Mr. Packard, the deputy Defense Secretary according to Richard Beeston, *Daily Telegraph*, Sep. 18] hurriedly leave a banquet has inevitably excited speculation of military action.

"The movement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to 'within an easy hop of Amman' and the stationing of a squadron of Phantom fighter-bombers in Turkey, less than an hour's flight away, are described by Administration sources as precautionary moves."

Adam Raphael, *Guardian*, 17 Sep. 1970

"The Sixth Fleet is composed of about 40 ships and submarines. The fleet also has 1,600 marines and 175 carrier-based aircraft plus two land-based anti-submarine patrol squadrons. Heading the Sixth Fleet power are two attack carriers, U.S.S. Saratoga and Independence and two guided missile cruisers, Albany and Springfield. Around this nucleus are 16 destroyers, five amphibious ships carrying the marines and their equipment, four mine sweepers and eight ammunition ships ... plus three submarines. This group does not include the submarines stationed in the Mediterranean. The number of polaris subs is classified."

Daily Star, 18 Sep. 1970

"In Washington, U.S. Defence Secretary Melvin Laird said that the U.S. was prepared to airlift Americans from areas of Jordan where fighting was going on. He said the U.S. could possibly use six C-130 transports sent earlier to Adana, in Turkey, and added that the U.S. would depend on the Jordanian Air Force to protect any airlift rather than use navy aircraft from the U.S. Sixth Fleet."

Financial T, 18 Sep. 1970



"The 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina has also been ordered to a state of readiness. ...Vessels from the Atlantic were ordered to join the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 27,500-ton helicopter carrier Guam is on her way from Virginia with 1,000 marines ... More transport planes are expected to join the airlift fleet in Turkey. It was emphasized that the moves are directed to evacuation needs."

*D Telegraph*, 19 Sep. 1970

"Secretary of State William P. Rogers called on Syria today to end her 'invasion' of Jordan and warned that Syrian intervention raised the danger of a wider war. ...The United States conveyed a similar warning this afternoon to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, urging Moscow to impress on Syria the dangers of the situation ...

"Privately the President himself said last Thursday that he would be inclined to intervene if Syria or Iraqi forces were to tip the balance against King Hussein. Mr. Rogers' statement, officials here conceded, prepared the diplomatic groundwork for American intervention if it became necessary. ...The Rogers' statement did not say whether the intervening tank forces were regular Syrian Army units or Palestinian groups operating from Syria, but it made clear that in either case the United States held the Syrian government responsible."

*NYT*, 20 Sep. 1970

"U.S. officials said King Hussein was appealing to the Big Four Powers to support him in his fight against the guerillas. The placing of Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units on alert was announced by the Pentagon as the White House described the Jordanian situation as very serious."

*E Standard*, 21 Sep. 1970

"The Pentagon has dispatched still more C-130 troop transports to European air bases and alerted several thousand U.S. infantrymen in West Germany to stand by ... An additional 1,500 to 2,000 Marines and 25-30 large troop-carrying helicopters are on the way by ship ..."

*IHT*, 21 Sep. 1970

"Again on September 22, King Hussein, rocked by the extent of Syrian invasions of northern Jordan, has appealed to the Big Four Powers to come to his rescue as quickly as possible."

*E Standard*, 22 Sep. 1970

"President Nixon has ordered American paratroop and infantry units in Europe and the United States to be placed on a Middle East crisis alert. The Defence Department said yesterday that the alert had been put into effect overnight. The

move was part of 'a series of precautionary measures to increase the readiness of army, navy, marine, and air force units to support an evacuation operation for American citizens,' the Department added. ...The American emergency force would comprise 10,000 men of the 82nd Airborne Division ... There are about 400 Americans in Jordan ..."

Stephen Barber, *D Telegraph*, 22 Sep. 1970

"Turks now fear that a United States intervention, using Incirlik [air base in southern Turkey] as a base, would ruin years of Turkish efforts ... to improve relations with neighboring Soviets and Arabs ... Consequently it is felt here [Istanbul] that Turkey would not let Americans use Incirlik for overt military intervention in the Mideast ..."

Sam Cohen, *CSM*, 22 Sep. 1970

"A United States Embassy spokesman in Athens said tonight, 'We are making contingency plans with our own facilities ... The contingency plans included stand-by orders to the 7206th Air Force Support Group, based at Athens Airport to receive what was described as 'evacuation equipment' and to provide logistic support for the United States rescue force.'"

*NYT*, 22 Sep. 1970

"President Nixon yesterday moved closer towards intervention in the Jordanian crisis. ...Officially, it was a precaution to support the evacuation of American citizens in Jordan ... But the extent of the forces now mobilised suggests that the U.S. is prepared for more than a simple evacuation procedure. ...The concentration of military forces of all kinds, in or near the Middle East, is thus immense, and the extent of the U.S. preparedness almost certainly encompasses other forces which have not been officially mentioned."

*Financial T*, 22 Sep. 1970

"Mr. Herbert Klein, President Nixon's Director of Communications, said today that the Nixon administration did not rule out American military intervention in the Middle East."

*E Standard*, 23 Sep. 1970

"A strong American mechanised airborne force made hasty preparations in Germany yesterday for a possible drop into Jordan. The main scene of action was Lee Barracks, in Mainz, headquarters of the United States 8th Infantry Division's 509th airborne mechanised brigade. ... Hundreds of soldiers spent Monday packing duffle bags and getting inoculations. Others packed crates of ammunition, rations, and communications equipment. ... In Wiesbaden, across the river from Mainz, the 8th Division's 11th Quartermaster company was packing and crating 106mm recoilless rifles in quarter-ton jeeps for an airborne drop. ...Eighteen



Army American C-130 transport planes took off yesterday from a base in Germany and were later reported to have landed at a NATO base in Adana, Turkey."

*D Telegraph*, 23 Sep. 1970

"The United States and Israel were preparing to take coordinated military action in the recent Jordanian crisis, according to American and Israeli sources. This plan envisioned an Israeli attack on the Syrian tank forces that had entered Jordan if it appeared that King Hussein's army was incapable of stopping them. In this event, the United States would have used Sixth Fleet and other units to safeguard Israel's rear and flanks from Egyptian or Soviet attacks from the Suez Canal area. The plan was not put into effect because the Syrian tanks, harassed by King Hussein's jets and armor, began retreating into Syria."

*NYT*, 8 Oct. 1970

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### ISRAEL

"Washington received panicky messages from King Hussein's palace; the young monarch did not see how he could hold out against outside forces and appealed for Western military help; he even went so far as to indicate privately that he would not mind if the Israelis struck against the Syrians, through he would have to deny that publicly."

Hedrick Smith, *NYT*, 27 Sep. 1970

This was not an ordinary civil war—the Palestinian's arch enemy and its big power supporter were behind the Jordanian monarch, and have been since 1948.

"From the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 until the 1967 war, Israeli prime ministers David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Levi Eshkol all made dramatic statements in support of the Hashemite government.

"Before 1967, Israeli prime ministers repeatedly warned that any change in the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan would be regarded as a cause for war. But with Jordan's participation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, all that changed and Israel no longer considers King Hussein's rule vital for its security.

"General Dayan announced in Tel Aviv [in the winter of 1968] 'We do not care who rules in Amman. We are only interested in quiet along the Jordanian-Israeli border.'"

Francis Olnet, *CSM*, 5 Sep. 1970

"Deputy Premier Yigal Allon has stated that 'the situation may arrive when Israel may have to act.' ... He said Israel had 'special security interests in that area and it must insure them.'"

James Feron, *NYT*, 17 Sep. 1970

The "Allon doctrine" as it is called, reportedly states that "there are liable to be situations in which Israel might be asked to lend assistance to neighboring nations and regimes which seek peace with Israel and which ask help against domestic or foreign insurgents or both."

"Another fear is that Israel will seize the opportunity of civil war in Jordan and bitter dissension within the wider Arab world to launch pre-emptive blows against guerilla positions in Jordan and Lebanon."

*D Telegraph*, 18 Sep. 1970

"Israel moved tank carriers, tanks, armoured cars and troop carriers to Beit Shean, ten miles east of Irbid in Jordan, September 21. Irbid, the Jordanian city overlooking the Jordan River valley which has been captured by Syrian tanks, may become the target of an Israeli assault within days or even hours. 'My failure to take Irbid was the big error of the Six-Day War,' Minister of War Moshe Dayan was quoted several months ago by a French correspondent. A virtual bid to Dayan to correct his 'error' has emerged from the broadcast by retired Maj. Gen. Haim Herzog in his strategy talk to the Israelis last night.

"Irbid is the key to holding the southern bank of the Yarmouk River, main feeder of the Jordan. ... By directing the flow of the Yarmouk River northward into the sea of Galilee rather than allowing it to flow as at present into the Jordan, Israel would gain virtual total control of the Jordan Valley water system."

George Weller, *New York Post*, 22 Sep. 1970

"All Israeli air force units in central and northern areas were today standing by on red alert. The Israelis have told friendly governments that they are not prepared to allow any hostile air force to operate even marginally in Israeli air space and will act accordingly.

"Moreover, General Dayan has emphasized in a statement that any Israeli action in Jordan now 'must not lead King Hussein to assume that the Israelis will do his work for him in dealing with the Palestinians.'"

*E Standard*, 22 Sep. 1970

"*Davar* says that developments during the past few days have proved that a war is being waged in Jordan with the active intervention of foreign troops. This situation obliges Israel to be on the alert owing to the changes of its eastern



border. The paper believes this change in the status quo entitles Israel politically and morally to freedom of action in its own interests."

Israel HS, 22 Sep. 1970

## LONG LIVE KING KHOUSSEIN



Demonstration in Israel

*Al-Muharrir*, 13 Jan. 1971

It is doubtful that Hussein felt threatened by Israel during September. If he did feel some animosity, it was gone by November when he began cooperating with Israeli leaders again on the "peace proposals."

In fact, behind the scenes "more substantive negotiations are under way—and peace in the Middle East may be a few inches closer than it has sometimes seemed. The negotiations grew out of the face-to-face meeting four months ago between Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Allon in a parked automobile on the border between the two nations [during the first week of November]. Since then, subordinates have held as many as half a dozen meetings, out of which have come the outlines of a possible settlement. Jordan will not move publicly before Egypt, of course, but *Time* has learned that these essentials have, very tentatively, been agreed upon."

*Time*, 8 Mar. 1971



